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The real situation of Europe would, then, appear to be this: its
long and splendid past has brought it to a new stage of existence
where everything has increased; but at the same time, the institutions surviving from that past are dwarfed and have become an
obstacle to expansion .

.

. Will she be able to shake off these

survivals, or will she remain forever their prisoner?
-Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses
I.

T

INTRODUCTION

HOUGH CREATION of a European common market has
been a goal since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in
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1957,2 movement toward a single market in commercial air
transport has consumed most of the ensuing half-century.
While economic unification has come relatively easy in many
sectors, creating a single market for air transport has proven to
be a difficult challenge. The history of European commercial
aviation is a colorful mix of national politics and economic policy. Although efforts to achieve regulatory liberalization were
undertaken in the years leading up to the creation of the European Union (EU, or the Union), comparatively little liberalization occurred until the Union was achieved. While historically
the airlines of Europe had been heavily regulated, owned, and/
or subsidized by their governments,3 by the 1980s the European
Community (EC, or the Community) began to move toward liberalization. 4 National governments traditionally shielded their
2 In 1997, the European Union's Member States adopted the Treaty of Amsterdam. Aside from some slight changes in structure of the Union's governance,
the Treaty of Amsterdam renumbered the articles of the Treaty of Rome. However, as the renumbering did not go into effect until 1999, virtually all regulations, decisions, and directives referred to in this paper use the original
numbering system. To avoid confusion, the original numbering has been used
throughout this paper; however, the reader should be aware of these changes.
Below are the relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome mentioned in this paper,
followed by their new numbers tinder the Treaty of Amsterdam. Please see the
Treaty of Amsterdam for a comprehensive guide:
Article 2 = 2, Article 3 = 3, Article 5 = 10, Article 7 = 14, Article 48 =
39, Article 49 = 40, Article 50 = 41, Article 51 = 42, Article 74 = 70,
Article 75 = 71, Article 84 = 80, Article 85 = 81, Article 86 -= 82,
Article 87 = 83, Article 88 = 84, Article 89 = 85, Article 90 = 86,
Article 92 = 87, Article 93 = 88, Article 175 = 232, Article 198 = 262,
Article 229 = 302, Article 234 = 307, and Article 235 = 308.
3 Michael Feazel, New GAT7I Negotiations Could Give Impetus to Airline Deregulation, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 8, 1986, at 58. For an overview of early international negotiations for air rights, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Little Prince and the
Businessman: Conflicts and Tensions in Public International Air Law, 45 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 807 (1980); PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 7-22 (1987).
4 American aviation was also heavily regulated prior to 1978. See PAUL STEPHEN
DEMPSEY & WILLIAM E. THoMs, LAW AND ECONOMIC REGULATION IN TRANSPORTATION 26-29, 121-133 (1986).
Percentage of capital held in 1979 by States in the main European scheduled
airlines was as follows:
Aer Lingus 100%, British Airways 100%, Sabena 100%, Air France
99%, Alitalia 99%, Lufthansa 82%, KLM 78%, Air Inter 50%, and
Luxair 26%.
BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 35 (May 1979) (cited in Comment, Introducing Competition to the European Economic Community Airline Industry, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 364,
365 n.7 (1985)). More recently, a number of European airlines have been partially or wholly privatized. For example, British Airways has been completely
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airlines from the rigors of the marketplace, perceiving the industry to have public utility characteristics. Governments utilized air carriers to promote public policy objectives beyond
allocative efficiency, such as increasing tourism and foreign exchange, augmenting international prestige, enhancing national
security, reducing unemployment, and promoting domestic aircraft manufacturing.5
With the implementation of the EU Council's Third Package
of liberalization in 1993, these positions began to change. National flag carriers now are forced to compete on equal terms,
and are increasingly being run as competitive enterprises. Today, the EU commercial aviation market is well on its way to
becoming a market without state-imposed anticompetitive restrictions.6 Some experts predicted that liberalization would
force unprofitable carriers out of business, into mergers, or into
buyouts.7 Airlines initially responded to liberalization by forming massive alliance structures.8 It remains to be seen whether
these cartels are beneficial for the consumer. 9
privatized, and the Dutch government today holds only an 11% interest in KLM.

See KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

ANNUAL REPORT

1997-98, at 86 (1998).

For historical reference, the following list indicates the levels of government
ownership of the largest European major airlines in 1992:
Air France 100%, Iberia 100%, Olympic 100%, TAP-Air Portugal
100%, JAT-Yugoslav 100%, Aer Lingus 100%, Alitalia 83%, Austrian 76%, Finnair 70%, Sabena 53%, SAS 50%, Lufthansa 48%,
KLM 39%, Swissair 23%, British Airways 0%, and Icelandair 0%.
D. Woerth, International Aviation: Cabotage, Foreign Ownership and International Marketing Alliances Appendix 1, Address at the University of Denver/
Smithsonian Conference on Airlines, Airports and Aviation, Washington, D.C.
(May 28, 1992).
5 Frederik Sorensen, Progress Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy, IATA MAG.,June-July 1985, at 3, 7-8 [hereinafter SORENSEN]; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the "Open Skies ": The Deregulation of InternationalAir
Transport, 15 TRANSP. LJ. 305, 362-63 (1987) [hereinafter TURBULENCE].
6 This new era is easily captured by the following industry statement:
"[e] uropean airlines will face continuing upheaval over the next five years as they
seek to lower costs and improve productivity, bowing to the inevitability of a more
competitive environment where unit costs, employee productivity, good service
and customer loyalty separate the winners from losers." Carole A. Shifrin, Air
Transport,Market Rigors Squeeze EuropeanFlagCarriers,Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar.
14, 1994, at 64.
7 See, e.g., Carole A. Shifrin, 5 Year Outlook: Air Transport, European Airlines to
Enter 21st Century with New Look, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 15, 1993, at 67;
European Deregulation Expected To Lead to Airline Mergers, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Mar. 9, 1987, at 203.
8 See Pierre Sparaco, EuropeanDeregulationStill Lacks Substance,Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53 [hereinafter SUBSTANCE].
9 See id.
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In the short time since the establishment of the EU, true cabotage rights have become a reality." Growth rates of mid-sized
carriers have surpassed that of the larger, national flag carriers. 1 Due to increased competition, landing fees are decreasing, new carriers are entering the market, and carriers are being
forced to improve on-time departures.12 State aid (government
subsidy) is increasingly becoming a historical concept." While
growing pains-particularly with respect to the degree of liberalization-have occurred,14 commercial aviation on the Continent is
drastically different today than it was even in the early 1980s.
Simply stated, the face of European commercial aviation has
already transformed. As the EU moves ever closer to a seamless
union-one without border crossings and tariffs and with a
common currency-the issues confronting the European aviation community are rapidly changing. While cabotage has been
a primary concern for the EU, the focus is increasingly shifting
towards the representation of the EU commercial aviation community as a whole. As the British Airways/American Airlines alliance 5 and the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case 6 both
demonstrate, EU commercial aviation players are realizing the
importance of banding together in an increasingly global aviation marketplace. Without a doubt, this arena is where the next
14 Implemented in 1997.
" SUBSTANCE, supra note 8, at 54 ("[M]id-size independents such as British
Midland, KLM uk, Air Europa, Spanair and Norway's Braathens are growing
faster than national carriers.").
12 Pierre Sparaco, Europe's Regionals Hit Hardest by User Charges,Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 28, 1995, at 52.
IS See, e.g., Pierre Sparaco, Air Transport, Wise Men Reject State-Aid Rescue, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Dec. 13, 1993, at 31.
14 See SUBSTANCE, supra note 8, at 54. Sparaco notes, as is certainly true, that
EU liberalization has much ground to cover before true success can be claimed.
He notes that while EU officials claim such success, "airline fare structures are far
from being revolutionized, dramatic service improvements have not materialized
yet and no major consolidation initiatives are in sight." Id. These are critical
issues that the EU must address. This chapter will confront and assess such critiques and what the EU is doing to solve these problems.
15 See generally G. Porter Elliott, Learning to Fly: The European Commission Enters
UnfamiliarSkies in Its Review of the British Airways-Amen can Airlines Alliance, 64J. AiR
L. & COM. 157 (1998) (examining the alliance in the context of Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome, the European Commission's extraterritorial application of the
EC Competition Rules, and the Merger Regulation of 1989).
16 See generally Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission's Decision
on the Boeing-McDonnellDouglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperationin
the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1029 (1998) (delineating the European Commission's actions and subsequent resolution of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger).
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great European commercial aviation debate will occur. As was
noted in an industry publication, " [t] he EU's ultimate goal is to
support European carriers' efforts to preserve a major role in
the globalized market and allow effective competition against
U.S. giants."' 17 National flag carriers now are forced to compete
on equal terms, and are increasingly being run as competitive
enterprises. Today, the EU commercial aviation market is well
on its way to becoming a market without anticompetitive
restriction.
European aviation policy has always been the product of conflicting and competing legal, economic, and political interests.'"
The principal actors include scores of airlines (many still publicly owned or subsidized),") the European Union, 2 and a number of air transport associations including the Association of
European Airlines (AEA), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and the European Civil Aviation Conference
(ECAC). 2 ' The achievement of any sort of cohesive policy is further complicated by a labyrinth of bilateral air transport agreements, 2 2

old European Community regulations and directives,

2
and an increasingly competitive regional air transport market. 1
After the United States deregulated its domestic air transport
market 24 and began to export its ideology abroad, many observ17 Pierre Sparaco, New CarrierRelationships Create Legal Complexities in Europe,Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 17, 1997, at 61, 62.
18 See generally Break It Up, but Not the American Way, Europe's Air Cartel, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 1986, at 23, 93-107, 241-55 [hereinafter AIR CARTEL].
19Id. at 23. Many European nations are, however, moving toward privatization
of their national airlines. For example, the Thatcher government privatized British Airways. Subsidies are also a major factor in the well being of governmentally
owned airlines. In the early 1990s, the French government provided Air France
with $400 million, the Belgian government gave Sabena $300 million, and the
Italian government gave Alitalia $300 million. DOT Says "HandsOff' Best Approach
to Helping Competition, AVIATION DAILY, Mar. 6, 1992, at 427.
20 The fifteen Member States are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
21 EEC DeregulationProposalBlocked While ECAC Plan Proceeds, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 7, 1986, at 33.
22 See generally Dr.J. Naveau, BilateralismRevisited in Europe, 10 AiR L. 85 (1985);
DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 47-75.
23 Michael Feazel, EEC Officials Draft New Directive to Ease Regional Airline Regulation, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., April 14, 1986, at 37. See also SUBSTANCE, supra note
8, at 53.
24 See PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
DEREGULATION: THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (Quorum Books
ed., 1989).
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ers argued that rigid regulation and pricefixing created inefficient markets and excessively high fares. 5 Capacity controls,2 6
tariff coordination and pricefixing, 27 market access restrictions, 2 and revenue sharing (pooling) agreements29 were
targeted by liberalization proponents. In the 1980s, the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands led the fight for liberalization,
entering into a number of liberal bilateral transport agreements
with other nations.3 0 At the same time, the more conservative
southern European nations, such as France and Greece, advocated a more modest relaxation of the regulatory reins.3 ' New
airlines, such as Ireland's Ryanair, entered the market to take

25 See, e.g., R. AMACHER, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 318-19 (2d ed. 1983).
For an examination of U.S. domestic airline deregulation and its exportation
abroad, see Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics
Board-Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91 (1979), and Paul
Stephen Dempsey, The InternationalRate and Route Revolution in North Atlantic Passenger Transportation,17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1978).
26 Capacity is defined as the total available aircraft seats on given air routes
over a given period, usually expressed in terms of available-seat/kilometers. Capacity controls, which fix the number of seats that airlines from two different
Member States will offer, are concluded in bilateral air transport agreements between nations. Analysis by the Council of Europe, Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of U.S. Deregulation of Air Transport and Its Inferences
for a More Liberal Air Transport Policy in Europe, May 21, 1984, at 79; Commission of the European Communities, CIVIL AVIATION MEMORANDUM No. 2, PROGRESS TOwARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNrrY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 32-33
(1984) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM 2].
27 Governments impose price controls in an effort to guarantee revenues and
enhance the viability and safety of airlines and ensure nondiscrimination among
consumers.
28 Market access restrictions determine which airlines will be granted particular air rights. See Dr. Z. Joseph Gertler, Nationality of Airlines: A Hidden Force in the
InternationalAir Regulation Equation, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 51, 54 (1982).
29 Pooling agreements between airlines equalize the revenue between airlines
based on capacity offered. MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 33. Traditionally,
before liberalization, 70 to 80% of the route-miles performed in Europe had
been subject to pooling agreements. Michael Feazel, ECAC Leaders Expected to Approve Liberalized Regulatory Proposals,Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,June 17, 1985, at 28,
29.
30 Michael Feazel, European Civil Aviation Leaders Commit to Increased Liberalization, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 24, 1985, at 36 [hereinafter INCREASED
LIBERALIZATION].

31 Id. See also British CaledonianReduces AEA Activity in DeregulationDispute, Av.
Oct. 7, 1985, at 36 (discussing attitudes of European airlines

WK. & SPACE TECH.,

toward deregulation)

[hereinafter BRITISH

CALEDONIAN].
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advantage of areas that were amenable to competition. 2 Some
established airlines also advocated increased liberalization."
The EC itself-and then the EU-promulgated a series of comprehensive regulations mandating intra-Community air transport liberalization. This series, known individually as
"packages," culminated in the Third Package, put into effect in
1993. The Third Package brought the EU commercial aviation
market ever closer to true cabotage rights. The Treaty of Rome
established the EC in 1957 for the purpose of enhancing economic efficiency among the western European nations. 4 The
EU was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. 35 On
January 1, 1993, the EU began functional operation and the
power embodied in the Treaty of Rome passed on to the EU.3 6
The Treaty of Rome includes rules intended to promote competition in various economic sectors, including transportation.:
Nevertheless, until the packages were promulgated, for nearly
three decades the EC/EU left aviation outside the mainstream
of European integration.3
The four governing bodies of the EU-the Council, the Commission, Parliament, and the European Court of Justice-share
responsibility to interpret and implement the governing treaties.3 9 The Council, whose members represent the Member
States, is responsible for carrying out the objectives of the EU
through legislative enactments. 4° The Commission, comprised
of nonpartisan members chosen by common agreement by the
Member States, gives recommendations and advisory opinions
to the Council.41 Parliament has the duty of advising the Council on issues relevant to the development of the EU.42 The
Court of Justice interprets the provisions of the Treaty of Rome
'1 Sean D. Barrett, Irish Airline's Model for Deregulation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
1986, at 35.
3- BRITISH CALEDONIAN, supra note 31, at 36.
34 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME]. Salient provisions are set forth
in DEMPSEY, supra note 4, at 451-59.
35 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter TREATY OF MAASTRICHT].
36
37

Id.
TREA'Y OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 3.

38 M. Wouters, Some Aspects of E.C. Law in Relation to the Air Transport Industry I (unpublished address of April 1, 1992) [hereinafter WOUTERS].
3" L. HENKEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1077 (1980) [hereinafter HENKEN].
40 3 Eur. Union L. Rep. (CCH)
4401, 4405 (1987).
41 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4472, 4481 (1987).
42 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4302 (1987).
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and enforces its requirements. 43- Each of these governing bodies
has its own conception of how the competition rules of the
Treaty of Rome should be applied to air transport.
This paper examines the EC/EU's movement toward air
transport liberalization. It begins by identifying the various
commercial air transport organizations in the EU and discusses
their respective positions-historical and current-on liberalization. It proceeds by examining the actions that the member European governments have taken on the subject, and reviews how
these actions foreshadowed multilateral agreements. It discusses the Treaty of Rome's competition rules and their application to the field of air transport. The paper then focuses on the
current structure of the EU. It also reveals how the Single European Act was the catalyst in not only the establishment of the
EU, but also the acceleration towards air transport liberalization. The paper proceeds to review the important Court of Justice cases that circumscribed the zone of application in which
the competition rules can regulate air transport. It next details
how the EU institutions, early on, utilized the Treaty of Rome
and the Court of Justice decisions to develop the foundation for
a unified European transport policy. The paper then moves to a
detailed discussion of what is commonly considered the contemporary environment for commercial air transport regulation-the sequence of 'packages.' The section breaks down the
regulatory environment by sector area-for example, pricing,
market access, state aid, etc. It also considers the relevance of
the EU merger regulations to air transport. In addition, this section discusses EU regulations of non-economic air transport issues. Finally, this chapter looks into the future of EU air
transport and examines the prospectus for further liberalization, paying particular attention to true cabotage and the EU
acting for the European commercial aviation market as a whole.
Table 11.1 describes the primary events that were responsible
for the contemporary regime. Our discussion in this paper also
proceeds chronologically.

43

3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

4600 (1981).

990

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

Table 11.1 - European Community/Union Events Leading to
Air Transport Liberalization1
1944

The International Convention on Civil Aviation signed in
Chicago.

1958

The Rome treaty becomes effective.

1962

February
November

The anti-cartel Regulation (No. 17) becomes effective.
Transport is withdrawn from the scope of application of
Regulation No. 17.

1969

December

End of transition period.

1974'

French merchant seamen's case decided.2 Articles 48-51
applicable to sea transport.

1977-1984

Air Transport deregulation in the USA.

1978

Council establishes priority list of problems to be examined
in air transport-Parliament votes resolution on competition
in air transport.

1979

June
July

First direct election to the European Parliament.
First Memorandum of the Commission on aviation.

1980

Parliament emphasizes the need for a proper application of
Articles 85 and 86 to the air transport industry.
The Sterling Airways complaints against SAS investigated by
the Commission tinder Article 89.

1981

First proposal of the Commission for the application of
Article 85 and 86 to air transport.-

1982

Parliament endorses Commission's proposal - little progress
in Council.

1983

January

July
1984

March, 2""

March, 20"

August
1985

May
June
September

The European Parliament brings action before the European
Court of Justice against the Council for inactivity in the field
of transport.4
Directive on interregional services adopted by Council.
The Tribunal de Police de Paris decides to seize the Court of
Jtstice with the question of the application of Art. 85 to air
transport.'
The Commission presents "Civil aviation Memorandum No.
2" including a proposal on the application of the
competition rules to air transport.
The Nouvelles Frontieres case is laid before the ECJ
(applicability of Art. 85 to air transport).
The Parliament's transport case is decided.6
Commission presents the European Council the White Paper
on the completion of internal market by 1992.
The Advocate General Lenz delivers his opinion in the
Nouvelles Frontieres case.'
Commission proceeds against Member States in the air
transport sector.

43 Otto Lenz, Address at the International
Krumbach, Austria (Sept. 3, 1999).
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January

The Saeed case is led before the ECJ (applicability of Articles
85, 86 and 90 to air transport),8 referring to the opinion of
Advocate General Lenz.
The Single European Act, providing for majority voting on
air transport matters, is signed.
The ECJ decides the Nouvelles Frontieres case: applicability
of Art. 85 to air transport.9

February
April

July 1"
December

The Council reaches agreement in principle on a package of
measures [based on the Commission's proposals of 1984 and
198?] to increase competition in the civil aviation sector (socalled "first package").
The Single European Act enters into force.
The "First Package" is adopted by the Council.

1988

January

First Package becomes effective.

1989

April

The Saeed case is decided." The court confirms the
Nouvelles Frontieres decision as to Art. 85, declares Art. 86
directly applicable and rules on the applicability of Art. 90.
Commission adopts a package of proposals on the second
stage of liberalization of air transport in the Community. 2

1987

June

September

°

1990

July/November

The "Second Package" of air transport regulations enters into
force. ' -

1991

July

1993

January

The Commission proposes the "Third Package" of air
4
transport regulations.
5
The "Third Package" becomes effective.'

Speech by Otto Lenz at the International Law Forum Conference at Krumbach, Austria (Sept.
3, 1999).
'ECR 74/359.
"OJ Nr. C 291 of 12/11/81, p.0004.
4ECR/85/1513 (Parliament's transport case).
5Notivelles Frontieres case).
6 ECR/85/1513.
' ECR/86/1425.
'ECR/89/803.
9ECR/86/1425.
0
OJ Nr. L374/87 of 31.12.87.
"ECR/89/803.
2
1 OJ C 258, 11/10/1989 p. 0003.
" OJ Nr. 217 of August 11, 1990.
14 OJ C 258, 04/10/1991, p. 0002.
5
O'J L 241, 24/08/1992 p. 0001.

II.
A.

THE TREATY OF ROME

OBJECTIVES OF THE ROME TREATY

The EC was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. 44 By
the mid-1980s it consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. With the addition of Spain and Portugal on January 1, 1986, the EC grew to
44 TREATY OF ROME,

supra note 34.

DEMPSEY,

supra note 4, at 241-43.
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twelve member nations.45 In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht was
signed and the EC became the European Union at the end of
that year. 46 By the dawn of the 21st century, the EU had grown
to 15 members, having added Austria, Sweden, and Finland in
January 1995. 4 1 It is widely anticipated that most of the remaining European states will join by 2012.48 The twin goals of the
Union/Community, as described by Peter Sutherland, former
EC Commissioner for Competition, are "the completion of a
genuine, barrier-free internal market and the restoration and
49
enhancement of the competitiveness of European industry.
The Treaty of Rome bound together the nations of Western
Europe for the purpose of creating an economically efficient
market in Europe and restricting anticompetitive behavior on
the part of the Member States.' The objectives of the Treaty of
Rome include harmonious development and expansion of economic activities, increased economic stability, an improved standard of living, and closer relations between the Member
States. 5 ' To accomplish its goals, Article 3(e) of the Treaty of
Rome directs
the EC/EU to adopt, inter alia, a common trans52
port policy.

The Treaty of Rome has essentially become the Constitution
of the European Union.5

1

Consequently, community law, in-

45 H.A. Wassenbergh, Regulatory Reform-A Challenge to Inter-Governmental Civil
Aviation Conferences, 11 AIR L. 31, 40 n.26 (1986). Originally, only six nations
(France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg)
joined to form the European Economic Community (EEC), later renamed the
European Community (EC). On January 1, 1973, the original six became nine,
with the addition of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Greecejoined
in 1981. West Germany annexed East Germany in 1990. Turkey, Austria, Malta
and Cyprus all have applied for membership. However, attempts to integrate the
EC within its 1992 target put expanded membership on hold.
41 TREAiY OF MAASTR[CHT, supra note 35.
47 THE WORLD ALMANAC 866 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1998).
48 Projections for membership:
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland may be admitted as
early as 2003. By 2007: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. By 2012:
Bulgaria and Romania. Probably after 2012: Croatia (which has not
completed its application) and Turkey.
Who Will join Europe's Club - and When?, ECONOMIST, April 8, 2000, at 53.
4, Peter D. Sutherland, The Competition Policy of the European Community, 30 Sr.
Louis U.LJ. 149, 149 (1985) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND].
50 TREAlY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 3.
51 Id. at art. 2.
52 [d. at art. 3(e).
5- See SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, at 149.
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cluding competition law, takes precedence over the law of the
individual Member States, and the governments of those states
must bring their laws into conformity with the mandates and
decisions of the EU ministers and the decisions of the Court of
Justice.54 The Treaty of Maastricht, in providing for a Union,
also provided for a common currency, known as the Euro, which
was inaugurated on January 1, 1999. In 1997, the EU took another step towards greater cohesion when its Member States
signed the Treaty of Amsterdam. 5 The Treaty of Amsterdam
expanded EU citizen rights, increased freedom of movement,
and increased freedom of employment.56 At the dawn of the
21st Century, the EU was embarking on Agenda 2000, which endeavored to enlarge and strengthen the Union by admitting
countries from central and eastern Europe into the EU.57
B.

COMMON TRANSPORT POLICY

The Treaty of Rome was enacted with the presumption that
"national economies can be unified only if there is an efficient
system for moving people and goods.""8 The importance of
transport in Europe is evidenced by the fact that the industry
accounts for more than 7% of Europe's gross national product,
(GNP) for approximately 7% of total employment, for 40% of
Member States' investment, and 30% of Community energy consumption, and has shown almost continuous growth for the past
54 Id.; Don't TakeEuropa to Brussels, They Cry, ECONOMisT, Nov. 8, 1986. [hereinafter DON'T TAKE EUROPA]. National courts of Member States may be used to
enforce the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome, and this route is being encouraged by the Commission to reduce its increasing workload. Only national
courts may award damages in private litigation for injuries suffered through infringement of Articles 85 and 86. CompareTREATry OF ROME, supra note 34, at art.
177; 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4656 (preliminary rulings by Court of Justice), with TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 183; 3 European L. Rep. (CCH)
4575 (jurisdiction of national courts).
55 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREA-rv OF AMSTERDAM].
56 European Union, The ABC of the European Union, at http://europa.eu.int/
abc-en.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 1999).
57 European Union, Agenda 2000 - For a Stronger and Wider Union, at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/overview/en/agenda.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 1999).
58 Anastassopoulos, Report Drawn Up on Behalf of the Committee of Transport on the judgment of the Court of Justice on the Common Transport Policy
and the Council's Obligation in Relation Thereto, EUR. PARL. Doc. (A 2-84/85/
B) 15 (1985) [hereinafter REPORT].
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20 years.5 9 The draftsmen of the Treaty of Rome were cognizant
of the integrating function of transport as well as its unique
problems. Thus, they gave special consideration to air transport
under the Treaty of Rome. A major consideration was the coordination of sovereign rights both inside and outside the boundaries of the EC."
The importance of transportation in the overall scheme of the
European Community was underscored by separate provisions
in the Treaty of Rome for a common transport policy." Nevertheless, in 1962, when the Council adopted Regulation 17
(which implemented Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome),
it specifically exempted transportation from its application. 2
The solicitude for transportation arose, to a significant extent,
because of longstanding bilateral and multilateral agreements
among Member States. These agreements concerned international airline coordination that already existed at the adoption
of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, such as the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation of 1944, and the multitude of
bilateral air transport agreements between European nations. 3
The draftsmen of the Treaty of Rome were unable to design a
policy to benefit the EC while maintaining the integrity of extraEC treaties. 4 Consequently, air transport policy made little
headway during the EC's first two decades, since most European
governments were satisfied with the status quo. 5
A common transport policy for rail, roads, and inland waterways was adopted in 1968."" Special consideration was given air
transportation in Article 84(2), which provided: "The Council
may, acting [unanimously,] decide whether, to what extent and
by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for

51, European Union, Transport Services: Current Position and Outlook, at http://
europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/vb/124040.htm (last visited February 2, 2000).
6) EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 469) 14 (1980).

1812 (1974).
61 Common Transport Policy, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
62 N. Argyris, The EEC Rules of Competition and the Air Transport Sector, 26 CoMMON MKT. L. REV. 5, 6 (1989) [hereinafter ARGVRIS].
63 See TURBULENCE, supra note 5, at 307-08, 314-18, 325-42.
1945.05 (1974) ("[w]ith respect to transport
64 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
by sea and air, Article 84(2) makes the applicability of the Title 'Transport' dependent upon a unanimous Council decision").
65 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 3.
66 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 245; Council Regulation 1017/68, 1968 O.J. (L
241) 10.
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sea and air transport."6 7 A formal policy for sea transport was
not adopted until 1986.8

In view of the widely perceived shortcomings in the EC's approach to air transport policies and procedures, it was to be expected that the debate would turn to the general Competition
provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 69 The
applicability of these rules to air transport within the EC/EU has
been a central issue since the mid-1970s. 70 While it was concluded that the competition rules would, indeed, be applied to
air transport, the question was where, when, and how. 71 As we
shall see later in this paper, even though the European Court of
Justice declared in the 1986 Nouvelles Frontierescase that the competition rules applied to air transport, significant questions remained unanswered.72
C.

COMPETITION RULES

Competition was intended to play an essential role in achieving the objectives of the EC.73 In order to diminish barriers to
the free flow of commerce, the draftsmen included Articles 85
and 86 in the Treaty of Rome, prohibiting anticompetitive activities.74 The Commission declared that competition is the best
motivator of economic activity and is essential for the improvement of living standards and employment prospects. 75 As a basic policy issue, Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome incorporates the
goal of efficient economic integration of the Community.7" Article 3(f) directs the implementation of a system assuring that7
competition will not be distorted within the Common Market.1
67 TRFAVi'y OF ROME, supra note 34, at art.

84(2).

- Council Regulation 4056/86, 1986 OJ. (L 378) 4.
69DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 245.
7) TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 85, 86.
71 WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 55-56.
72

Id. at 56.

73 DEMPSEY,

supra note 3, at 242.

74 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 85, 86.
75 P. S. R. F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE
1985) [hereinafter MATHIJSEN].
76 TREATY OF ROME,

77 Id. at art. 3.

TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw

167 (4th ed.

supra note 34, at art. 2.

Activities in Article 3 which are pertinent to competition

include:
(e) the inauguration of a common transport policy;
(f) the establishment of a system ensuring the competition shall
not be distorted in the Common Market;
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The competition rules generally aim at preventing the introduction of obstacles to free trade. Still, this does not mean that
Union policy on competition is basically restrictive. Indeed, cooperation among enterprises is permitted and even encouraged
where the effect is to promote competition both inside and
outside of the Union. 8 The primary thrust of the competition
79
laws of the EU is to maintain a "beneficial, unified economy.
Unlike the United States, EU competition laws are aimed only at
anticompetitive practices that produce abusive, harmful effects
in the marketplace. S°
The Commission may exercise considerable discretion in enforcing the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome.8 ' Articles
85 and 86 are administered by the Commission as set forth in
Regulation 17.82 Under Regulation 17, the Commission may
grant "negative clearances," declaring agreements not to be violative of Articles 85 and 86. Pursuant to Article 85(3), it may
grant exemptions from the applicability of Article 85(1). Upon
application of Member States, natural or legal persons, or upon
its own motion, the Commission may take steps to put an end to
violations, conduct investigations, and levy fines and penalties.83
1. Article 85
Article 85(1) prohibits as "incompatible with the common
market; all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and any concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market. ... . In order to fall
(g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to
co-ordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy
disequilibria in their balances of payments.
(h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market.
Id.; see also MATHISEN, supra note 75, at 179.
78 MATIIIJSEN, supra note 75, at 168.
7:, DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 241-55.
80 Id.

81 Id. at 242.
82 MATHJSEN, supra note

75, at 181.

83 Id. at 182-83.
84 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 85(1). Article 85 (1) "in particular"
prohibits practices which, aside from satisfying the other criteria, consist of:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of
any other trading conditions;
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within the prescriptions, agreements having proscribed objects
need not be cast in the form of a legally binding contract.85
Such an agreement within Article 85(1) may be written or oral,
and may be inferred from the circumstances, and may consist
merely of an informal and nonbinding combination to restrict
competition. 6 If such a binding agreement exists, a violation
has occurred even if it is not implemented. A violation of the
Treaty of Rome may also be found if informal agreements are
followed by certain practices. Impermissible binding agreements or practices may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including behavior having an anticompetitive effect.87
However, an anticompetitive effect alone, such as a parallel
price increase, does not establish the existence of a prohibited
agreement. Rather, such conduct may be the result of independent decisions or other factors not reflecting violations of the
competition rules.8 8
The competition rules apply only to practices that affect trade
among Member States.89 In an agreement between a Member
State and a non-EU nation, anticompetitive provisions would
not be prohibited unless those provisions had an anticompetitive object or effect within the EU.90 "An agreement 'may' affect
trade when it 'is capable of constituting a threat, either direct or
indirect, actual or potential, to freedom of trade between Member States in a manner which might harm the attainment of the
objectives of a single market between States.' """ It should be
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or investment;
(c) Market-sharing or the sharing of sources supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in
respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies, which, either by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
Id.
85 CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM
PETITION
86 Id.

D.

CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COM-

49 (3d ed. 1987).

supra note 75, at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
89 Id. at 172.
90 Id. at 172-74.
91 Id. at 172 (quoting from Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Consten & Grundig v.
Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, at 341).
87 MATHIJSEN,
88
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noted that, because the prohibitions extend to agreements that
"affect" trade, even agreements that have the effect of increasing
the volume of trade or which do not involve imports or exports
may be prohibited.12 The European Court of Justice has indicated that in order to constitute an impermissible "distorting,"
competition "must be prevented, restricted or distorted to an
appreciableextent."'' 3 In summary, in order to fall within the prohibition of Article 85(1), an agreement must (1) consist of an
agreement or concerted practice between undertakings, (2) distort, prevent or restrict competition,9 4(3) within the European
Union, (4) to an appreciable extent.
Under Article 85(2), any agreements or decisions prohibited
by the Treaty of Rome are automatically void.9 5 With respect to
entire agreements, however, only those clauses or provisions
found to be in violation are void; the remainder of the agreements may remain in effect.96

92 MATHIJSEN, supra note

75, at 172 n.17, 174-75.
Id. at 173 (emphasis in original). Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere v.
Maschinenbau Ulm 1966 E.C.R. 235; Case 5/69, Volk v. Vervaeke, 1969 E.C.R.
295; Case 22/71, Beguelin Import v. GL Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949.
N The "appreciable extent" requirement was deemed of such importance that
on May 27, 1970, the Commission issued a "Notice of Agreements of Minor Importance," known as the De Minimus Rule, which gives further guidance as to
when the effect of an agreement on the European Community can be considered
too weak for Article 85 (1) to apply. However, the notice is only for guidance and
is not binding on national courts of the European Court ofJustice. In practice,
the De Minimus Rule means that the Commission need not be notified of agreements where (1) the turnover of the participating undertakings does not exceed
200 million ECU, and (2) the goods or services which are the subject of the
agreement together with their substitutable products or services, in that part of
the market where the agreement has its effect, do not represent more than 5% of
the total market. The Rule has since been updated, most recently on September
3, 1986. Oddly, the threshold requirements of the De Minimus Rule do not coincide with those of the Merger Regulations. In order to have Community dimension under the Merger Regulations, the parties (undertakings) to the merger
must have (1) worldwide turnover of 5 billion ECUs, (2) they must have an European Community turnover of 250 million ECUs, or (3) they must obtain twothirds of their turnover within a single member state. With the coming into force
of the Merger Regulations, mergers need not proceed toward notification directly under Articles 85 and 86, but under the Merger Regulation itself.
93

MATIIJSEN, sufra note 75, at 175.
96 Id. at 173. Exceptions of the "automatically void" provision exist for agree95

ments executed before March 13, 1962, when Regulation 17, the first regulation
implementing Articles 85 and 86, was enacted. Id. at 175. However, even the socalled "old" agreements may be voided if found to be in violation of the Treaty.
Id. at 175-76.
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The Commission may grant declarations of inapplicability of
the operation of Article

8 5 (l).97

The Commission may grant

negative clearances, declaring that the agreement does not distort, prevent or restrict competition, and therefore does not fall
under the definition of Article 85(1). If negative clearance is
not given because the Commission is of the opinion that the
agreement does prevent, restrict or distort competition under
the definition of Article 85(1), the Commission may still grant
an exemption under Article 85(3), but only after the Commission has been notified and the four conditions specified in Article 85(3) are satisfied as follows:
(1) The agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical and
economic progress,
(2) consumers must get a fair share of the resulting benefit,
(3) the agreement may not impose restrictions which are not indispensable for the objectives under (1) and (2), and
(4) the agreement may not afford the parties the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of
the products in question.9"
2.

Article 86

Article 86 addresses the abuse of market position within and
affecting the internal market.9 9 As the Commission and the
Court have applied the foregoing rules, the following main types
of agreements have been found likely to be prohibited: "(a)
agreements relating to prices and conditions of sale; (b) limitations on markets and productions; (c) agreements whereby a
vendor agrees not to compete within the market of the purchaser; (d) exclusive dealing agreements such as supply agreements; collective exclusive dealings; and (e) joint purchasing
and joint selling agreements."' 01 1
Practices such as tariff agreements, pooling agreements, and
capacity and territorial restrictions raise questions under Article
97 Id. at 176. The Council gave the Commission the power to look into agreements between companies with the promulgation of Regulation 17. The Commission can take agreements into consideration upon the request of the
contracting parties, most commonly upon notification by them, or less commonly, upon notification by a competitor.
'1 See TREATY OF RoME, supra note 34, at art. 85(3).
99 Id. at art. 86.
100 MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 177-78; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art.
85(3). See generally ARG'RIS, supra note 62, at 9.
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85 even under the most liberal of bilateral agreements. Both
Council and Commission Regulations have been promulgated
to define Article 85(3)'s application to aviation. Council Regulation 3976/87 gave the Commission the power to implement
Article 85(3), which the Commission did in Commission Regulation 2671/88. The Council Regulation runs parallel to Council
Regulation No. 17, in which the Commission received the power
from the Council to issue exemptions under Article 85(3).
However, since air transport was excluded from Council Regulation No. 17, Council Regulation 3976/87 gave no power to the
Commission to exempt agreements under Article 85(3) for
agreements regarding some aspects of air transport. For example, the Commission was given power only for regulation of air
transportation between community airports. The Commission
was only allowed to grant exemptions to certain agreements:
those that have as their objective (1) joint planning of capacity
to assure the spread of service at non-peak periods, (2) revenue
sharing not to exceed one percent, (3) certain tariff consultations, (4) slot allocation and scheduling, (5) computer reservations systems, (6) ground handling, (7) interlining, or (8)
catering, all within certain specific restrictions. The Commission Regulation permits "consultations" between airlines to prepare joint tariff proposals subject to the approval of the
aeronautical authorities of the Member States, provided inter
alia that participation in the consultations is (1) voluntary (2)
open to any carrier that operates or proposes to operate on the
route in question (3) the resulting tariff is not binding (thereby
preserving the carriers' right of independent action), and 4)
does not discriminate on the basis of the passengers' nationality
or residence, and that discussions not include capacity or agent

remuneration issues.""
Article 86, which complements Article 85, forbids abuse of a
dominant position enjoyed individually or collectively by a
group of undertakings.0 2 The concept of "dominant position"
I' Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 9. Commission Regulation 2761/88 expired on January 31, 1991, and has been replaced by Commission Regulation 84/91, 1990 OJ. (L 10) 14.
1)2 MATI*IJSEN, supra note 75, at 179. Article 86 states that prohibitions are
aimed at abuse of a dominant position "within the Common Market or within a
substantial part of it" which affects trade between Member States. TREATY OF
ROME, supra note 34, at art. 86; see also 2 European Union L. Rep. (CCH)
2101
(abuse of dominant position). The Article goes on to state:
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
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indicates a position of economic strength allowing the possessor
to "behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of the consumers." ' 3 Dominance is the power to hinder effective competition, to behave
independently of the market. 104 Whether an undertaking or
group of undertakings enjoys such a position must be established in view of relevant product and geographic markets, the
market share possessed therein,0 5 and the likelihood of actual6
10
or potential entry eroding the position of the dominant firm.
Although the dominant position must be over a substantial portion of the Common Market, the territory of a single Member
State arguably could be sufficient for Article 86 to apply. Most
European national airlines hold dominant positions in their
own countries. 17 However, dominance is established not by size
alone, but as noted above, by considering a number of factors. 08
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or
selling prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in
respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of additional supplies which, either by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contract.
TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 86. Compare these latter "in particular"
provisions with those in Article 85(1), supra note 84.
103 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461; Case 85/76, Hoffman La Roche v. Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R.461; Case 27/76, United Brands v.
Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207 (dominance consists of "a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors."); MATHUIJSEN, supranote 75,
at 179-80; DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248; C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 8-004 (3d ed. 1987).
104 BELLAMY & CHILD, supra note 103, at 8-004.
105 "IT]he view may legitimately be taken that very large shares are in themselves, and save exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position. An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it
for some time ... is by virtue of that share in a position of strength." Comm'n v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Case 95/76, 1970 E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 CLMR 211.
106 Id.; MATHIJSEN, supra note 75, at 180-81, DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248.
107 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248.
108 MATHUSEN, supra note 75, at 181.
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The concept of "abuse" of a dominant position refers to an
adverse impact on competition.""' Any activity that "interferes
with one of the basic freedoms or the free choice of purchasers
or consumers or freedom of access to business, must be viewed
as limiting competition and therefore as an 'abuse.'"'"' The

methods employed to affect competition are irrelevant. Activities that are "detrimental to production or sales, to purchasers
or consumers, and changes to the structure of an undertaking
which lead to competition being seriously disturbed in a substantial part of the common market are prohibited by Article
86."11' The mere existence of a monopoly does not establish a

violation of Article 86; rather, only practices detrimental to con12
sumers and the economy bring the proscriptions into play.'
3. DistinguishingArticles 85 and 86
In distinguishing Articles 85 and 86, it is important to note
that unlike Article 85, Article 86 does not provide for exemptions.113 Under Article 2 of Regulation 17, the Commission may
grant a "negative clearance," which merely certifies that because
it perceives no violation, the Commission sees no reason to proceed against the entities involved." 14 However, this does not
confer "absolute immunity"; the Commission still reserves the
power to determine subsequently
that a violation exists and to
15
proceed with enforcement.'
As noted above, while Article 86 prohibits abuse of monopoly
power, the mere existence of the monopoly is not prohibited. 116
Rather, a violation consists of the use of monopoly power in a
manner injurious to consumers-an abuse of market position.
A national airline might be held to occupy a sufficiently dominant position over a large enough part of the Common Market
(its own country) to bring the provisions of Article 86 into
play.1 7 Price-fixing and capacity-limitation agreements by firms
in monopoly positions might be held to be violations of Article
io)9Id.
11o Id.
-I' Id. at 179.
11 DEMPSEY, sup)ra note 3, at 248.
H3 Id.
114 Id. at 249, n.61.
11-5Id. at 249; see also Unlawful Practices by Dominant Concerns, Application of
Article 86, 2 Common Mkt, Rep. (CCH)
2111 (1978) (CCH Explanation).
ii" DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 248.
117 Id.
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86.118 Therefore, an argument could be made that airline faresetting and capacity limitations and other agreements and practices violate Article 85 absent a Commission regulation permitting such practices.
Direct application of the competition rules could have resulted in the prohibition of many European airline practices
under both Articles 85 and 86. Indeed, the Commission
threatened to (and subsequently did) take action on its own if
the Council failed to act on a common air transport policy.' 9
An understanding of the competition rules as they affect air
transport requires further review of the governing institutions of
the EU and the actions they have taken in response to air transport issues.
The drafters of the Treaty of Rome also recognized the market harm of state financial assistance to business otherwise
known as "state aid" or government subsidies. Embodied within
Article 92, the Treaty of Rome prohibits all state aid to firms
unless such aid fits certain narrow provisions. These provisions
generally focus upon social, humanitarian, disaster relief, or cultural aid.1
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In practice, the prohibition of state aid in commer-

cial aviation has only really gained force since the late 1980s.
Until that time, the Council ignored violations under the guise
that it could not regulate air transport. Article 92 played a
prominent role as liberalization emerged and the Council became more aggressive in enforcing Articles 85 and 86 with respect to air transport. Arguably, the turning point in the
competitiveness of the European commercial aviation market
turned on the Council's determined stance of reducing the influence of state-aid. 121

III.

INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
A.

INTRODUCTION

The institutions of the Treaty of Rome were created to ensure
proper compliance and implementation of its provisions. 122
118

Id.

I " Id. at 250.
ROME, supra note 34, at art. 92.
See generally Carole Shifrin, Air Transport Market Rigors Squeeze European Flag
Carriers,Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1994.
122 HENKEN, supra note 39, at 1077.
120 TREATY OF
121
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The four governing bodies of the EU-the Council, the Commission, Parliament, and the European Court of Justice-have
devoted considerable attention to the question of how the
Treaty of Rome should be applied to air transport. The Council
consists essentially of representatives of the member governments. Most EU states originally owned or subsidized their airlines, and therefore, resisted liberalization. The Commission is
essentially the secretariat or bureaucracy of the EU government.
Its mission is to facilitate implementation of the Treaty of Rome,
whose principal purpose is to create a unified economic union
of free trade within Western Europe. The Commission sought
liberalization, and proposed several texts to implement it (the
so-called "Memoranda"). But the Commission only has the
power to propose law to the Council, and may act only after the
Council gives it power to act. At first, the Council resisted the
proposals of the Commission. However, the Court of Justice issued several opinions that suggested the Council had a duty to
act in the area of air transport, and that if it failed to do so, some
of the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome might essentially become self-executing. With this prodding, the Council did finally adopt several of the Commission's proposals and
made them law (the so-called "packages"). Let us examine the
conflict and cooperation between these super-governmental
units in greater detail.
B.

FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNIONTHE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

An analysis of the functions and activities of the EU governing
bodies would not be complete without an understanding of a
major motivating force within the EU-the goal of a unified internal market, which was legislatively in place by 1992.123 The
Single European Act (SEA), which entered into force in July
1987, was intended to facilitate and compel the creation of the
Union. As we shall see, the SEA provision allowing majority voting may have moved the Council to action on air transport.
This provision replaced the previous requirement of unanimity
24
in Council decisions. '

123 Creation of Internal Market, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 202.07 (1978)
(CCH Explanation); They've Designed the Future, and It MightJust Work, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 13, 1988, at 45-48; Thompson, EC92, NATION'S BUSINESS, June 1989, at 18.
124 Single European Act, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
101.15 (1978) (CCH
Explanation).
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The attainment of a bona fide internal market in all economic
sectors, including aviation, requires not only the removal of
trade barriers, but also a "fusion of the members into a single
economic area ...

extended to include freedom of movement

of workers, the right of establishment, the free movement of services and capital, and a common transport policy."'1 25 The Com-

mission assumed a prominent role in urging and planning for
the eventuality of this economic and political unification. 12 6 In
1984, the Commission called attention to a marked slowdown in
the progress toward the internal market throughout the 1970s.
The Commission proposed the creation of a comprehensive
127
program for the achievement of a genuine internal market.
The program included not only the simplification of procedures
as intra-Community frontiers, but also the complete abolition of
procedural formalities at the borders.128 The Commission also
stated that the internal market would be incomplete unless citizens of the European Community could reside
in other Member
29
justification.1
economic
States-even without
In June 1985, the Commission revealed a "White Paper," a
major proposal for progress toward an internal market. 30 This
set of specific, detailed proposals was submitted for consideration at the Council's Milan meeting. Reciting the Community's
recognized need for an internal market, the Commission indicated that a definite target date and detailed plans had been
missing and were needed. As a result of its deliberations, the
Commission set the "bold target" of completion of the internal
market by 1992.' 1'
Creation of Internal Market, supra note 123, at 202.07.
See Proposals Aim to Strengthen the Community's Internal Market, [19821985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,415 (1982) (information
memorandum from the Commission, June 1982); Commission Submits Program
for the Consolidation of the Internal Market, [1982-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,595 (1984) (information memorandum from the
Commission, June 1984) [hereinafter COMMISSION SUBMITS PROGRAM].
127 COMMISSION SUBMITS PROGRAM, supra note 126,
10,595.
125

126

128
129

Id.
Id.

130Completion of the Internal Market Sought by 1992, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH)
10,693 (1985) (information memorandum from the Commission,June
1985).
13'Id. In the bulletin announcing the White Paper, the Commission recited
the need for removal of barriers in numerous sectors of the Community and,
among other matters, called for encouragement of industrial cooperation and
the removal of disruptive taxation schemes as well as the free movement of goods
and services. The Commission noted that removal of barriers to the flow of ser-
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The Council meeting in Milan, for which the White Paper was
prepared, was the juncture at which firm Community efforts
commenced toward the creation and implementation of the Single European Act. 132 Ultimately, the signatories of the SEA
agreed to the target date of December 31, 1992. ' ,3'
The SEA grew out of efforts initiated by the European Council to advance the European Community toward a European
Union.'13 4 In response to the European Council's Solemn Declaration at Stuttgart in June 1983, the first draft of the treaty was
presented in February 1984. The Act was signed by representatives of the then twelve Member States on February 4, 1986, but
did not take effect until July 1, 1987, after ratification by all
Member States.' 35 The majority of the SEA's provisions were
amendments to the Treaty of Rome or new provisions to be added to it.'3 6 The SEA sought to create a genuine internal market in which the remaining barriers to free movement of goods,
persons, services,and capital were removed. 13 7 To almost every
extent, the Union has become successful in this regard. In signing the SEA, the Member States committed themselves to establish an internal market by December 31, 1992, although this was
in reality only a statement of political intent at the time.'
The SEA made a number of institutional changes in the operation of the EC. The role of the European Parliament was expanded, and it was granted some degree of control over Council
decisions. The role of the Commission was also expanded and
vices had proceeded more slowly than for goods, but reaffirmed and explained
the importance of service industries. Service industries included "traditional" areas such as "banking, insurance, and transport."
132 Single European Act a Milestone on the Road Toward a European Union, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,812 (1986) (CCH Comment) [hereinafter
MILESTONE].

Single European Act, supra note 125, at
101.15.
13,Id. The European Council grew out of previously unsuccessful meetings of
Heads of State and Government, starting in 1972, intended to solve economic,
social, and political problems. At the original meetings in 1972 it was decided to
pursue the goal of attaining a European Union that would govern all relations
between the Member States by 1980. This goal was confirmed at the Paris Summit in December 1974. At that time, it was formally decided to conduct such
meetings three times a year and as otherwise necessary. These meetings were to
constitute the European Council, and their purpose was to pursue solutions to
the problems the ordinary Council could not solve. European Union, 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
101.13 (1978) (CCH Explanation).
135 Single European Act, supra note 124, at
101.15.
1'36 MILESTONE, supra note 132, at
10,812.
137 Single European Act, supra note 124, at
101.15.
138 Id.; MILESTONE, supra note 132, at
10,812.
133
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changed, particularly in regard to its interaction with the Parliament. The Council was allowed, at the request of the Court of
Justice, to set up a court to hear, among other matters, appeals
brought from Commission decisions on competition. 3 '
A major barrier to the establishment of an internal market
was the right of veto that every country maintained.1 40 The right
to veto (the so-called Luxembourg compromise) was extracted
by the French in 1966 in order to terminate General De Gaulle's
"empty-chair" period, a boycott maintained to defend French
sovereignty.' 4 ' The SEA made no provision for this right, under
which, if a Member State declared a Council decision to be adverse to its vital national interests, and if enough other Members
agreed (which they usually did), then the veto could not be outvoted. 14 2 Nonetheless, this opportunity was significantly diluted
by the replacement of unanimous voting with qualified majority
(54 votes out of 76) and weighted voting (the larger nations
have 10 votes; the smallest has two) on a number of subjects,
including development of a common transport policy. 4 ' Thus,
the Council can now act by a qualified majority in deciding
"whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate
144
provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport."
Two years after issuing the White Paper, the Commission
stated that in a second annual report "[t]he Community must
do better" in order to achieve an internal market by 1992. The
Commission acknowledged numerous failures in itself, the
Council, and Parliament to keep up with workloads, but looked
with optimism to the improved decision making to be implemented through the Single European Act. The Commission
stressed the importance of cooperative and expeditious involvement by officials of member governments and the necessity of
not letting "national and sectorial interests take over."' 145 In
these movements toward an internal market, the Commission
recognized the importance of a unified transport policy. ConMILESTONE, supra note 132, at
10,812.
DON'T TAKE EUROPA, supra note 54, at 55; MILESTONE, supra note 132, at
10,812.
141 DON'T TAKE EUROPA, supra note 54, at 55.
142 Id. The article adds that "[t]he veto power is often abused." Id.; see also
MILESTONE, supra note 132, at
10,812.
143 Id.; Single European Act, supra note 124, at
101.15
144 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 84; WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 2.
145 Faster Rate of Progress in the Completion of the Internal Market Needed, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,882 (1987) (information memo from the Commission, May 1987).
139

140
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sidering the significance of commercial aviation in the transportation infrastructure, initiatives directed toward liberalized
competition and flexibility assumed critical importance and focus in the mid to late 1990s.
C.

PARLIAMENT

Meeting alternatively in Strasbourg, France, and Brussels,
Belgium, the EU Parliament comprises more than 600 members' 4 6 who are elected directly by the citizens of Member

States.' 47 Parliament's members are expected to act for the benefit of the entire European Union, rather than on behalf of
their respective governments. 14 1 Parliament has the duty of advising the Council
on issues of importance to the development
49
EU.'
the
of
As a matter of procedure, the Commission issues recommendations to the Council that are subsequently referred to Parliament for further comment and recommendation. Parliament
generally comments on the potential legal and political implications of the proposed regulation. 5 ' However, under the Treaty
of Maastricht, Parliament gained more legislative power, and
now shares "co-decision-making" powers with the Council in cer51
tain substantive areas.'
D.

THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

Sitting in Luxembourg, the European Court ofJustice is composed of fifteen judges who are appointed for terms of six years
by "common accord" of the Member States.' 52 Also appointed

by the Member States for similar terms are nine advocates general who in turn "deliver, in open court and with complete impartiality and independence, opinions on the cases brought
before the Court." 53 As the highest court in the Union, the
146The European Parliament, European Parliament Overview - History, available
at http://www.europarl.eu.int/presentation/defaulten.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2001). In 1999, Parliament had 626 members.
147 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4306 (1987).
148 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4302 (1987).
149 Id.
150See generally id.
151 The European Parliament, European ParliamentOverview - History, available
at http://www.europarl.eu.int/presentation/default-en.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2001).
152 The European Court of Justice, Composition and Organization, available at
http://curia.eu.int/en/pres/co.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 1999).
153

Id.
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Court of Justice renders decisions on the application to Member
States. The Court54 interprets and enforces the provisions of the

Treaty of Rome. 1

Several problems arise when the Court interprets the Treaty
of Rome and, in effect, changes Union policy in the absence of
governing regulations promulgated by the Council. In such situations, Member States must administer competition laws without guidance of regulations. Consequently, in the past, laws
have not always been applied with uniformity, because the individual states have been somewhat free to interpret them as they
please. Furthermore, in the past, competition laws have been
invoked only when convenient or acceptable to individual states,
thereby only marginally stimulating competition. 5 5 The historically inconsistent application of the competition laws was certainly adverse to one purpose of the Treaty of Rome-to
1 56
promote an economic and harmonious transport system.
Moreover, a decision applying the competition laws in the airline industry interfered with the Council's authority to adopt of1 57
ficial policy for the economic harmonization of air transport.
The Court did, however, render decisions of great importance
that held the competition laws of the Treaty of Rome applicable
to air transport, and that the Council has a duty under the
Treaty of Rome to formulate a coordinated transport policy for
the EU. These decisions will be examined further on in this
paper.
E.

THE COMMISSION

Headquartered in Brussels, the EU Commission is a nonpartisan body comprising of 20 commissioners (two each from
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, and
one each from the other Member States) appointed for fouryear terms by the common agreement of the Member States.
The Commission works closely with the Council, but acts independently of the Council and Member States.15

The Commis-

sion's duties are primarily executive in nature-to oversee EU
development and to ensure that the development conforms to
the Treaty of Rome. To fulfill its role, the Commission issues
3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 4600 (1981).
Letter from Knut Hammarskjold, Director-General of the LATA (source on
file with author).
156 See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 74-84.
154

155

157

Id. at art. 84(2).

158

3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

4472, 4482 (1987).
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recommendations and advisory opinions to the Council for the
consideration and adoption of regulations."5 9 The Commission
has specific and critically important jurisdiction over issues surrounding the infringement of the Treaty of Rome's competition
laws. 160
F.

THE COUNCIL

The Council, which meets in Brussels and Luxembourg, includes one representative appointed from each of the Member
States who directly represent their State's interests.' 6' The
Council has both legislative and executive powers 62 and is responsible for carrying out the objectives of the Union and coordinating the economic policies of Member States.16 The
Council can issue recommendations that are not binding on
Member States, 164 or it can issue decisions, directives, and regulations that are binding. 6 The Council adopts regulations
based upon recommendations and advisory opinions from the
Commission or Parliament.16
IV. JURISDICTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO
REGULATE AIR TRANSPORTATION: DECISIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
A.

INTRODUCTION

During the 1970s and 1980s, the European Court of Justice
delivered a series of decisions that mapped out the fundamental
legal underpinnings of EC/EU regulation of air transport. Until these cases clarified the law, it was unclear whether the Commission and Council had jurisdiction under the Treaty of Rome
to regulate air transport. As the Court delineated, the Commission and Council did indeed have such power. Through these
cases, the Court detailed the structural extent of air transport
regulatory power, and constructed a framework in which the
Commission and Council could proceed with liberalization.
1593 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
4472 (1987).
160 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 89. Article 89 gives the Commission

investigatory powers.
3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
supra note 39, at 1078.
163 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
164 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
165 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
16 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
161

4406.02 (1978).

162 HENKEN,

4402.04 (1978).
4902.31 (1976).
4902.15, 4902.25 (1976).
4402 (1987).
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THE FRENCH SEAMEN'S CASE

Prior to the adoption of the SEA, Article 84(2) of the Treaty
of Rome provided that "[t] he Council may, acting unanimously,
decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport." This
provision is one of the few from the Treaty of Rome allowing the
Council to act without a proposal from the Commission.
Before the Court's 1974 decision in the French Seamen's Case, it
was unclear whether the failure of the Council to promulgate
regulations under Article 84(2) shielded air transport from all
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, or67 only those provisions
specifically dealing with transportation.
In this decision, the Court pronounced that the general rules
of the Treaty of Rome- such as nondiscrimination on national
grounds, right of establishment, competition, mobility of labor,
and equal pay-apply to transport, even though no regulation
had been adopted to enforce those laws.'" 8 This holding, of
course, violated the plain meaning of Article 84(2)-that the
Treaty of Rome's provisions be applicable only after the Council
has adopted rules making them so. Only Title IV was inapplicable to air transport by virtue of the Council's inaction.
C. THE TRANSPORT POLICY DECISION
(EuRoPEAN PARLIAMENT V. COMMISSION)

Another important decision of the Court concerning European transportation was rendered in response to a complaint
brought against the Council by Parliament." 9 In January of
1983, Parliament took the unusual step of bringing an action
against the Council in the Court of Justice under Article 175,
seeking a declaration that the Council had failed to act in the
field of common transport policy. 70 Parliament also asked for a
declaration that the Council breached the Treaty of Rome by
supra note 34, at arts. 74-84.
supra note 5, at 3; Case 167/73, Comm'n v. Fr., 1974 E.C.R. 359;
see also Case 156/77, Comm'n v. Belg., 1978 E.C.R. 1881.
169 European Parliament Committee on Transport, Notice to Members Concerning theJudgment of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities of 22
May 1985 in Case 13/83, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities: Common Transport Policy-Obligations of the Council, June 7, 1985,
at 2 [hereinafter OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL].
170 Bombardella, Analysis of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of 22 May
1985-Common Transport Policy-Council's Obligations, June 14, 1985, at 1
[hereinafter BOMBARDELLA].
167 TREATY OF ROME,
168 SORENSEN,
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failing to render a decision on sixteen specific proposals relating
to surface transport submitted to it by the Commission. 7 ' Parliament insisted that the establishment of a common transport
policy was a requirement flowing directly from the Treaty of
Rome. 172
In the Transport Policy Decision, the Court held that a complaint brought on grounds of failure to act was admissible. 7 '
This was the first time in the history of the EU that the Court
had so held. 17 The Court concluded that the Council failed to
act with regard to freedom to provide services in the field of
international transport and the fixing of conditions under
which nonresident carriers may operate transport services
within a Member State, by not taking measures necessary for
that purpose before the expiration of the transitional period
(December 31, 1969), and that these failures constituted a
breach of the Treaty of Rome. '71
supra note 169, at 2.
European Parliament Committee on Transport, Notice to Members: Proceedings Against the Council for Failure to Act, May 31, 1985, at 8 [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]. Parliament argued that the Council's inaction violated articles
3(e) 61, 74, 75 and 84 of the TREAI OF ROME, supra note 34.
173 Florus Wijsenbeek, European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and
Citizens' Rights Opinion for the Committee on Transport on the Report on the
Judgment of the Court of Justice on the Common Transport Policy and the
Council's Obligation in Relation Thereto, June 28, 1985, at 3; Case 13/83, European Parliament v. Council, 1985 E.C.R. 519 at 1513.
174 See REPORT, supra note 58, at 12 (first time Council found guilty of failure to
act); see also Wijsenbeek, supra note 173, at 3 (Parliament strengthened by fact
action for failure to act admissible). The Court reasoned that the institutional
position of a body, as intended by the Treaty, particularly Article 4(1), would be
prejudiced if it were restricted in the exercise of that power. The fact that the
Parliament exercised political control over the Commission, and to a certain extent the Council, "does not affect the interpretation of the provisions of the
Treaty governing the legal remedies available to the institutions." BOMBARDELLA,
supra note 170, at 2. The Court found a close connection between freedom to
provide services under Article 75(1) (a) and (b) and the adoption of a common
transport policy. Furthermore, Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty define the scope
of the Council's obligation to introduce freedom to provide services. See OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 169, at 6. The Court held that the Council
does not have discretion in applying Articles 59 and 60. Articles 59, 60, and 61,
in conjunction with 75(1) (a) and (b), clearly indicate that discretion may be exercised only with regard to the details of how the objective will be attained. Id. at 7.
The Court's decision confirmed that there was not a coherent body of rules that
could be described as a common transport policy within the meaning of Articles
74 and 75 of the Treaty, but that this does not in all aspects constitute a failure to
act which is actionable under Article 175.
175 OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 169, at 7. The Court qualified its
grant of review by holding that the failure to act must relate to measures that the
171 OBLIGATIONS OF THE COUNCIL,

172
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The Court held that the Council did, however, retain the
right to determine the objectives and means of attaining a common transport policy in accordance with procedural rules laid
down in the Treaty of Rome. The Court further held that the
Council has wide discretion with regard to the substance and
organization of the common transport policy, limited
only by
176
limits.
time
specific
and
requirements
procedural
The significance of this decision may best be described as an
official acknowledgment that the Council failed in its duty to
provide a common transport policy, and that the other bodies of
the EU government had the right to obtain judicial review of the
Council's activities. While the decision only explicitly addressed
the Council's obligations to develop a surface transport policy,
its implications for air transport are manifest.
D.

OLYMPIC AIRWAYS

The Commission took a strong position on the question of
whether the competition laws could be applied directly to sea
and air transport' 7 7 in the Association des Compagnies Aeriennes de la Communaute Europeenne's (ACE's) complaint
against Olympic Airlines.1

78

Charges against Olympic followed

Council has not adopted but are specific enough for the judgment to be executed under Article 176. In other words, Parliament must show that the Council
has completely failed to act where there is a specific directive requiring action.
Furthermore, the measures forming the subject matter of the dispute must be
sufficiently defined to allow the Court to appraise the legality of their adoption or
nonadoption. See BOMBARDELLA, supra note 170, at 2. But if the Parliament had
specified which measures the Council should have adopted in the common transport policy, it would have risked having the case dismissed as an encroachment
on the Council's discretion. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172 at 6. As to the objective difficulties that, according to the Council, prevent progress from being made
toward a common transport policy, the Court held that they are irrelevant in the
context of disputes under Article 175. Article 175 makes no concessions to the
degree of difficulty involved for the institution to fulfill its obligation. The Council is obligated to make a decision despite the difficulty it may encounter.
176 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 9. Thus, as a procedural matter, if the
Council is required to adopt a certain measure by a qualified majority, as in Article 75, it cannot justify its failure to act because of lack of unanimity. See
BOMBARDELLA, supra note 170, at 3. The Council is also required to act on the
measures specified by the Court within a "reasonable period." Id. The Court's
determination that the Council must act with a "reasonable" time is not sufficiently clear. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 7. Nor has the Treaty set a time
limit as to when action must occur. But a prolonged failure to act would presumably have been a further infringement of the Treaty. See BOMBARDELLA, supra
note 170, at 3.
177 T, EArY OF ROME, sup-a note 34, at art. 84(2).
178 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 246-49.
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in the wake of charges against Sabena, which was accused of receiving illegal government loan guarantees and subsidization of
depreciation charges and interest payments. The formal complaint against Olympic alleged that it received subsidies from
the Greek government in the form of an exemption from paying
landing fees at Greek airports, and it was abusing its "dominant
position" in enjoyment of a monopoly in the provision of baggage handling at Greek airports. ACE claimed that allowing one
airline to avoid paying fees "distorts or threatens to distort competition." 179 ACE's complaint charged that the market distortion created thereby violated Article 92 (1), which mandates free
and equal trading opportunities throughout the Common Market. ACE also alleged that the aid violated Article 7, which prohibits

discrimination

on

the

basis of nationality. 18

The

Commission concluded that "[t]here is no legal basis for claiming, as Olympic Airways claims, that Articles 85 and 86 do not
apply to air transport."' ' The European Court of Justice held
that while air transport might be exempt from the direct applicability of Article 85, ancillary services (e.g., ground
handling
82
and computer reservations systems) were not.1
E.

NOUVELLES FRONTERES

Decided in April, 1986, the case of Nouvelles Frontieresinvolved
the issue of whether Member States have the right to regulate
the price of airline tickets sold within their borders, and the potential application of exemptions and sanctions of the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome to air transport. 8 ' The
Court answered certified questions from a French court concerning applicability of the competition rules of the Treaty of
Rome to IATA price-fixing agreements made by French airlines.' 84 Nouvelles Frontieres, a French travel agency, was sell179 ELC Claims Greek Airline Received Illegal Subsidies,Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan.
17, 1983, at 34.
180 Id.
181Commission Decision of Jan. 23, 1985, pmbl. 5.1, 1985 O.J. (L 46) 51, 52;
DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 104-06.
182 Commission Decision ofJan. 23, 1985, pmbl. 5.1 (1985); Olympic Airways,
1985 O.J. (L 46/51), [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 730; WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 21.
183 Michael Feazel, LiberalizationPolicies at Issue in Ruling in French Fare Case, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 15, 1985, at 28 [hereinafter LIBERALIZATION POLICIES].
84 See generally Prof. Henri Wassenbergh, The 'Nouvelles Frontieres' Case, 11 AIR
L. 161 (1986).
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ing tickets at fares that had not been approved by 8the
French
5
Government under the French Civil Aviation Code.1
The Nouvelles Frontierescase answered both a procedural and
substantive question. As noted above, Council Regulation No.
17 implemented the competition rules of Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome and gave the Commission power to look
into cases of their infringement; by virtue of Regulation 17, the
Commission may grant an exemption under Article 85 (but not
Article 86). 186 However, air transport had been specifically excluded from the application of Regulation No. 17 in 1962.
In the absence of another Council regulation regarding implementation of the competition rules, the transitional regime
contemplated under Articles 88 and 89 remains applicable. Article 88 gives Member States the power to rule on the lawfulness
of agreements, decisions, or concerted practices and on abuses
of dominant positions according to their national law, until the
Council (acting on a proposal of the Commission) promulgates
regulations implementing the competition rules.
Article 89 gives the Commission more limited power. The
Commission may (in cooperation with Member States) investigate cases of suspected infringement of the competition rules,
and-if it finds an infringement-shall propose measures to bring
it to an end. If such conduct does not cease, the Commission
shall issue a "reasoned decision" authorizing Member States to
remedy the situation.
The Court first confirmed that, absent specific language
within the Treaty of Rome, air transport was "subject to the gen1 87
eral rules of the Treaty, including the competition rules. 1
The Court then concluded that absent specific regulations governing air transport adopted by the Council under Article 87, it
was, in effect, up to the competent "authorities in Member
States" under Article 88 to apply the competition rules of the
Treaty of Rome to agreements concerning the air transport industry, or, alternatively, the Commission could issue a "reasoned
decision" under Article 89.188 Either option could open a Pan185 Peter Haanappel, Colloquium 'Nouvelles Frontieres,' State University of Leyden, the Netherlands, 11 AIR L. 181 (1986).
186The four criteria for such an exemption under Article 85(3) are discussed
above in (11.403].
187 Ministere Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontieres), 1986 E.C.R. 65, 72, [198586 Transfer Binder]; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287, at 16,772, 16,778
(1986).
188 Id. at 16,778-80.
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dora's box of litigation in the national courts of Member
States.18
The substantive question addressed by Nouvelles Frontieres involved the French law requiring approval of tariffs from public
authorities. The Court held that the tariff-filing procedure was
not contrary to the Treaty of Rome unless the tariffs themselves
run afoul of the competition rules. Professor Peter Haanappel
noted, "In essence, the Court ruled that it is contrary to... the
Treaty to approve air tariffs where these tariffs are the result of
an agreement, a decision of an association of undertakings
[trade association] or a concerted practice itself contrary to Article 85."110

Nouvelles Frontieres effectively expanded the power the Commission potentially could wield against anticompetitive practices
among European airlines. But while a philosophical victory for
those seeking greater liberalization, Nouvelles Frontieres was in
fact a partial defeat. Although the Court found that Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome specifically apply to air transport,
they created a right without a remedy until either the Council
adopted regulations (under Article 87) or the Commission issued a reasoned decision (under Article 89), and Member States
themselves acted to enforce the competition rules (under Articles 88 and 89)-something the Member States at the time appeared particularly reluctant to do. Thus, while in theory there
was a remedy, in practice there was none.
Nonetheless, the decision intensified the pressure on the
Council to promulgate regulations to keep the Pandora's box
closed. The following year the Council did precisely that, although it limited their application to intra-European international air transportation between Community carriers.191
F. AHMED SAEED
In April 1989, the European Court of Justice handed down
the important decision of Ahmed Saeed.192 The case was brought
before the German courts by the Association for the Protection
Against Unfair Competition against two Frankfurt travel agencies that were selling airline tickets to German nationals for
See id. at 16,780; DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 104-06, 252.
190 Haanappel, supra note 185, at 181.
189

191Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 1, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1.
192 Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Fluereisen and Silver Line Reiseburo v. Zentrale
zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs EV, reprinted in 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
LUFT-UND WELTRAUMRECHT

[ZLW] 124 (1989).
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flights ostensibly beginning in Lisbon, Portugal, via Frankfurt to
points beyond. The passengers boarded in Frankfurt, discarding the Lisbon-Frankfurt ticket coupon, in violation of German
law, to take advantage of airfares that were 60% less than those
approved by the German government. The High Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany submitted the case on certiorari
to the European Court of Justice asking for a preliminary ruling
as to whether: (i) airline tariff agreements are void as a violation
of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, even if neither a Member
State (under Article 88) nor the Commission (under Article
89(2)) had declared them incompatible with Article 85; (ii)
such tariffs constitute an abuse of a dominant position within
the meaning of Article 86; and (iii) the approval of such tariffs
by a Member State are incompatible with Articles 5 and 90 of
the Treaty of Rome, even where the Commission has not objected to such tariff approval (under Article 90(3)). After the
initial hearing of the case, but before final judgment, the Council adopted its First Package of Liberalization and the Commission adopted its regulations in response thereto (discussed
below). The Court re-opened the case so as to assess the impact
of these developments.
The Court found that Article 85 was directly applicable to inter-Community tariff agreements, even in the absence of implementing legislation promulgated by the Member States (under
Article 88) or the Commission (under Article 89), a conclusion
that went beyond the holding in Nouvelles Frontieres. While tariff
"consultations" remain exempt, in order for the resulting agreements to be lawful, they must comply strictly with the requirements for individual exemptions specified in the Commission's
regulations.1 93 The Court also found that Article 86 was directly
applicable to air transport even in the absence of implementing
regulations, and infringement thereof could be invoked by any
person.19 ' Thus, the fixing of scheduled air tariffs on domestic
flights, intra-Community flights, or flights to and from the EC
(now EU) would be unlawful if they constituted an abuse of a
dominant position and if trade between Member States might
be affected. The Court thus affirmed its earlier holding in the
Wood Pulp case, 95 which held the competition rules of the
Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1990 O.J. (L 10) 33; Council Regulation
3975/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 30.
193

194 WouTEms, supra note 38, at 20.
195 Joined
Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. AhIstrom
Osakeyhito and Others v. Comm'n of the EC, 1988 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS 2898.
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Treaty of Rome applicable to agreements made outside the EC
where they are put into effect within the EC. 19 6
Moreover, the Court did not rule out the possibility that both
Articles 85 and 86 can apply simultaneously. Thus, even if an
airline qualifies for an individual exemption for a scheduled intra-Community tariff under Article 85(3), it may nevertheless
run afoul of the law by abusing a dominant position under Article 86. The Court in Ahmed Saeed also addressed the role of
Member States, reminding them of their obligation not to approve or encourage the consummation of tariff agreements contrary to Articles 85(1) or 86."'
V. EARLY EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REGULATION OF
AIR TRANSPORT: DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, COMMISSION, AND COUNCIL
A.

INTRODUCTION

Until the late 1980s, the European Community had, at best, a
disjointed and inconsistent approach to deregulation and liberalization. Flustered by the undermining presence of bilateral
agreements and the stubborn "hands-off' approach taken by the
Council, for many years the Commission appeared to be alone
in its efforts to centrally liberalize air transport policy. As noted
above, this disarray changed with the passage of the Single European Act. As we will see later, some argue that a degree of this
disharmony still exists in direction of liberalization. This section
will delineate the prelude to that debate-the early liberalization
actions of the relevant institutions of the EU.
B.

PARLIAMENT

The EU Parliament devoted years of effort to bring about a
comprehensive and coherent common transport policy."' Parliament's stated priorities are to bring the people of Europe
closer together, boost intra-Union trade, encourage economic
growth, reduce unemployment, open outlying regions, help
bridge the gap between the prosperous and impoverished regions, and remove congestion from certain overcrowded urban
centers. Parliament envisions achievement of its objectives by
196 L. Weber, Effect of EEC Air Transport Policy on International Cooperation
(address before the International Congress on EEC Air Transport, Brussels, May
26, 1989).
197 TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 5 and 90(1).
198REPORT, supra note 58, at 7.

2001]

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

1019

the construction of new major routes and infrastructure and by
the elimination of bottlenecks in existing route networks, to be
paid for with taxpayer money. 99
In 1985, Parliament approved a cautious approach to deregulation to be accomplished over a period of 14 years. Its advisory
decisions would allow only limited exemptions to the competition rules for the first seven years. A parliamentary report stated
that either nation served by a route in question should unilaterally be able to block new low fares on that route. ° Since that
time, however, the Parliament has largely assigned itself alternately the role of cheerleader or conscience of the Commission
and Council. On such matters as noise limitations and most
other environmental issues, the Parliament has been largely appreciative of the Commission and Council.2

1

1

However, the Par-

liament has been extremely concerned that liberalization may
somehow have a negative "social impact," and it has frequently
called for studies showing what the effects of liberalization have
been. 2 The 21st Century may see an expansion of the Parliament's involvement in air transport regulation, as the Treaty of
Amsterdam, adopted in 1997, gives the Parliament much
broader powers to shape regulation.20 3 Yet so far the Parliament
has not exerted its new powers in the field of aviation, content
to follow the lead of the Commission and Council.
C.

THE COMMISSION

The Commission has been the most active and impatient body
in the EU/EC government in pursuit of a unified transport policy and liberalization of airline regulations. While the Commission asserted that it did not believe the American style of
deregulation would work in Europe, it advocated a gradual
change from existing policy, referred to as the "go-slow" approach.2 "4 For instance, the Commission advocated increased
at 21.
EuropeansAdvise Slow DeregulationApproach, Av.WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 23,
1985, at 39.
201 See Towards an International Agreement on Aircraft Noise Level, available at
http://Nvww.europarl.eu.int/dg3/sdp/newsrp/en/nOO0127.htm#3
(last visited
Aug. 14, 2000).
202 See Air Transport Liberalisation, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg3/
sdp/newsrp/en/1998/n980121.htm#3 (last visited Aug. 14, 2000).
203 Roger J. Goebel, Symposium: The European Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam,
22 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 7, at 28.
204 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 6.
199 Id.
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flexibility0 5 and proposed liberalization of capacity, airfares,
and conditions of competition. 2 6 Nonetheless, it grew increasingly impatient with the Council's inability or unwillingness to
promulgate regulations applying the Treaty of Rome's competition articles to air transport. Beginning in 1979, the Commission issued several memoranda that put forth possible objectives
the Council could adopt.
1.

The First and Second Memoranda

In 1979, the Commission issued Memorandum 1, which
pointed out several problems of the current structure, including
a tendency towards high tariffs due to governmental presence,
limited fare flexibility for holidays, and limited possibilities for
innovation.2 0 7
In March 1984, the Commission followed with Memorandum 2,
entitled "Progress Towards the Development of a Community
Air Transport Policy. ' 2 8 Memorandum 2 expanded on the ideas
promulgated in Memorandum 1.209 The aims of Memorandum 2
were to review the developments since Memorandum 1, to propose an overall framework for air transport in the Community,
to put forth legislative measures for the Council's adoption, and
to outline future work the Commission plans to pursue.21 0
The policies of Memorandum 2 focused on air transport between Member States as an important part of the creation of a
Common Market in aviation and the improvement of the Common Market in general. 21 1 However, the Commission was not
oblivious to the impact and importance of international aviation
outside of the Community. The memorandum recognized the
effects of deregulation in the United States, under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, and the need to establish a unified
Community posture toward international organizations and
nonmember countries.21 2 At the time, the Community's major
scheduled airlines were earning 40% of their revenues in local
Europe. The remainder of their revenue was earned on routes
to other international destinations, especially on intercontinen-

209

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
See generally MEMORANDUM 2, supranote
SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 5.

210

Id. at 6.

205
206
207
208

211 MEMORANDUM
212

Id. at 12-13.

2, supra note 26, at I.

26;

DEMPSEY,

supranote 3, at 100-02.
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tal routes.213 The Commissioners sought to maintain the existing system of regulation and agreement while introducing
flexibility and the benefits of competition.21 4
Memorandum 2 asked the Member States to consider proposals
to increase competition by restricting the influence of governments on scheduled airline operations and by introducing
greater flexibility in their air service arrangements, particularly
in route access, designation, capacity, and fares.215 The Commission asserted that all of the proposals in the memorandum
were interdependent, and, therefore, must be adopted by both
the Council and the Commission and implemented as a package.2" 6 While the Commission recognized the time necessary for
discussion and implementation, it discouraged excessive delay
and expressly reserved its right of direct action against airline
practices that violated the competition articles.21 v
In Memorandum 2, the Commission addressed several specific
areas for liberalization in Europe's highly regulated scheduled
air transport industry. Capacity guarantees were to be reduced
to no more than 25%,218 although 50% had been the norm
under typical bilateral agreements. The document addressed
pooling agreements-where traffic and revenues are shared regardless of which carrier generates the traffic or earns the revenue.2 19 The Commission also proposed guidelines designed to
monitor state subsidies of airlines to ensure a fair, competitive
environment. 220 Finally, in what has since become a major issue
in liberalization, the Commission sought to apply the competition rules, specifically Articles 85 through 90 of the Treaty of
Rome, to the scheduled air transport industry. 221 The Commission justified this assertion, two years before Nouvelles Frontieres,
on the basis of Court ofJustice rulings in 1974 and 1978.222 Op-

ponents argued against adjustments to the European civil aviation regime on the ground that such changes would result in
213

Id.

at 9.

I.
Colin Thaine, The Way Ahead from Memo 2: the Need for More Competition, a
Better Dealfor Europe, 10 AIR L. 90.
216 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at III.
217 Id.; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 85-90.
218 Thaine, supra note 215, at 93.
214 Id. at
215

219 Id. at 94.
220 Id. at 95.
221 Id.
at 95-96.
222 MEMORANDUM

April 30, 1986.

2,

supra note 26, at 17. Nouvelles Frontieres was decided
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unacceptable impacts on international aviation outside of the
Community. The Commission rejected this rationale. Rather,
the Commission insisted that such steps would contribute to a
"Community market in aviation" and the "improvement of the
internal market in its wider sense. ' 22 3 Nevertheless, it recognized the repercussions of its proposals on the non-Community
states of Europe in formulating its proposals. 224 The Commission sought a qualified increase in competitiveness throughout
European civil aviation:
[R]ecent years have made it clear that although the present regime has produced an extensive network of aviation services, the
rigidities of the system . . . give rise to an increasing degree of
public dissatisfaction. This criticism (not all of which is justified)
has tended to center on the civil aviation services provided within
Europe, and the Commission is confirmed in its view that within
the Community there is scope for introducing more flexibility

and competition into the existing system without destroying it or
losing the benefits that it has brought about. Flexibility is not,

however, an end in itself. It should be regarded rather as the
means to improving the services to the consumer and the profitability of the efficient and enterprising airline.225
The Commission's qualifications on competition included a
recognition of strong state interests in the survival of national
airlines 22' and recognition of a history of competition in services
227
within the industry, especially with respect to charter airlines.
In addition, the Commission explicitly acknowledged that the
U.S.-style deregulation would not work in Europe 22 and that direct comparisons of costs and fares between European and similar U.S. routes were invalid. In particular, fuel, air traffic
control, and airport charges presented significant cost elements
that European airlines could not influence. 229 Memorandum 2

concluded that airfares in Europe were not unreasonably related to costs, owing in large part to the fact that only 40% of
total costs were controllable by the airlines. Nevertheless, the
Commission believed that changes in procedures related to the

225

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.

226

Id. at 22.

223
224

MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 23. Charter traffic within Europe accounts for 60% of all air travel. See AIR CARTEL, supra note 18, at 23, 26.
228 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 26-27.
229 Id. at 24.
227
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fixing of airfares would result in a "wider range of fares."2 '
Moreover, the belief was expressed that competitive pressures
would ultimately lead to lower airfares.23 1
Memorandum 2 expressed a general preference for an "evolutionary approach '23 2 to a more competitive air transport policy,
rather than the more revolutionary policy adopted earlier by the
United States.2 3 3 While comprehensive deregulation arguably
had merit in the large, unified market of the United States, conditions in Europe would not justify such an approach. 3 4 Additionally, at the time of deregulation, the United States had
about 20 major air carriers, and the government could take "a
relaxed view on the fate of any one of them," in contrast to the
nationalized airlines and international character of European
aviation. 23 5' The issue, therefore, was whether the system could
be modified sufficiently to meet the needs of the European
Community while at the same time bringing to bear sufficient
competitive pressures for the airlines to "control costs, increase
productivity and provide efficient and attractively priced services
to the user; and to enable the efficient and enterprising airline
to benefit . . ."236 The Commission stated that the principal
measures to be taken were: (a) Community rules on certain aspects of bilateral agreements between Member States; (b)
changes in methods for settlement of air tariffs; and (c) action
limiting the effect of commercial and tariff agreements between
airlines.23 7
Regarding bilateral agreements, the Commission urged elimination of mandatory pooling arrangements between airlines.
Also, it suggested rigid 50/50 traffic-sharing agreements should
be relaxed to where no one party is guaranteed a traffic share of
more than 25% in agreements between Member States. 3 8
"This would . . .permit a greater degree of competition and
assure a Member State that its airline would have as a safety net
a level of operation below which it could not fall without the
239
consent of its own government.

231

Id.
Id.

232

Id. at 27.
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233 MEMORANDUM
234 Id. at 26.
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Id. at 27.
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237 Id. at 29.
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2, supra note 26, at 26.

2, supra note 26, at 30.
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The principal features of bilateral or multilateral agreements
between airlines were identified as scheduling, capacity, revenue
sharing, and tariff provisions. Even though the Commission, as
explained above, wanted to prevent capacity agreements that
were either mandatory or required a strict 50/50 sharing, it recognized that in some cases such agreements were desirable in
order to assure service in thin markets. On the other hand, the
Commission recognized that such agreements tended to inure
to the detriment of the more efficient airline. Consequently,
Memorandum 2 indicated that capacity agreements should be
permissible, but emphasized that any party should be able to
withdraw from such an agreement upon giving reasonably short
notice. 40
As with capacity sharing, the Commission also recognized that
pooling agreements could have desirable consequences in encouraging carriers to operate outside of profitable periods. 24 ,
At the same time, such agreements may also restrict competition
that otherwise might take place, contrary to Article 85(1).242
Pooling agreements between airlines were of two basic types:
open pools, which distributed revenue on the basis of the capacity offered by each airline (regardless of which carrier actually
earned the revenue), and limited pools, which almost equalized
revenue. The Commission was of the opinion that revenue
pools should be permitted in certain limited circumstances,243
but that open pools should be prohibited.244 In order to be exempted from the competition rules under Article 85(3), such
agreements must contribute to the improvement of air transportation with a minimum of anticompetitive effect. 245 However,
the Commission's guideline in this area was more restrictive,
limiting the transfer of revenue from one airline to another to
one percent of poolable revenues. All other revenue-pooling arrangements would be subject to "specific scrutiny in each case in
order to determine whether they would qualify for exemption
under Article 85(3).,246
2411

Id. at 32-33.

2'4

Id. at 33.

2.12 Id.;

TREA'

Or

ROME,

supra note 34, at art. 85(1).

2, supra note 26, at 33.
'44Id. at 33-34; TREATry OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 85(3).
245 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 33, 34; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at
art. 85(3).
246 MEMORANDUM 2,supra note 26, at 34.
241 MEMOPANDUM
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The Commission also recognized that airlines should be as
free as possible to determine what tariffs best suited their commercial needs and should be able to set tariffs within certain
predetermined "zones of reasonableness" without governmental
approval.247 In its "Amended Proposal for a Council Directive,"
the Commission indicated the minimum acceptable range to be
covered within the zones. 248 This proposal reflected then-recent

developments in the economic and regulatory environment,
such as the agreements between the United States and certain
ECAC countries for a given number of "reference tariffs," as well
as "zones of reasonableness.

' 24 9

Within the zones, the following

alternatives could be agreed upon: (1) airlines would be free to
set fares without government interference; (2) proposed fares
would take effect unless both countries disapproved ("double
disapproval"); or (3) proposed fares would be subject to country-of-origin approval. While both governments in bilateral
agreements would be expected to consult and agree in setting
the zones of reasonableness, in case of a dispute between the
two governments concerning fares outside of the zone, the
country of origin would be able to determine the fare.250
The tariff-setting proposals of Memorandum 2 also extended to
agreements among airlines. The Commission observed that
most of the nations that were members of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), which includes virtually the entire global aviation community, recognized such tariff consultations as an essential part of transport policy. These
consultations restricted competition, but at the same time had
resulted in a "system [which] allowed the provision of reliable,
high quality services to the consumer.

' 25'

Tariff-setting arrange-

ments would be permissible if they "confer[red] an equivalent
advantage to the consumer, [were] not unduly restrictive and
... [from which] a reasonable degree of competition [was] ensured. ' 252 The Commission indicated that these conditions
would be met if:
Id. at 31.
The proposal called for two "zones of flexibility," each with a minimum
range of 25%. The first zone was to "extend at least 15% on either side of the
existing air fare for economy class," and the other was to "be situated below the
first and cover restricted use air fares." Id. at Annex II, art. 6(4) & (5).
2411 Id. at 31.
250 Id. at 32.
251 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 35.
252 Id. at 35.
247
248
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airlines had an effective right of independent action, both in
terms of proposing tariffs independently of other airlines, and in
terms of freedom to implement such tariffs, subject only to the
[proposed] limited government control ....
The Member States concerned and the Commission were enabled to participate as observers in tariff consultations.2 53
Another major aspect of competition, market access, was
given cursory treatment by the Commission.2 5 4 While recognizing the dominance throughout the EC of large, national airlines, and that services to the consumer would be improved with
a proliferation of smaller airlines, the Commission proposed
only that the smaller airlines be allowed to operate on bilateral
routes not presently utilized.2 5 5 The Commission believed that
such steps could be taken without "significant damage" to major
airlines and without the detailed justification or reciprocity ordinarily required. 25" The Commission went further and suggested
that if a Member State desired, such routes could be so utilized
only after giving national airlines a right of first refusal.2 5 7
The Commission also proposed tight control of state aid and
subsidies to encourage airlines to accept competition. Without
guarantees that other airlines would compete on the same level,
airlines would be reluctant to join an open market. 25 The Commission feared that unless state aids were adequately controlled,
implementation of competition measures would result in a subsidy race-competition being financed by Member States. This
was to be prevented by application of the Treaty of Rome's state
aids rules in Articles 92 and 93, for which the Commission has
responsibility. 2 59 Proper application of these rules would result
in advance disclosure of all proposed state aids so that the Commission could take a position as to whether it opposed individual subsidies or other forms of governmental assistance. 2' ° The
Commission recognized that state aids may be appropriate in
certain circumstances in order to fulfill public service obligaId.
254 See Thaine, supra note 215, at 93; International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), European Commission Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2: A Response by the ICC,
10 AIR L. 99, 103 (1985) (policy declaration and response adopted by the Execu253

tive Board of the ICC on Dec. 3, 1984).
255 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at 43-44.
256

Id.

2-57Id. at 44.
258 SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 7.
259 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26,
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tions, to compete with subsidized carriers from third countries,
to overcome "particularly precarious" but temporary financial
problems, or to assist economically underdeveloped regions.2 1
Assistance in the form of "normal commercial transactions,"
such as loans, capital or guarantees, would also be acceptable,
although cases would have to be examined individually to determine the presence of impermissible aid.2
As indicated previously, the primary concern and focus of the
Commission in Memorandum 2 was with the EC (now EU). Consequently, with regard to the international implications of its
proposals, it reasserted the supremacy of Community law.
Under Article 234,263 Member States must take steps to eliminate conditions in agreements with third countries inconsistent
with forthcoming Community/Union aviation provisions. Nevertheless, the Commission agreed that, given the legitimate priorities and programs in third countries, especially nonCommunity members of ECAC, some flexibility would be required. 264 Accordingly, the Commission entered into cooperation

agreements

under

Article

22926i5

with

ECAC

and

EUROCONTROL.
In spite of its general adherence to a phased, evolutionary implementation of policies, Memorandum 2 indicated some signs of
the Commission's growing impatience with the situation. It suggested that any group exemptions from the competition provisions should be limited to seven years.2 " Additionally, even
though the memorandum identified exceptions to the prohibi-tions in Article 85(1), if certain objectives were manifest, such
exceptions would expire on December 31, 1991.267 The Com-

mission reminded the Council of the proposals it had submitted
to the Council in 1981 calling for directives and regulations,
upon which the Council still had not taken action. 218 Finally,

the Commission repeatedly asserted its right to take direct action, in certain circumstances, against practices in violation of
Treaty of Rome provisions.269
261
262

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
supra note 34, at art. 234.
2, supra 26, at 50.

263 TREATY OF ROME,

264 MEMORANDUM

265 TREATY OF ROME, supra note
266 MEMORANDUM
267
268
2-i

34, at art. 229.

2, supra note 26, at 35.

Id. at Annex III C.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at III, 36, Annex III C.2.
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Memorandum 2 also addressed a significant number of additional issues. 271 The memorandum attached six annexes, which
included detailed proposals for Council action and guidelines
related to the foregoing matters.27 ' Memorandum 2 was more
than a general indication of the Commission's position and
thoughts on European civil aviation. The memorandum was intended to provoke action by the Council and serve as a comprehensive guide to achieving the policy goals contained therein.
Reaction to Memorandum 2 was mixed. IATA and AEA, while
agreeing as to the necessity of reform, published their own proposals, which differed considerably from Memorandum 2.272 Perceiving significant threats to their economic well-being, trade
unions and airports opposed Memorandum 2. By contrast, charter airlines and consumer groups voiced strong support for the
Commission proposals, particularly in areas approached most
warily by scheduled carriers. 273 The European Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee conducted extensive hearings and published comprehensive reports that supported the
overall thrust of Memorandum 2, but proposed significantly different approaches to many of the issues contained therein.274
The Council instituted a high-level working group, which met
eight times before the end of 1984. The efforts of the group
culminated in a report that "can be said to build on Memorandum No. 2, taking into account the views that had been expressed in the interim.

'2 71

On December 11, 1984, the Council

endorsed the report as a guideline for further actions and arranged for additional study.27 6
2. Enforcement
The failure of the Council to adopt regulations implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome led the Commission in
1986 to send letters to ten European airlines 277 alleging that
27(0 See id. at 13, 48 (aircraft noise), 14 (search and rescue), 15 (accident investigation and interrogational air services), 42 (air freight transport), 43 (access to
market), 45 (non-scheduled services), 47 (social matters as related to Community
and aviation policies), 48 (research), 49 (general aviation).
271 MEMORANDUM 2, supra note 26, at Annexes I-VI.
272 WOUTERS, supra note 38, at 52-53.
273 Id. at 53.
274 Id. at 53-54.
275 Id. at 54.
276 Id. at 55.
277 Air France, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, British Airways, British Caledonian, KLM,
Lufthansa, Olympic, Sabena, and SAS.
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they had violated the Treaty of Rome by engaging in price fixing, capacity limitation, revenue pooling, and restricted market
entry.27 8 The Commission threatened that failure of the airlines
to cooperate to eliminate these anti-competitive practices would
lead it to issue a "reasoned decision" under Article 89, an alternative which had been explicitly approved by the European
Court of Justice earlier that year in Nouvelles Frontieres. The issuance of such a "reasoned decision" by the Commission potentially would open a Pandora's box of litigation by private parties
in the national courts of Member States.
Hence, the ten airlines had a strong incentive to comply. Although some of the southern European airlines initially resisted
meeting with DG-4 (the Commission ministry responsible for
competition) ,279 a more strongly worded Commission letter in
early 1987 advised recalcitrant carriers that the Commission believed an apparent infringement of the Treaty of Rome existed
and that a "reasoned decision" would soon be forthcoming.
This ultimately brought all the carriers to the bargaining table.
During tense meetings in Brussels, Mr. Peter Sutherland warned
representatives of Alitalia, Lufthansa, and Olympic that unless
they agreed to join negotiations on pricing liberalization, he
would bring an action against them in the European Court of
Justice for operating an illegal cartel. The carriers
capitulated.28 °
Yet, the informal understandings ultimately entered into between the Commission and the airlines were surprisingly modest
in substance, allowing a great deal more anticompetitive activity
than would be tolerated in, for example, the United States.
With respect to pricing, the Commission allowed a continuation
of carrier discussions regarding rates and permitted carriers to
enter into voluntary rate agreements, so long as (1) such discussions were not conducted in secret, (2) the results of the discussions would not be binding upon any carrier participating in
them, and (3) carriers retained the right of independent action
to file a tariff deviating from the agreed rates. As to revenue
and capacity-pooling agreements, they would continue to be tolerated so long as they were voluntary, they involved a sharing of
278

EEC Commission Action Could Result in Suits Against 10 Large Carriers,Av. WK.

& SPACE TECH., July 14, 1986, at 35; ARGYRIS, supra note 62, at 10-11.
279

Alitalia Rejects EEC Request for Data on OperationalPractices,Av. WK. &
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revenue of no more than one percent, and the transfer of revenue went to the carrier providing off-peak service. Slot allocation would be permitted so long as negotiated and concluded
publicly. And, as to computer reservations systems, there would
have to be equal and unbiased access to the systems.
Thus, the Commission effectively did an "end run" around
the Council, defining the perimeters of lawful vis-A-vis unlawful
carrier conduct when the Council had been rendered immobile
by an inability to reach a consensus on regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Yet, the Commission's modest constriction of anti-competitive behavior by air
carriers surprised almost everyone because the Commission had
previously done so much "chestbeating."
More recently, the Commission has been less reticent to use
its enforcement power. In March of 1992, the Commission
fined Aer Lingus 750,000 Euros for abuse of its dominant position on the Dublin-London Route because it broke an interlining agreement with British Midland Airways after it became a
competitor on the route.28 ' The Commission stated, "[r]efusing
to interline is not normal competition on the merits. Interlining has for many years been accepted industry practice, with
widely acknowledged benefits for both airlines and passengers.
... A refusal to interline.., is a highly unusual step and has up
to now not been considered by the European airline industry as
a normal competitive strategy. '' 282 This was the first time the

Commission
agreement.

imposed

a fine

D.

for breaking

an

interline

THE COUNCIL

In 1962, the Council adopted general competition rules, but
specifically exempted air and sea transport. On June 30, 1968,
the Council decided that competition laws should be made applicable to transport by rail, road, and inland waterway.283
When the Treaty of Rome was adopted in 1957, air and sea
transport were excluded because of the special attitude adopted
toward these methods of transport. 214 Indeed, Council Regulation No. 141 states specifically that Council Regulation No. 17,
281 Aer Lingus Fined by EC Commissionfor Breaking InterliningAgreement, AVIATION
EUROPE, Mar. 5, 1992, at 1; WOUTERS supra note 38, at 25.
282 British Midland v. Aer Lingus, 4 C.M.L.R. 596 para. 25 (1993).

2852 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2841 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

2401-2634 (various dates) (Reg. No. 17).
1945.05 (1974).
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which gives the Council the direct means of investigating violations of Articles 85 and 86 in transport and imposes penalties for
failure to comply, 285 does not apply to air transport and related
activities. 28 6 The Council did not adopt maritime competition

rules until December 1986.
Many in Europe, including northern European governments
and the Commission, implored the Council to adopt regulations
that would specify how the competition laws would be applied
and enforced. 28 7 However, the major stumbling block in the

adoption of competition regulations was the desire of each nation to guarantee the success of its own airline. Because the
Council members represent the interests of their own States,
they must follow the policies of their governments, many of
which have been generally opposed to air transport
liberalization.288

Article 74 of the Treaty of Rome states that "[t] he objectives
of this Treaty shall ... be pursued by the Member States within
the framework of a common transport policy. ' 289 Article 75 di-

rects the Council to create common rules applicable to international transport within the Member States. 29° Despite a strong
push for liberalization by the Commission in 1979 and 1984,
and an important decision by the EEC Court of Justice in 1986,
the Council pled impossibility because of the
complexity of the
29

issues and dissent within the Council itself. '

By mid-1987, the Council appeared poised to conclude a comprehensive agreement on defining the application of relevant
provisions of the Treaty of Rome to air transport. In particular,
it would have laid down detailed rules for the application of the
competition provisions-Articles 85 and 86. It would have also
supra note 75, at 181-83.
286 Association of European Airlines, European Air Transport Policy-AEA
Proposals, Sept. 27, 1985, at 14 (paper adopted by President's Special Assembly at
Brussels).
285 MATHIJSEN,

287 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 246; TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 84(2).

288 DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 98.
289TREATY OF ROME, supra note 34, at art. 74.

290 Id. at art. 75.
291

See BOMBARDELLA, supra note 170, at 3. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 12.

In 1978, the Council established a priority program to address the problem of air
transport. The Council's priorities include: control of nuisances, simplification
of formalities, implementation of technical standards, implementation of provisions regarding aid and competition, and mutual recognition of licenses. Other
items of Council concern include: working conditions, the right of establishment,
improvements in inter-regional services, search, rescue and recovery operations,
and accident inquiries. SORENSEN, supra note 5, at 3.
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identified the group exemptions to be allowed thereunder and
included directives on scheduled airline fares, capacity, and
market access.
Specifically, the package would have eliminated secret
pricefixing, but allowed public and voluntary agreements between carriers as to fares. As to entry, instead of being restricted
to regional routes between provincial airports, the airlines
would have been permitted to compete on feeder routes between regional and hub airports. The 50-50 capacity limitation
agreements in many bilaterals would have been reduced to 4555 for the first two years and 40-60 thereafter. Revenue pooling
would have been limited to one percent and transferred to the
carrier providing off-peak service. Computer reservation systems were to be open to all carriers without bias. The carriers
would have been granted block exemptions from the competition rules to enable them to agree on certain joint operations,
292
such as scheduling.
But the entire package, accepted in principle by all Member
States, foundered in mid-1987 on the question of the inclusion
of Gibraltar in the proposed arrangements for route development.2 13 Newly admitted Spain exercised its veto at the eleventh
hour on an issue having virtually nothing to do with air transport. Spain contested British sovereignty over Gibraltar and apparently used this platform to reassert its position.
Although the Spanish veto scuttled the mid-1987 agreement,

the ability of the Council to reach a majority resolution of such
issues was greatly facilitated by the weighted voting of Member
States permitted by the Single European Act, adopted on July 1,
1987. With implementation of the SEA and advent of the EU,
no single nation can again unilaterally thwart the Council's ability to promulgate rules by casting a veto as Spain did in the Gi-

braltar debate. As noted above, the Single European Act may
have prompted Council agreement on a conservative liberalization package (the so-called "First Package") in December 1987.
The Council adopted a more liberal "Second Package," which
entered into force on August 11, 1990294 and a fully liberalized

"Third Package," which became effective in January 1993.295
2112

Merritt, supra note 280, at 9, 12.

29- Spain Blocks the Adoption of Air Deregulation in EC, WALL ST.

J., July 2, 1987, at

15; UnfairAir Fares, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1987, at 16; Spain in Search of Europe, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 43.
294

1990 OJ. Nr. 217.

295

1992 OJ. (L 241) 1.
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Before proceeding, the difference between the types of actions that may be taken by the Council should be made clear. A
"regulation" has general application, and is binding in its entirety and directly upon all Member States. A "directive" is binding as to its objective as to each Member State to which it is
addressed, but leaves to the Member State the means by which it
shall be implemented. A "decision" is binding in its entirety
upon all to which it is addressed."
VI.

CONTEMPORARY AIR TRANSPORT POLICY OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. INTRODUCTION

The contemporary landscape of European regulation of air
transport is one of growing competitiveness and government
regulation designed to promote competition. This competitive
environment was spawned in no small part by the historic movement of the European Council towards full liberalization. While
the European Commission and industry organizations such as
AEA and ECAC encouraged liberalization earlier than the
Council actually undertook the task, true liberalization was not
likely to occur until the Council became a liberalization actor.
By the mid-1980s, the European Court of Justice made it clear
that the regulation of air transport was well within the domain
of the Council. With such impetus, the Council finally began to
heed the advice of the Commission, and launched its voyage
into liberalization-in a series of three packages. As the 1990s
dawned, many commentators projected that the Council's liberalization plan would precipitate a competitive market-though at
the same time producing a highly contentious climate full of
merger activity and privatization difficulties. There was some
hope that an intensely competitive merger climate would weed
out poorer performing airlines 297 and provide economic benefits to the consumer.
The picture that emerged at the end of the 20th Century was
somewhat different. While liberalization did make some aspects
of'the European air transport industry more competitive, alliances seemed to take the place of mergers. The anticipated
consolidation thus occurred, but in a manner that might be
even more potent than pure monopoly. These alliance struc296

TREATY OF ROME,

supra note 34, at art. 189.

Piere Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 53.
297
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[66

tures presented their own somewhat oblique uncompetitive
challenges.
In terms ofjust the number of airlines, the industry appeared
more competitive on its face. For example, in 1998, 164 scheduled air carriers operated in the EU, up from 132 in 1992. Of
the carriers, twelve operated 70 to 100-seat regional jets, up
from eight in 1995 and four in 1992.298 However, there was argument that such numbers were inefficient, and that the "European airline industry restructuring [was]
lagging, and the
2
number of players [was] hardly evolving.

99

Privatization was reasonably difficult; yet the greater regulatory challenge presented itself in the form of supranational conflict (i.e., air transport regulatory differences between the
United States and the European Union). Prices had not fallen
as drastically as was hoped, and new value-based entrants were
not as successful as some commentators thought they would be.
Ancillary services (ground handling) were also still relatively
uncompetitive.
Regardless of the partial success of liberalization by the end of
the 20th Century, the overall state of the air transport market
was one of increasing competitiveness. Prices were falling and
smaller, value-based airlines were gaining competitive ground.
Restrictive bilateral agreements between nations were disappearing, and the European Union was beginning to assert its role as
principal negotiator of air traffic rights by sweeping aside internal restrictions on air transportation. This section of the paper
delineates the landscape of applicable European Union regulation of air transport-the Commission's proposals, the Council's
packages, and other relevant legislation.
In December 1987, three decades after the signing of the
Treaty of Rome, the EU Council adopted its long-awaited regulations on the application of the Treaty of Rome's competition
° group exemptions thereto,""°
rules to scheduled air transport, 311
a directive on scheduled airfares," 1 2 and a decision on capacity
298

Id.

Id. (quoting Bernard Van Houtte, head of the Application of Community
Law unit of the EC Transportation Directorate General).
3110Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 1.
301 Council Regulation 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 Application of Article
85(3) of the Rome Treaty (Group Exemptions), 1987 0.J. (L 374) 9.
302 Council Directive 87/601 of 14 December 1987 Scheduled Air Fares, 1987
0.J. (L 374) 12.
299
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sharing and market access."" : The regulations applied only to
flights between EU Member States, and not to domestic flights
or flights between Member States and third countries.
Why, after so many years of wrangling, had the Council finally
achieved agreement? The political problems between Spain
and the United Kingdom surrounding the UK's possession of
Gibraltar, which had led Spain to veto the agreement earlier in
the year, were resolved in December 1987.1"4 Moreover, beginning on July 1, 1987, the implementation of weighted voting
under the Single European Act had eliminated the possibility of
a single state veto. Hence, no one nation could repeat the Spanish impasse of summer 1987. With weighted voting, consensus
became more practical than intransigence.
Threats by the Commission to utilize the sanctions approved
by the Court of Justice in Nouvelles Frontiereshad abated considerably with the relatively conservative agreements it had entered
into with offending airlines. The Commission itself began to appreciate the difficult political problems that international aviation posed for Member States, and was willing to opt for
increased diplomacy over unilateral actions that might rip at the
very threads of the fragile European alliance.? 5
Moreover, much of air transport had already been made more
liberal, with the new bilateral air transport agreements in effect
between Britain, the Netherlands, Ireland and many of their aviation partners."' ECAC had adopted modest liberalization proposals. Hence, there was already much for the European
scheduled air transport industry to digest.
Charter services, which had largely been deregulated in the
1950s, dominated more than half of the air passenger market," 7
and inter-city rail services were also responsible for a sizable portion of the city-pair passenger market. With increased privatiza3o1 Council Decision 87/602 of 14 December 1987 Capacity Sharing and Market Access, 1987 O.J. (L 374). These regulations, directives, and decisions are set
forth in Paul Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of ETC Air
Transport,53J. AIR L. & CoM. 615, 687-736 (1988).
304 The Rock Stands Aside, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1987, at 55.
305 As Peter Sutherland, EC Commissioner for Competition, noted, "it was better to move this way than by confrontation, which would have taken longer and
involved protracted legal battles." Susan Carey & Julie Wolf, EC Adopts Plan to
Partly DeregulateEurope's Airline Industry Startingin '88, WALL ST.J., Dec. 8, 1987, at
24.
306 See DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 102-04.
307 Id. at 99.
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tion of carriers such as British Airways and KLM ,308 and
proposed mergers then in the offing (such as that between British Airways and British Caledonian), the market was already becoming increasingly competitive.
All of this made political consensus on a more conservative
package, one more palatable to the southern European governments, easier to achieve. Effective January 1, 1988, the package
provided for a three-year transition to a more liberalized air
transport regime in areas of pricing, entry and capacity, ostensibly attempting to meet the Community's ambitious 1992 deadline for a unified internal market. 0 9
As noted previously, original Council regulations excluded
the transport sector from the application of the competition
rules.3 " The 1987 Regulation on the Application of the Competition
Rules" ' was the first to apply Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome to air transport.3 1 2 Under it, the Commission was explicitly conferred jurisdiction to hear complaints regarding violations of Articles 85(1) and 86 brought by member governments
or by natural or legal persons having a legitimate interest. 13 It
was given powers of investigation3 1 4 and the authority to levy
fines against enterprises found to have violated the Treaty of
3 5
Rome.
308 British Airways was completely privatized by the Thatcher government.
KLM's government holdings have been reduced to 39%. P. Haanappel, A Decade of Deregulation, Address before the Aviation & Space Law Section of the
Ass'n of American Law Schools 10 (Miami, Fla., Jan 9, 1988) [hereinafter P.
HAANAPPEL].

301 See

They've Designed the Future, and It Might Just Work, supra note 123, at 45.
to Council Regulation 141, Regulation 17 was made inapplicable
to transportation. Subsequently, the Council adopted Regulation 1017/68 to apply the competition rules to inland transport. And more recently, it adopted
Regulation 4056/86, applying the rules to maritime services. See DEMPSEY, supra
note 3, at 245; Cotncil Regulation 4056/86, 1986 O.J. (L 378) 44.
311 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 1.
11
It was subsequently elucidated by Commission Regulation 4261/88, 1988
0J.(L 376) 10, which identifies the due process rights of parties to participate in
proceedings involving the application of competition rules to the transport sector, and amended by Council Regulation 1284/91, 1991 O.. (L 122) 2, which
allowed the Commission to take interim measures for up to nine months to deter
the jeopardizing of existing air service.
313 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 3, 1987 0J. (L 374) 2. Exceptions for
technical agreements are set forth id. See also Council Regulation 4261/88, 1988
O.J. (L 376) 10, which establishes procedural rules for complaints.
'114Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 11, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 4-5.
315 Id. at 5.
310 Pursuant
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Also, as noted above, Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome authorizes the establishment of group exemptions from the competition rules, and the Council adopted regulations
implementing procedures for their creation." 6 Here again, the
Commission was explicitly conferred significant powers to adopt
regulations authorizing carriers to engage in, inter alia, capacity
and revenue sharing, agreements regarding pricing, slot alloca7
tions, computer reservations systems, and ground handling.,
Significantly, revenue pooling 8 was limited to one percent of
the revenue earned on a route, with the transfer being made to
the carrier suffering a loss because it was scheduling its flights at
less busy times."' Hence, revenue pooling was substantially circumscribed. The Commission quickly promulgated three regulations that established the requirements for group exemptions
for airlines under Article 85(3).2 °
On July 26, 1987, the Commission adopted regulations implementing the block exemptions on the application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome on agreements between airlines in
three areas: (1) capacity, revenue pooling, tariff consultations
and slot allocations (the airline agreements regulation)3 21 ; (2)
computer reservations systems (the CRS regulation)1 22 ; and (3)
ground handling services (the ground handling regulation).323
These rules came into force on January 1, 1988.
The Council's First Package of liberalization, while revolutionary at the time, stopped quite short of true full cabotage. Likewise, in its Second Package, the Council rejected the
Commission's proposals for the elimination of cabotage restrictions.3 24 It also failed to extend antitrust exemptions to domes316 Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 9.
317 Id. at 2. These regulations were subsequently amended by Council Regulation 2344/90 of 24July 24 1990, 1990 0.J. (L 217) 15, to include consultations on
cargo rates.
318 See DEMPSEY, supra note 3, at 64.
319 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 2, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 2.
320 Commission Regulations 2671/88, 2672/88 and 2673/88. These regulations were effective until January 1, 1991.
321 Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 0.J. (L 239) 9.
322 Commission Regulation 2672/88, 1988 0.J. (L 239) 13, subsequently extended by Commission Regulation 83/91, 1991 0.J. (L 10) 9. See also Council
Regulation 3976/87, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 9 (giving the Commission power to issue
these block exemptions).
323 Commission Regulation 2673/88, 1988 0.J. (L 239) 17.
324 Werner F. Ebke & Georg W. Wenglorz, Liberalizing Scheduled Air Transport
Within the European Community: From the First Phase to the Second and Beyond, 19 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 493, 525 (1991). Cabotage restrictions prohibit foreign air-
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tic flights and flights to third countries, despite the holding in
Ahmed Saeed that the competition provisions of the Treaty of
Rome are applicable to such operations. 25 The 1990 regulations did not apply to cargo services, for which a separate regulation has been adopted.126 Neither did they apply to charter
services.3 2 7 However, the Third Package of liberalization addressed both charter and scheduled carriers.
While the early "packages" and proposals did much to change
the competitive landscape of air transport, the largest impact by
far was made by the last package of reforms put into effect by
the Council. The First Package, while revolutionary in its approach, did little to practically affect the internal competitiveness of the European air transport market.3 2 8

The Second

Package effectively moved forward from this position, yet failed
on major grounds to fully implement the desired level of liberalization.3 29 In July 1991, the EC Commission proposed a threepart legislative package-the Third Package-designed to remedy these deficiencies and complete air transport liberalization
within the EU byJanuary 1, 1993. The Commission submitted it
to the Council for approval, and with Council modification, the
Third Package went into effect on January 1, 1993.'-"
This section focuses upon the regulatory constructs that currently affect the European air transport market-both EU-based
constructs and those from private industry organizations. Particular areas of scope and interest are analyzed separately: pricing
and tariffs, pooling of revenue, market access, (including licensing, capacity limits, traffic rights, slot allocation and bilateral
agreements) computer reservation systems, ground handling,
lines from serving domestic markets, or stated differently, providing service between two domestic points within a nation in which it is not registered. DEMPSEY,
supra note 3, at 78-79, 112, 384.
325 See Ebke & Wenglorz, supra note 324, at 526.
-26 Council Regulation 294/91, 1991 OJ. (L 36) 1; E. GIEMULLA & R. SCHMID,
EUROPAN AIR LAw, § 51 (1992).
327 GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note

326, §§ 53-54.

See Dennis A. Duchene, The Third Package of Liberalization in the EuropeanAir
TransportSector: Shying Away from FullLiberalizaton, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 119, 131 (1995)
("Although the First Package was intended to be the first step in a process of
liberalization of the air transport industry, the reforms had little overall effect on
the development of competition, especially in the area of air fares.").
3219 See id. at 137 ("The Second Package of liberalization considerably advanced
the EC air transport system towards the goal of a more competitive market in the
areas of air fare approval, route and slot access, and capacity growth. However,
many obstacles remain [ed] to free competition, especially for new entrants.").
321s

330 1992 OJ. (L 241) 1.
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cargo services, merger regulations, stateaid, procedure, and the
power of the EU to act on the commercial aviation world stage
for Member States. Each area of analysis begins with an overview of the general regulatory environment for that area, followed by a detailed chronological delineation of relevant
packages, proposals, resolutions, and regulations.
B.

PRICING AND TARIFFS

Country-based tariffs are highly limited under the current
scheme of air transport regulation. The "tariff-as-weapon" concept has lost effective support as a greater number of old-line
European state-owned/controlled airlines become privatized.
As such, in addition to the relaxed regulatory environment,
fewer nations have a vested interest in tariff consultations.
Granted, such analysis leads one to a question of what came
first-privatization or the relaxed regulatory climate? Actually,
it was a bit of both. Regardless, tariff consultations between nations are becoming less important as the Third Package grows in
maturity and the European air transport market moves towards
an alliance structure crossing international boundaries.
1. Directive and Regulations
a.

Directive on Scheduled Air Fares

Part of the First Package, the Council's 1987 Directive on
Scheduled Air Fares (Directive 87/601) "' gave to the aeronautical authorities of Member States the jurisdiction to approve carrier rates.3 3 2 Rates were to be approved if "they [were]
reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated costs" of the
carrier. 33 They were not be denied on grounds that the proposed rate "[was] lower than that offered by another air carrier
operating on the route . . .""'I' Moreover, the Directive established two zones of pricing flexibility-a discount zone, extending from 90% to more than 65% of the referenced fare;
and a deep-discount zone, running from 65% to 45% of the referenced fare.33 - Although the conditions attached to these fares
3131 Council

Directive 87/601, 1987 OJ. (L 374) 19.

-32 Id. at 14

.33Id. at 13-14.
.14 Id.

135Id. at 14. The "referenced fare" is the "normal economy air fare charged by
a third- or fourth-freedom air carrier on the routes in question .
Id. at art.

2(c).
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were rigid (e.g., advance purchase requirements, minimum and
maximum lengths of stay, and age restrictions)336 within these
zones, carriers could set their prices freely without government
restrictions.337
b.

Regulation 2671/88

Following the implementation of the First Package, the Commission took action to assure that tariff consultations remained
exempt from the normal operation of Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome. In July 1988, the Commission passed Regulation 2671/
88, which addressed multiple aspects of the air transportation
industry, including tariffs. 3
Regulation 2671/88 permitted
consultations between airlines subject to seven conditions.""
The first condition was that all such consultations had to be
made with the purpose of setting tariffs within the parameters of
Directive 87/601."' Next, the consultations could not concern
tariffs that were not subject to approval by Member States, nor
could they connect tariffs with the capacity level offered. 4 ' The
first part of this condition was presumably designed to address
American threats to bring antitrust actions against tarifffixing
on flights into the US, while the second part seemed to prevent
revenuefixing via harmonization of tariffs and capacity. The
third condition required that agreed-upon tariffs could not discriminate against passengers based on passengers' nationalities
or place of residence within the Community, 42 while the fourth
obliged carriers to make such consultations voluntary and
open.34 Following that, it was required that any tariffs reached
through such a consultation had to be voluntary.144 The sixth
condition prohibited the consultations from dealing with remuneration for ticketsellers 45 Finally, the air carriers which participated in a tariff consultation had to notify the appropriate
authorities in concerned Member States of any tariffs reached as
-33Council Directive 87/601, Annex II, 1987 0J. (L 374) 17.
537 Id. at 14.
-38 Commission Regulation 2671/88, 1988 0J. (L 239) 9.
:"39 Id. at 11.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342

Id.

343 Commission Regulation 2671/88, art. 4(1)(d), 1988 0J. (L 239) 11.
344

Id.

345 Id.
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part of a consultation arrangement. 46 The Commission set the
regulation to expire on January 31, 1991.117
c.

Regulations 2342/90 and 2343/90

In response to the Commission's proposals of September
1989 for liberalization of tariffs, capacity and market access,348 in
June 1990 the Council adopted new regulations governing
scheduled intra-Community air transportation.3 4 9 This primary

focus of the Second Package for pricing regulations was simple-extension of liberalized pricing structures to "conditional
Fifth Freedom rights under the condition that the Fifth Freedom air fares [fell] within the flexibility zones."35 Under the
Second Package, regulations fares were still to be approved by
the Member States concerned. 5 ' The EC, however, dealt with
more than just pricing concerns. For the first time in history,
with respect to tariff regulation, the EC embraced the double
disapproval system (i.e., both nations must disapprove the proposed tariffs or they become effective) for tariffs that exceeded
the referenced rate by at least five percent (i.e., the proposed
rates go into effect unless both governments object), until January 1, 1993, when the double disapproval system was expanded
to apply to all rates.352
Under the 1990 regulations, Member States had to approve
the airfares of EC airlines if they were reasonably related to the
carrier's long-term fully allocated costs. The fact that a proposed fare was lower than that offered by other airlines in the
market was not a sufficient reason for disapproval. 5 3 Disagreements between Member States over applicable rates in their
markets were to be submitted to arbitration. 54
A "normal class economy ticket" could be established from
105% to 95% of the reference tariff. The reference fare was the
average normal economy airfare on the route in question.355
The discount zone was narrowed from 94% to 80% (from its
346

Id.

347 Id. at 12.
348See COM(89) 417 final (source with author).
349Council Regulation 2342/90, 1990 0.J. (L 217) 1; Council Regulation

2343/90, 1990 0.J. (L 217) 8.
350 Duchene, supra note 328, at 133.
351Council Regulation 2342/90 art. 4(1), 1990 0.J. (L 217) 3.
352 Id.
353

Id. at 2.

354 Id.

at 4.

355 Id.

at 2.
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previous 90% to 65%), while the deep-discount zone was expanded from 79% to 30% (from its previous 65% to 45%) of the
reference rate. Member States had to approve any rate within
the zones.356 On the whole, this allowed significantly more rate
flexibility than was permitted under the First Package. 57 Restrictions, which under the First Package had limited the applicability of the discount zone to Saturday night stayovers and sixnight excursions or off-peak travel, were eliminated, although
they remained in effect for the deep-discount zone.
d. Regulation 84/91
In 1990, the Commission also promulgated a new regulation
(Regulation 84/91) governing passenger and cargo tariff consultation, 358 although it was not to go into effect until the expiration of Regulation 2671/88. 59 Regulation 84/91 provided
exemptions so long as, inter alia, participation was voluntary and
not binding, tariffs were nondiscriminatory, such discussions
were for purposes of facilitating interlining, they did not address
agent compensation, and each participant informed the Commission. 6 The Commission and the Member States could send
observers. 6 A Member State having a legitimate interest in the
market could request that the Commission review a tariff
outside the aforementioned flexibility zones and whether another State had satisfied its obligations under the Regulations.
The Commission could review whether high tariffs were in the
best interest of consumers, or whether carriers were "dumping"
in order to drive other airlines from the market. 6 2 The new
regulations (2342/90 and 84/91) also allowed airlines to introduce lower fares within the aforementioned zones not only in
Third and Fourth Freedom markets, but also in Fifth Freedom
markets. 63' Member States could also permit scheduled airlines
351 Council Regulation 2342/90, Annex II, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 6.
'157 See EBKE & WENCLORZ, supra note 324, at 519.
358

3,9

Commission Regulation 84/91, 1991 O.J. (L 10) 14.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16.

360
'36 Id.
M"2Council

Regulation 2342/90, arts. 3(3), 5, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 2, 3.

361 Id. at 3. Third Freedom movements involve transit from an airline's nation

of registry to another nation. Fourth Freedom involves flights from another
country to an airline's nation of registry. Fifth Freedom involves the right to
carry traffic between two nations other than its nation of registry, so long as the
flight originates or terminates in its own nation of registry. DEMPSEY, supra note
3, at 11, 49-50.
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to meet the prices offered by competing charter airlines offering
equivalent services. This accelerated the blurring of the distinc364
tion between the two classes of carriers.
e.

Regulation 2409/92

The Council's efforts at achieving a uniform regulation for
pricing culminated in Regulation 2409/92, the third regulation
of the Third Package.36 Regulation 2409/92 is broad in scope,
applying to all Union carriers and all routes except for those
under a public service obligation.3 6 However, it is still limited
to flights that originate and terminate within the Union.367
Charter fares and cargo rates are to be based on "free agreement" between the carrier and its clients. 368 Carriers are obli-

gated to make all their fares and cargo rates available upon
request. 69 This provision would appear to be designed to avoid
the market capacity problems American consumers face when
searching for fares.
The more substantive portion of Regulation 2409/92 commences in Article 5. The first paragraph of Article 5 establishes
that the Union's default position will be to allow carriers to set
prices at will. "7 Member States may (but are not obligated to)
require carriers to file tariffs with them for review up to 24 hours
before the tariffs are scheduled to go into effect, provided that
the filing process is nondiscriminatory. 71 Until April 1, 1997,
an exception existed for domestic routes that were served by
only one carrier or multiple carriers jointly operating a single
route. 72 In such an instance, the Member State concerned
could require that tariffs be filed for such routes up to one
month before they were scheduled to go into effect;3 73 however,

this provision has been allowed to lapse.
Despite the Council's seeming endorsement of free-market
principles in pricing, the regulation also granted broad powers
to the Member States to withdraw fares. Article 6 gives the
§ 44.
Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15.
366 Id.
367 Id.
-8 Id.
3

GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326,

,165

369 Id.
370

371
372

Council Regulation 2409/92, art. 5(1), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 15.
Id.
Id.

373 Id.
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Member States two situations in which their power can be exercised. The first is where a fare is so "excessively high" that it
results in a "disadvantage [to] users. 3' 1 74 A fare is determined to
be excessively high by examining the entire fare structure for
the route and the "competitive market situation," along with
comparing the fare to the long-term, fully allocated costs of the
carrier.3 75 A fare might also be withdrawn when it represents
part of a "sustained downward development" of fares that is not
an ordinary seasonal phenomenon and is resulting in "widespread losses" among the carriers on the route. 376 As with excessively high fares, an excessively low fare is determined 3 by
77
considering the long-term, fully allocated costs of the carrier.
A Member State invoking this power must notify the Commission, other Member States concerned, and the affected carriers
to provide an explanation for its actions.3 7 8 Other Member
States have 14 days to object to the withdrawal of the fare; if
none objects, the fare is automatically withdrawn. 79 Carriers
and other parties do not have the right to contest the withdrawal
of a fare, although any party with a "legitimate interest" may file
a complaint asking the Commission to investigate whether a fare
violates Article 6's provisions. 8 If the Commission determines
that a fare violates Article 6, the relevant Member State must
withdraw the fare, barring a successful appeal to the Council to
reverse the Commission's decision.3 ' The contested fare remains in effect pending the final decision of the Commission or
the Council (in the event of an appeal), unless a similar or lower
fare on the same route was found to be excessively high within
the previous six months. 8 2 This entire process effectively terminates the double disapproval regime that had previously existed.
Regulation 2409/92 went into effect on January 1, 1993,383 officially repealing Regulation 2342/90 in the process.3 8 4 Regulation 2409/92 remains the pinnacle of direct tariff regulation, as
374 Id.

375Council Regulation 2409/92, art. 6(1)(a), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15.
377

Id. at 16.
Id.

378

Id.

376

379 Id.

380 Council Regulation 2409/92, art. 7(2), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 15, 17.
181,Id.
382

Id.

383

Id.

384

Id.

at 17.
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it has not been amended since its implementation,
nor is there
3 5
any proposed measure to amend or replace it.

f. Regulation 1617/93
Although the EU's regulatory regime for pricing itself has remained unchanged since the implementation of Regulation
2409/92, the Commission has revisited the subject of tariff consultations several times. In 1993, the Commission adopted Regulation (EEC) 1617/93, which effectively replaced Regulation
84/91.86 Regulation 1617/93 was substantially similar to Regulation 84/91, but it did have some noticeable changes. The new
regulation broadened the exemption for tariff consultations
concerning interlining by permitting consultations for the purpose of being able to provide users with a single travel document reflecting all stages of their journey8 7 and by making it
possible for a user to change their flight to a different air carrier. 8 Regulation 1617/93, however, imposed one notable restriction: when a carrier participates in a tariff consultation, it
must individually file with the appropriate authorities of the
Member States concerned all tariffs that were not the subject of
the consultation. 389 Apparently this provision is intended to deter carriers from publicly consulting each other about a small
number of tariffs and then using those consultations as the basis
to covertly restructure the remainder of their tariffs. The regulation was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1998.390
g.

Regulation 1523/96

Regulation 1617/93 has been amended twice since its implementation, first in 1996 and again in 1999. In July 1996, the
Commission promulgated Regulation (EC) 1523/96, 39' which
made a substantial change to the Union's policy toward tariff
consultations. While earlier regulations concerning tariff consultations had governed all types of air carriage, Regulation
1523/96 specifically eliminated the exemption for consultations
on cargo tariffs by removing all references to cargo or freight
385 As of July 15, 2000.
386

Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993

0J. (L

155) 18.

3H7Id. at 20.
388

Id. at 21.

389 Id.
3110Id. at 22.
391

Commission Regulation 1523/96, 1996 0.J. (L 190) 11.
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services from the text of Regulation 1617/93.92 The Commission explained that the exemption for consultations had been
granted to help carriers adjust to the introduction of competition and because it was believed that consultations were necessary for interlining agreements which would lower costs to
users.,' " However, enough time had passed that carriers should
have acclimated themselves to the more competitive environment.394 Furthermore, evidence had shown that tariff consultations for the purpose of interlining did not actually result in
lower costs. 3 95 Therefore, the Commission felt that cargo tariff

consultations should no longer be protected from evaluation for
anti-competitiveness-"9' and gave carriers until June 30, 1997 to

bring themselves into compliance with the regulation's dictates.3 97 The Commission did not offer an explanation as to why
consultations on passenger tariffs should be permitted to continue. The 1999 regulation, Regulation (EC) 1083/1999,"9'
merely extended the conditions of Regulation 1523/96 to June
30, 2001.2 99 At that time, the Commission will reconsider the
exemption on passenger tariff consultations....
2. ECAC Contributions
Outside the EU proper, ECAC has also contributed to the liberalization of pricing. On a quasi-diplomatic level, despite internal disagreement, ECAC has engaged in a modicum of airfare
policy negotiations with the United States. In October 1984, the
United States and ECAC signed a Memorandum of Understanding that liberalized regulation of North Atlantic fares. The pact
set "zones of reasonableness" for North Atlantic fares through
April 30, 1987.401 A two-year memorandum with even more liberal provisions was signed in February 1987. The agreement established deep-discount fare zones of an average of ten percent,
392

Id. at 12.

393 Id. at 11.
394 Id.

Id.
9fi Commission Regulation 1523/96, prnbl. (7), 1996 OJ. (L 190) 11, 12.
397 Id. at 12.
. Commission Regulation 1083/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 131) 27.
IId. at 28.
395

400

Id. at 27.

401

U.S. European Carriers Extend Agreement on North Atlantic Fares, Av. WK. &

SPACE TECH., Apr.

8, 1985, at 31.
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and allowed such fares to be offered with fewer restrictions.4 0 2
Under this arrangement, airlines enjoyed freedom to set transatlantic fares without government intervention so long as they fell
within an agreed-upon percentage above or below a reference
price.

403

Liberalization in the areas of rates and capacity took an important step forward in December 1986, when ECAC concluded
two Memoranda of Understanding regarding intra-European
scheduled air tariffs and capacity.40 4 The former was the first
effort by a significant number of European states to embrace a
tariff scheme whereby rates falling within a specific range would
be automatically approved by the involved governments. The
tariff Memorandum of Understanding established a Discount
Zone of 90% to 65% and a Deep-Discount Zone of 65% to 45%
of the reference price, provided that the passengers using them
satisfied certain conditions.?° The Memorandum of Understanding on capacity sharing allowed either participating nation
to provide up to 55% of the market's capacity, as opposed to the
previous 50/50 sharing standard. Thus, for the then twenty-two
ECAC member nations (which included all EU members at the
time), liberalization in the areas of rates and capacity took an
important first step forward in December 1986.46
3.

Commission Investigations

Interestingly, since the implementation of the Third Package
pricing regulation, the Commission has issued no decisions concerning tariff levels or tariff consultations.? 7 In 1996, EasyJet, a
value carrier operating on the London-Amsterdam route, filed a
complaint against KLM, alleging predatory pricing.40 8 The
Commission spent over a year investigating the allegations, by
402 ECAC, U.S. Renew North Atlantic Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 23, 1987,
at 32. The agreement was effective for a two-year period, beginning April 1,
1987. The following 16 ECAC Member States are affected by it: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
403 U.S., ECAC Sign Atlantic Fare Pact, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 22, 1984, at
33.
404 ECA C Approves LiberalizingFare, Capacity Regulations, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 36.
40,

Id.

406

i.

Lois Jones, When the Going Gets Tough..., AIRLINE Bus., May 1998, at 26.
408 John Dodgson & Jose Jorge, Law of the Jungle?, AIRLINE Bus., May 1997, at
70, 72-73.
407
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the end of which Easyjet had withdrawn its complaint. 4"' Another value carrier, World Airlines, filed a pricing complaint in
1996 against Air UK. 410 But World Airlines went bankrupt
before the Commission could take action on its complaint."
Finally, VLM, a Flemish regional carrier, filed a pricing complaint against Cityflyer Express in 1996,412 but it apparently also

withdrew its complaint. Virgin Express has publicly expressed
concern over the pricing policies of SAS, but it has not formally
filed a complaint. 41 3 EU Competition Commissioner Karel Van

Miert said in 1998, "[Predatory pricing] is a real problem but a
very difficult problem to tackle. But if there is a good case then
14
4
we eventually will rule on it.

C.

POOLING OF REVENUE

Revenue pooling is a much smaller concern of the European
Union now that full-scale liberalization of prices and cabotage
has occurred. The EU last directly addressed revenue pooling
as part of Regulation 2671/88, granting block exemptions for
airline agreements from Article 85 regulations.4" 5 In order to
avail themselves of the block exemption for revenue pooling,
the economic transfer must go to the carrier offering the less
favorable schedule (service at less busy times of day and less busy
periods of the travel season), and must be determined prior to
the offering of the service, on the basis of the schedule of the
pool participants.4 16 The regulation imposes a one-percent ceil4 17
ing on the transfer of revenue (exclusive of shared costs).

Moreover, each carrier is guaranteed flexibility as to capacity offered. 8' Since the implementation of Regulation 2671/88, the
Council and Commission have left the subject of revenue pooling undisturbed, either through further regulations or
decisions.
409.Jones,

supra note 407, at 31.
410 Lois Jones, 96 at a Glance,AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 1997, at 30 [hereinafter 96

AT

A GLANCE].
411 Dodgson &Jorge, supra note 408, at 72.
412 96 AT A GLANCE, supra note 410, at 30.

41-3Jackie Gallacher et al., Holding the Pieces Together, AIRLINE Bus.,Jan. 1998, at

28.
414 Jones, supra note
415

hI.

416
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417 Id.
418

Id.

407, at 31.
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MARKET ACCESS

A keystone element of liberalization, market access provisions
have been a primary focus of the Council and Commission for
many years. Historically, market access was predicated on bilateral agreements ("bilaterals") between individual states" (i.e.,
nations would independently negotiate terms of market access
for each other's air carriers).4 20 But bilaterals go against one of
the central purposes of the EC/EU: establishing uniform laws
and regulations among Member States to advance commerce,
including transportation.4 2' Thus, the Council and Commission
have worked to establish a body of regulations governing intraUnion market access 4 22 and have increasingly sought to replace
the bilaterals that exist between Member States and non-members with EU-negotiated multilateral agreements.4 23 The EC/
EU's internal efforts at improving market access have been primarily directed at four areas: standardizing licensing of air carriers, eliminating capacity limits on routes, making full cabotage
available, and regularizing slot allocation.
1.

Licensing of Air Carriers

Processes for licensing for air carriers had been left undisturbed by the first two Packages, presumably because the Council was hesitant to touch a subject so closely bound to cherished
notions of national identity. However, as part of the Second
Package the Council ordered itself to adopt for implementation
no later than July 1, 1992, a regulation governing the licensing
of air carriers within the Community.4 24 Although it missed its
self-imposed deadline by six months, the Council did ultimately
pass a regulation concerning the licensing of Community air
carriers as part of the Third Package. 42' The Council may be
forgiven for its tardiness, however, for its Regulation 2407/92
was of grand scope.
4'9 EEC Transport Ministers Expected to Approve Compromise Liberalization,Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 20, 1986, at 45
420 Daniel C. Hedlund, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade In InternationalAirline Services, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 267-69 (1994).
421

Id. at 288.

422 Council Regulation 2408/92, pmbl., 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8, 9.
423
424
425

Chris Thornton & Chris Lyle, Freedom'sPaths,AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 74.
Council Regulation 2343/90, art. 3(2), 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8, 10.
Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1.
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Regulation 2407/92

The regulation begins by stipulating that it does not cover the
carriage of passengers, mail, or cargo by "non-power-driven" or
ultra-light aircraft, nor does it cover flights take take-off from
and land at a single airport."2 ' These types of aviation will remain subject to relevant national laws. 27 Therefore, all commercial aviation (other than certain types of sightseeing flights)
is placed under the EU's jurisdiction. The regulation proceeds
to establish that an air carrier meeting the requirements that
follow is "entitled" to be granted an operating license, but licensing does not itself give an air carrier rights to specific routes
or markets. 2 A Member State may confer an operating license
when the undertaking applying has its principal place of business located in that Member State and its primary purpose is to
conduct air transportation. 29 The air carrier must also be majority owned by Member States or their nationals, unless there is
a preexisting agreement between a Member State and a non-EU
member concerning ownership requirements."' A further exception to the general rule concerning the ownership requirement is that certain airlines are recognized as being
grandfathered out of it,"' although if their ownership shifts to
another non-EU state or national, they will than become subject
to the general rule. 32 Air carriers must be able to show on demand by a Member State that they are in compliance with the
4
ownership requirements. 11
The regulation also imposes a number of financial obligations
on an air carrier seeking a license. The carrier must show that it
can meet "at any time" its "actual and potential obligations" and
both its fixed and operational costs, premised on realistic assumptions, for three months from its start of operations without
any income from its operations. 4"s To establish that it meets the
previous requirements, the carrier has to provide a business
plan for its first two years of operation to the appropriate licens26

Id. at 2.

427 Id.
428

Id.

Id.
430 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 4(2), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1, 2.
429

[d. at 2. The excepted airlines are Scandinavian Airlines System, Britannia
Airways, and Monarch Airlines.
432 Id.
4311Id. at 3.
431

434
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ing authority in the relevant Member State."' The carrier must
give advance notice of any changes in its operations to the licensing authority, along with notice of planned mergers or acquisitions, or any change in ownership of a block of shares that
represents ten percent or more of the company's total shareholding.43 6 If the licensing authority decides that the above sort
of activities have "a significant bearing on the finances" of the
carrier, it can require that the carrier provide a new business
plan covering at least the following twelve months.437 Furthermore, if a licensing authority determines that "financial
problems" exist with a carrier under license by it, the authority
may examine the carrier's financial situation and suspend or revoke its license if it decides that the carrier cannot meet its actual and potential obligations for the next twelve months.4 8 All
air carriers must provide financial statements for each fiscal year
to their licensing authorities and must also be able to provide
such statements on demand by the licensing authorities.4 " Additionally, all air carriers must carry liability insurance.""
At their own discretion, Member States may require proof
that the managers of the air carrier seeking a license are people
'
of "good repute."441
The managers may also be required to
show that they have not declared bankruptcy, nor have they had
a previous operating license suspended or revoked
for "serious
4 2
professional misconduct" or a criminal offense. "
An air carrier seeking a license need not own any aircraft, but
it must have at least one aircraft under lease."43 Other than in
exceptional circumstances, all aircraft operated by a carrier
must be registered in a Member State."4 ' If a carrier wishes to
register in one Member State an aircraft that was previously reg435 Council

Regulation 2407/92, art. 5(2), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 3.

Id. at 3.
437 Id.
416

438 Id. However, none of these aforementioned provisions apply to air carriers
that exclusively operate light aircraft, provided that they do not operate scheduled services or have a turnover greater than three million Euros per year. Id.
439

Id.

440

Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 7, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1, 4.

441

Id. at 7.

Id. Proof of qualification can be made with appropriate official documents
from the Member State or the manager's home Member State (if different from
the Member State issuing the license), or may be made by swearing an oath or
declaration before a competent notary, judge, or an equivalent administrative
official. Id.
443 Id.
444 Id.
442
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istered in another Member State, the State that will receive the
new registration cannot apply any discriminatory fee to the registration and must process the registration without delay.44 5 Interestingly, the regulation specifically prohibits only
discriminatory fees and delays on the transfer of registration of
aircraft within the Community. This would suggest that it is acceptable for a Member State to apply additional fees and to refuse to promptly handle transfers of registrations for aircraft
belonging to non-Community carriers, perhaps indicating a protectionist impulse on the part of the Council.
The regulation also grants Member States broad powers to intervene in the operations of carriers after they have been licensed. Any carrier that wishes to lease an aircraft from or to
another carrier must receive prior approval from the appropriate licensing authorities.4 46 Member States may review a carrier's operating license one year after it is granted and every five
years thereafter or if a carrier has ceased operations for six
months.447 If there is a change in "one or more elements affecting the legal situation" of a carrier, then the Member States that
license it may, at their discretion, require the carrier to reapply
for an operating license.44 Furthermore, a carrier that applies
for bankruptcy shall be stripped of its license if the appropriate
licensing authorities believe that there is not a realistic possibility of the carrier recovering within a reasonable time.449
The remainder of the regulation is primarily procedural in
nature. It requires that the Member States' processes for granting licenses be made public.450 Member States must render decisions on whether to grant a license within three months of the
carrier's application for one and, if the application has been refused, the Member State must provide an explanation for the
refusal.45 ' A carrier may appeal a license rejection to the Commission.452 Failure by a licensed carrier to comply with the requirements of the regulation can result in its market-access
rights being suspended until it brings itself into compliance.455
445 Council Regulation 2407/92, art. 8(4), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 7.
447

Id.
Id. at 8.

448

Id.
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450oCouncil Regulation 2407/92, art. 13(1), 1992 O.J, (L 240) 1, 8.
451
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Finally, carriers that were already licensed at the time the regulation entered into effect had one year to bring themselves into
compliance with the terms of the regulation unless otherwise
provided for.454
b.

The Savena Decision

Although licensing might appear to be a potentially contentious issue, most of the Commission's work on the subject has
been without particular rancor. An exemplary decision concerned the ownership restructuring of the Belgian national air
carrier Sabena.4 5 5 In May 1995, the Belgian government notified the Commission of an agreement it had reached earlier that
month to sell Swissair a considerable minority share in
Sabena.456 While Switzerland was a member of the European
Free Trade Area, it was not a Union member, so Swissair was
treated as a non-Union carrier, necessitating the review.4 57 At
the time the agreement was reached, the Belgian government or
its national holding company owned a 61.6% share in Sabena,
37.49% was owned by a subsidiary of Air France, and the
residual 0.9% was owned by other Belgian nationals (primarily
institutional investors and Sabena employees).458

The agree-

ment gave Swissair a 49.5% share of Sabena by transferring all of
Air France's shares to Swissair and by increasing Sabena's capitalization, with Swissair being given the opportunity to purchase
the new issue first.4

59

Swissair was also sold a block of "special

participation certificates," which appear to be similar to preferred shares, in that they did not confer voting rights on the
holders.46
Before the Commission began its analysis of the agreement, it
laid out what it considered the four key elements of Regulation
2407/92: (i) the carrier's principal place of business must be
located in the licensing Member State,461 (ii) the carrier's main
occupation has to be air transport or air transport in conjunc454

Id.

455 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, 1995 0J. (L 239) 19.
456 Id. The Belgian government also submitted an addendum a month later,

but the Commission treated the two documents as one for the purpose of its
analysis.
457 Id. at 23.
45 Id. at 20.
459 Id.
4COCommission Decision 95/404/EC, 1995 0.J. (L 239) 19, 23.
461

Id.
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tion with some other aspect of aviation (maintenance, repair,
etc.), 462 (iii)) the carrier must be majority owned by Member
States and/or nationals of Member States, 463 and (iv) the carrier
is required to be at all times "effectively controlled" by Member
States and/or their nationals.464
The Commission first noted that the agreement would leave
Sabena's headquarters in Belgium and Sabena's primary business would remain air transportation; so the agreement was in
compliance with the first two elements of the regulation.465
With respect to the third element, majority ownership, the Commission stated that it is satisfied if Member States or their nationals own even just 50% plus one share of the carrier's capital.4 6
The Commission defined capital for these purposes as equity
capital, (i.e., it confers voting rights on the holders and entitles
the holders to dividends and a share of the corporation's assets
if it is liquidated).467 The issue of how capital is defined was

relevant because of the "special participation certificates,"
which, if considered part of Sabena's capital, would have conferred a majority share to Swissair, thereby preventing Sabena
from receiving a license as a Union carrier. However, since the
certificates did not carry voting rights, Swissair would remain a
minority shareholder under the Commission's definition."' Finally, while the agreement also contained a provision awarding
Swissair warrants for the future purchase of additional Sabena
shares, the agreement prohibited the warrants from being exercised without a change in EU regulation to permit majority ownership by non-EU states or nationals.46 ' Thus, the Commission
decided that the agreement was in compliance with the third
element of Regulation 2407/92 as well. 47 °
Finally, the Commission addressed the element of "effective
control." The Commission stated that "effective control" means
that Member States or their nationals must, either individually
or jointly with other Member States or their nationals, have the
"ultimate decision-making power" in the carrier's manage4i2

(I.

,463 Id.

464 Id.

40 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, VIII, 1995
466 i. at 24.

0J. (L 239) 19, 23.

1(d
469 Id. at 25.
470 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, 1995 0.1. (L 239) 19, 25.
,468
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ment.47 1 This means that they must be able to, directly or indirectly, make final determinations about the carrier's business
plan, annual budget, or any major investments or cooperation
projects. 4 7 2 However, the Commission claimed that there was

no per se rule that could govern a determination about whether
"effective control" exists; thus, each instance must be analyzed
on the basis of its own merits. 4 7 3 In the case of the Sabena/

Swissair agreement, the Commission noted that the structure of
the company's board of directors, combined with Belgian majority ownership of voting shares, was such that the Belgian owners
would retain the ability to effectively veto any unilateral action
by Swissair.474 Concluding its analysis of the effective control requirement, the Commission stated that, "Article 4(2) [of Regulation 2407/92] is not designed to prevent Community air
carriers from cooperating with carriers from third countries...
The provision must not be read as prohibiting a Community carrier from limiting its commercial freedom in the context of such
long-term strategic cooperation.

4 75

The

Commission

con-

cluded that the Sabena/Swissair agreement would not result in
Sabena forfeiting its EU carrier status.4 76
2.

Capacity Limits

Capacity issues were initially addressed under the Council's
First Package, in its 1987 Decision on Capacity Sharing and Market
Access.4 77 Under this proposal, the traditional 50-50% split of capacity between European carriers was abandoned in favor of an
immediate 55-45% rule (fromJanuary 1, 1988, to September 30,
1989), and then a 60-40% split (after October 1, 1989).478 However, the Decision included an escape clause, enabling any
Member State to petition the Commission to postpone or cancel
the 60-40% rule on grounds that its flag carriers had suffered
"serious financial damage. ' 4" 7 The Decision also established
471

Id.

472

Id.

473 Id.
474 Id.

at 25-26. Swissair was also given veto powers but only in regards to
amending Sabena's articles of incorporation, its capitalization, or whether to liquidate, merge, or split up the company. The Commission considered this to be
ordinary protections for a minority shareholder.
475 Commission Decision 95/404/EC, XII, art. 1, 1995 0.J. (L 239) 19, 27.
476 Id. at 28.
477 Council Decision 87/602, 1987 0.J. (L 374) 19.
478 Id. at 21.
479

Id.
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new entry opportunities of multiple designation over routes having more than 250,000 passengers, with this threshold of passengers being reduced in the second and third year to 200,000 (or
1,200 return flights), and 180,000 (or 1,000 return flights), respectively.4"' Significant new opportunities for entry were created between hub and regional airports,4"' and for Fifth
Freedom rights.
Under the Commission's airline-agreement block-exemption
(from Article 85) regulations, capacity-limitation agreements between airlines had to have as their objective a satisfactory spread
of regular and reliable service over less busy periods as opposed
to anticompetitive market segmentation. Under the block exemption, airlines were also free to withdraw without penalty
from such arrangements on short notice.48 2
Via the Second Package, in 1990, the Commission adopted
another set of exemptions for the planning and coordination of
capacity.48 3 In order to qualify, any capacity agreements had to
refrain from binding the carriers to the results, had to have as
their purpose relief of airport congestion, and could not be designed to limit capacity.4 8 4 The agreements also could not have

the effect of preventing carriers from changing their allocated
capacities and schedules,48 nor could they be designed to influence the capacity or scheduling of a nonparticipating carrier.48 6
In conjunction with the revised Article 85 exemptions, the
Council promulgated a new regulation governing capacity allocation, Council Regulation 2343/90.487 The terms of the regula-

tion only applied to scheduled air carriers48" and Member States
were left free to impose other restrictions on domestically licensed air carriers.48" Member States were obliged to allow
other Community airlines the use of Third and Fourth Freedom
routes on a reciprocal basis.40 ° With the approval of any other
EC/EU nation concerned and the Commission, however, a
Member State was allowed to impose capacity limitations on
481,
481

Jd. at 22.
Id.

ARGVRIS, supra note 62, at 24-25.
483Commission Regulation 84/91, 1990 OJ. (L 10) 14.
484 Id. at 15.
'182

485 Id.
486 I(.

487 Council Regulation 2343/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 1, 8.
488Id. at 10.
489 Id
490 Id.
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routes that it had declared to be under a "public service obligation," provided that the route has 30,000 or fewer seats allocated
to it already." 1 The 1990 regulations allowed multiple carrier
designation on dense routes, defined as more than 140,000
(previously 180,000) passengers, or more than 800 (previously
1,000) round-trip flights during the preceding year.492 On January 1, 1992, these thresholds were lowered to only 100,000 passengers or 600 round trip flights. 43 The 1990 regulations also
permitted airlines to dedicate up to 50% of their seating capacity to Fifth Freedom routes (up from 30% allowed under Phase
One) .41 The Member States were permitted to regulate, "without discrimination on grounds of nationality," the division 4of5
flights between the constituent airports of an airport system 1
(i.e., multiple airports that serve the same metropolitan area).
As to capacity limitations, the 60-40% ratio approved under
the First Package (after October 1989) was extended beginning
November 1, 1990, by 7.5%.496 Thus, as of November 1, 1990,
the capacity of a Member State's airlines could reach as high as
67.5%,
and the regulation specifically called for the Council
to abolish capacity limitations by January 1, 1993.4' 8 But the
Commission reserved the right to limit capacity growth for "a
limited period" if it caused "serious financial damage" to an airline. 9 Member States were also granted the power to manipulate capacity limitations for the purpose of shielding certain new
routes from competition. 50 0

This power is granted where a

Member State has approved a new route for a carrier that will
operate between regional airports using aircraft with 80 seats or

less. 511 The Member State may prevent other carriers from op-

erating on the route for up to two years unless they agree to
limit their service to no more than 80 seats per flight (either by
using aircraft with 80 seats or less, or by selling no more than5112
80
seats on a larger aircraft) between the two regional airports.
491 Id. at
492

10-11.

Council Regulation 2343, art. 6(2), 1990 O.J. (L 217) 1, 11.

493 ld.
494

Id. at 12.

495

1(.

496

Id.

497

Council Regulation 2343/90, art. 11(1), 1990 OJ. (L 217) 8, 12.

4911

Id. at 12-13.

499

Id. at 13.

500 Id.
501
502

at 11.

Id.
Council Regulation 2343/90, art. 5(4), 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8, 11.
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Traffic Rights

The Third Package is broad in its scope and effect on the issue of traffic rights, its primary focus. On June 22, 1992, the
Council adopted this third phase of regulations for scheduled
and charter airlines. 5°13 The Third Package consists of three sep-

arate regulations, two of which directly address traffic rights: 1)
licensing of Community air carriers (discussed above) ,50 and 2)
access to intra-Community routes for licensed Community air
carriers. °5
Key to understanding the current air transport market, and in
turn, the EU's broader goal of full liberalization, is understanding the concept of Fifth Freedom rights. As defined by the Chicago Aviation Convention of 1944, a Fifth Freedom right is:
The right to transport passengers, cargo and mail between two
other States as a continuation of, or a preliminary to, the operation of the 3rd or 4th freedom ....
3rd Freedom: The right to transport passengers, cargo and
mail from the State of registration of the aircraft to another contracting State, and to set them down there.
4th Freedom: The right to take on board passengers, cargo and
mail in another contracting State, and to transport them to the
State of registration of the aircraft.""
The attainment of Fifth Freedom rights is the backbone of a
competitive European air transport market. Prior to liberalization, full Fifth Freedom rights were the exception, rather than
the norm, in the European air transport market. With Fifth
Freedom rights come the practical ability to compete in a variety
of national markets, an ability that in and of itself fosters competition. Around the concept of Fifth Freedom rights, the EU proceeded to build a superstructure of liberalization.
a.

Regulation 2408/92

Regulation 2408/92 was designed to specifically address the
issue of access to intra-Community routes for Community air
carriers, particularly Fifth Freedom routes.11 7 Unlike prior regulations, which had applied only to scheduled carriers, Regula50-1 See Carol A. Shifrin, EC Ministers Approve Liberalization, But 'Safeguards" May
Slow Competition, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 29, 1992, at 21.

504
505
506
1,7

Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1.
Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 8.
GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, at 5.
Council Regulation 2408/92, pmbl., 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 8.
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tion 2408/92 was directed at both scheduled and chartered
carriers. 5 8 The central premise of the regulation is expressed in

the first paragraph of Article 3, which reads, "Subject to this
Regulation, Community air carriers shall be permitted by the
Member State(s) concerned to exercise traffic rights on routes
within the Community. ' 5 9' Thus, the Council established that

the EC/EU's default position on internal air traffic would be to
permit air carriers to exercise traffic routes.
Article 10 (1) of Regulation 2408/92 abolished capacity limitations, with four notable exceptions.5 "' The first exception,
found in Article 6(1), was not noted in Article 10(1); but for
Article 6(1) to have meaning, it must be considered an exception to Article 10(1)'s elimination of capacity restrictions. Article 6(1) is effectively a modification of the new route protection
clause found in Regulation 2343/90, in that Member States may
limit capacity on new routes between regional airports to 80
seats per flight for two years.5 ' However, the regulation further
circumscribes the application of this provision by limiting its applicability to routes with a capacity of 30,000 seats or less per
year.512 The second exception is found in Article 8(1), which
states that the regulation does not affect the right of a Member
State to control the distribution of traffic among the component
parts of an airport
system, provided it is done in a nondiscrimi5'
natory manner.

The regulation does not state what the rela-

tionship between traffic distribution and capacity limits are, but
it can be inferred. Since many airports are incapable of handling all sizes of aircraft, the selection of which airport a carrier
is permitted to use may effectively limit the maximum number
of seats it can offer per flight. Article 9(1) provides the third
exception, in that it permits Member States to "impose conditions on, limit or refuse" traffic rights because of serious environmental problems or congestion.5 14 These conditions or
limitations, however, must be nondiscriminatory (on the basis of
nationality or identity of carriers), must not "unduly" affect competition among carriers, must not be more stringent than is required to alleviate the problem, and must not be imposed for a
508
509
510
511
512

513
514

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 11.
Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 6(1), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1, 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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period of more than three years.'
The Member State seeking
to impose the conditions must notify other Member States and
the Commission of its decision and provide a justification for its
actions. 51" Finally, the fourth exception mirrors another provision of the earlier regulation. Article 10(2) permits the Commission to, after conducting a review of the circumstances, limit
capacity in situations where a Community air carrier has suffered "serious financial damage. 51 7
b.

The Viva Air Decision

Regulation 2408/92 had been in effect for less than a month
when the first traffic rights case came before the Commission.51 8
On January 25, 1993, Viva Air, a value carrier based in Spain
requested that the Commission investigate the decision of the
French aviation authorities to deny it access to the Madrid-Paris
(Charles De Gaulle) route.51 9 Viva Air submitted an application
to the French air authorities on October 28, 1992, asking to be
granted traffic rights and slots to begin on January 2, 1993.520

This application was followed by two messages from Spanish aviation authorities and another from Viva Air, none of which were
acknowledged by the French authorities. 521 Finally, on Decem-

ber 18, following a third letter from Viva Air, the French authorities replied, denying Viva Air access on the grounds that it had
not complied with a French regulation specifically governing
the application process for non-French carriers.522 Viva Air responded that Community regulations superseded such national
regulations.
This led the French authorities to clarify their
position by offering traffic rights to Paris (Orly) instead, based
on Article 8(1) of Regulation 2408/92 which permits regulation
of traffic distribution within an airport system. 5 24 Furthermore,

the French authorities explained that they considered Viva Air
to be a subdivision of Iberia, which already was operating on the
Madrid-Paris (Orly) route, and duplication of routes was not
515

Id.

51i, Id.

517Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 10(2), 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 13.
518

Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, 1993 Oj. (L 140) 51.
at 51.

519 Id.

520

Id.

521 Id.
522 [d.

52-Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 140) 51, 51-52.
5'

Id. at 52.
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permissible.5 2 5 Following this response, Viva Air filed its complaint with the Commission.
In its complaint, Viva Air identified three principal areas for
consideration by the Commission: (i) the conditions of the authorization procedure, (ii) the implementation of the traffic distribution rules under Article 8(1), and (iii) Viva Air's status as
an independent carrier.5 26 With respect to the first area, the
Commission said that the "general principle [is] freedom of access for all Community air carriers to all intra-Community
routes. 52 7 Member States still have the right to impose authorization procedures in conjunction with the conditions laid out in
Article 3(2), 3(4) and/or Articles 4 through 10; although if
none of those restrictions apply then traffic rights should be automatically granted.5 28 However, even where the above restrictions apply, the authorization procedures "must be kept to the
minimum necessary" and the Member State must respond to an
application within a standard deadline.5 2 9 Furthermore, "the
right to exercise the freedom is now the rule and refusal the
exception," so where a Member State does not reply by the mandated deadline, authorization of traffic rights is assumed.'
Any
refusal of traffic rights should clearly explain why the rights are
being denied and what remedies are available to the carrier."'
Yet the Commission hastened to point out that this preference for granting traffic rights does not mean that carriers can
rely on being able to immediately implement service. The process of slot allocation is considered to be separate from traffic
rights, as reflected by it being governed by a different regulation.5 3 2 Therefore, a carrier may receive traffic rights but not
receive slots, or receive slots but not receive traffic rights. 3
Nevertheless, Member States may not deny traffic rights to a car53 4
rier merely because it lacks sufficient slots.
Finally, in regard to authorization procedures, the Commission took the French authorities to task over the applicability of
its traffic rights regulation. The Commission stated that Mem525

Id.

526
527

Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 54.

528

Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, II(VI), 1993

0.J. (L 140) 51, 54-55.

529Id. at 55.
530

Id.

531 Id.

532- Id. See next section for further analysis of Regulation 95/93.
533 Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, II(VI), 1993 0.J. (L 140) 51, 55.
534 Id.

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

1062

ber States could not have different authorization procedures for
domestic carriers than for carriers from other Member States. 5
Next, the Commission examined the Paris traffic distribution
rules in the light of Article 8(1) of Regulation 2408/92. The
Commission admitted that Article 8(1) could produce restrictions on access to routes; so it is necessary to consider whether
such restrictions are discriminatory or arbitrary. 536 The burden
of proof is on the Member State under review to justify any restrictions that result from its traffic distribution rules.5 "7 Traffic
distribution rules must be transparent and cannot have the effect of targeting individual carriers. Additionally, to be enforceable, any such rules must be published so carriers may have the
opportunity to read them and make plans accordingly. 538 The
traffic distribution rules for Paris were not published, so the
Commission ruled they were inapplicable. 5
Despite having determined that the traffic distribution rules
for Paris were per se inapplicable because they were unpublished,
the Commission still addressed the remainder of France's argument on the subject. French aviation authorities claimed that
they had a rule that did not permit air carriers to run services on
the same medium-haul international route from both Paris
(Orly) and Paris (Charles De Gaulle).

540

As the French authori-

ties considered Viva Air to be part of Iberia, which already operated on the Paris (Orly)-Madrid route, it would have
contravened this rule to permit Viva Air to fly from Paris
(Charles De Gaulle). The Commission viewed this argument
with a strong degree of skepticism, stating, "[we] cannot accept
at face value the explanations provided by the French authorities. ' 541' There was no clear rationale for why only medium-haul
international routes should be subject to such a rule when, applying the French authorities' own criteria, there were other categories of routes which might justifiably be more subject to the
rule. 54 2 Moreover, the Commission observed that Euralair, a

subsidiary of Air France, was allowed to operate a Paris (Orly)595
35.
536id

5.7 1(.

Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, II(VII), 1993 O.J. (L 140) 51, 56.
Id. The Commission also noted that French law prohibits the enforcement
of unpublished regulations, so the French aviation authorities violated national
law as well as Community law.
-538

531

54) Id.
541

(1.

542 Id.

at 56.
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Madrid route while Air France was operating a Paris (Charles De
Gaulle)-Madrid route, which clearly violated the supposed traffic distribution rule. 543 Thus, while this discussion was not essential to its decision, the Commission clearly established that it
would take a sharply critical view of traffic distribution rules that
appear capricious.
While the Commission had found by this point that Viva Air
was wrongfully denied traffic rights for the Madrid-Paris
(Charles De Gaulle) route, it chose to continue its analysis and
address the final issue, whether Viva Air was part of Iberia. The
Commission concluded that Viva Air should be considered a
separate carrier from Iberia, noting that Article 2(b) of Regulation 2408/92 only defines a Community carrier as one that
holds a valid operating license issued by a Member State, and
imposes no other restrictions.544 Viva Air held an operating license in its name and, furthermore, it had a separate staff,
"commercial image," and air fleet. 54 5 Thus, the Commission de-

termined that the French aviation authorities were obliged to
withdraw their refusal of Viva Air's application.546
4.

Slot Allocation

a.

Regulation 84/91

The Commission promulgated a new set of regulations in
1990 addressing slot allocation and airport scheduling.547 The
exemptions apply only if, inter alia, consultations on slot allocation and airport scheduling are open to all carriers, rules of priority are neutral and nondiscriminatory, new entrants receive
not less than 50% of newly created or unused slots, and air carriers participating in the consultations have full information. 48
b.

Regulation 95/93

The Council next broached the subject of slot allocation in
January 1993, with Regulation 95/93.549 The regulation was enacted to remedy increasing levels of congestion at Community
.54'1Commission Decision 93/347/EEC, 1I(VII), 1993 O.J. (L 140) 51, 57.
5414

Id.

545

Id.

546 Id.

5,17

Commission Regulation 84/91, 1990 O.J. (L 10) 14.

548 Id. at 16.
549 Council Regulation 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1.
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airports, while encouraging the entrance of new competitors. 5 "
It directly defined two categories of airports, and indirectly defined a third. The first category is that of "coordinated airports," those where a coordinator has been appointed to direct
the operations of carriers in regards to slot availability. 55' The
second category is that of "fully coordinated airports," those
where a coordinator has been appointed to actively allocate slots
to carriers desiring to land or take off.55 2 The implied third cat-

egory would be "uncoordinated" or "non-coordinated" airports,
where there is no planning for slot allocation, presumably because demand for space is so low.
Under Article 3 of the regulation, Member States are not obligated to designate any airport as coordinated or fully coordinated unless specifically directed by the terms of the
regulation. 5 3 A Member State must designate an airport as being coordinated in some manner when either: (i) the airport
authority and carriers representing the majority of the traffic at
the airport consider that capacity at the airport is inadequate,554
or (ii) new entrants encounter "serious problems" in obtaining
slots, 555 and, in either instance, a "thorough" capacity analysis

determines there is a genuine lack of capacity. 556 If the analysis
indicates that the lack of capacity cannot be quickly remedied by
other measures, then the airport must be declared fully coordi557
nated during those times when there is a shortage of capacity.
Once it has been determined that an airport must be coordinated in some manner, the Member State shall appoint a party
with "detailed knowledge of air carrier scheduling coordination" as the airport's coordinator..55 The same party may be appointed as coordinator at multiple airports. 5 9 The coordinator

must carry out its duties in an independent, neutral, nondiscriminatory, and transparent fashion, and make its information
on slot history, requests, availability, and criteria for allocations
available on request to interested parties.5 61 ° The coordinator
554) Id.
551

at 1.

Id. at 2.

552 Id.
553 Id.

Council Regulation 95/93, art. 3(3) (i), 1993 0J. (L 14) 1, 2.
Id. at 2.
55I hi.
557 Id. at 3.
554

555

58 Id.
5519Council Regulation 95/93, art. 4(1), 1993 0J. (L 14) 1, 3.

5,10 Id.
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must be assisted in its duties by a "coordination committee,"
composed of air carriers (or a representative organization), the
airport authorities, and air traffic control authorities concerned
with the operation of the airport.5 6 1 The coordinator, the coordination committee, and other concerned parties (including
customs and immigration authorities) must reevaluate the capacity available for slot allocation twice a year, using objective
criteria, and the feasibility of accommodating additional
traffic.56 2
Articles 8 through 10 provide the means by which slots are to
be allocated. A carrier that has used a particular slot previously
should be allowed to obtain the same slot in the future,5 63 provided that it has made use of that slot at least 80% of the time
over the previous scheduling period.5 6 4 In other words, the
Council's regulation embraces the notion of "grandfather
rights," whereby a carrier already holding and flying specified
slots may continue to retain them, provided that they are not
deemed dormant. Where all slot requests cannot be fulfilled,
the coordinator should give preference to commercial carriers
in general, and scheduled and "programmed non-scheduled"
carriers in particular. 6 5 After following those criteria, the coordinator must also consider any other priority rules established
by the airline industry and the coordination committee, provided those rules comply with EU law.5 66 The coordinator must
explain any refusals for slots and offer the nearest alternative
slot in its place.56 7 Carriers may exchange slots, subject to the
coordinator's approval that the exchange would not violate any
other parts of the regulation.5 68 New entrants may not exchange their slots for service between two Member State airports
for a period of two years. 56 9 Member States may reserve slots for
carriers operating routes subject to public service obligations.5 70
At fully coordinated airports, a slot pool must be formed from
unused slots, forfeited slots, and newly created slots. 571 Slots are
561 Id.
562 Id.

at 3-4.

56s id. at 4.
564Council Regulation 95/93, art. 10(3), 1993 OJ. (L 14) 1, 5.

Id. at 4.
566 Id.
515Council Regulation 95/93, at art. 8(2), 4.
565

568

Id.

5691Council
570 Id. at 4,
571

Id. at 5.

Regulation 95/93, art. 8(5), 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1, 4.
5.
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forfeited when the carrier that had been assigned them fails to
adequately use them and cannot offer evidence of mitigating
circumstances.5 7 2 As under the previous slot allocation regulation, 50% of slots in the slot pool must be reserved for new entrants, unless applications by new entrants total less than 50%.
If a new entrant refuses offers of reasonable alternative slots to
those it has requested, it can be stripped of its new-entrant
status.57 4
The regulation also contains a safeguard provision to prevent
carriers in a dominant position from "running up the score" on
weaker carriers.5 7 5 If two or more carriers operate on the same
route between EU airports, and at least one of those airports is
fully coordinated, the carrier with a greater number of frequencies may not acquire additional slots at the fully coordinated airport if the carrier with fewer frequencies has been denied slots
at the same airport.5 7 6 In such a situation, the Member States
concerned should make an effort to facilitate an agreement that
would permit the parties to acquire the slots as they desire.5 7 7
Finally, the regulation provides for reciprocity in regard to slot
allocation at non-Member State airports: a non-Member State
which does not provide equal access to slots at its airports will
find its carriers subject to refusal for slots at Member State
airports.5 78
c.

The Guernsey Transporatation Board Case

Slot allocation has been the subject of a number of legal actions. One interesting case was litigated in a British national
court,5 79 rather than before the Commission; but it offers a clear
example of the application of Regulation 95/93. In 1998, the
States of Guernsey Transportation Board ("the Board") brought
a suit against Airport Co-ordination Ltd. ("ACL"), the desig572

Id.

573

Id.

574 Council Regulation 95/93, art. 10(8), 1993 OJ. (L 14) 1, 5. Complaints

about the allocation of slots should be directed first to the coordination committee, then to the Member State. Id. at 4.
575 Id. at 5, 6.
576 Id. at 5.
577 Id. at 5, 6.
578 Id. at 6.
579 R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
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nated airport coordinator for Heathrow Airport in London.58 °
The Board filed suit in an effort to frustrate an exchange of slots
at Heathrow between Air UK and British Airways.581 The exchange of slots was the result of a decision by Air UK to terminate its London/Guernsey service, but which also had the
secondary effect of depriving Guernsey of any access to
Heathrow,58 the preferred airport for London flights. Aside
from providing Air UK with an equivalent number of other
Heathrow slots, British Airways also gave Air UK a sum of
money. 583 The Board alleged that this violated Articles 8 and 10
of Regulation 95/93, which permit only the "free exchange" or
"transfer" of slots between carriers, and that ACL was obligated
to block Air UK and British Airways from carrying out the exchange . 5 8 The Board also alleged that the decision of ACL to
reallocate the same slots to Air UK during the following schedul5
58
ing period was illegal.

The Board raised four possible issues for consideration. The
first was that the transactions between Air UK and British Airways "were not permissible exchanges" of slots. 586 The Board

grounded its argument on the fact that the slots British Airways
provided were unsuitable for Air UK's use and that Air UK never
used the slots, instead returning them to the Heathrow slot
pool. 587 To support this argument, the Board cited an informal

statement by a member of the Commission's Directorate General VII (Transportation) that an exchange of money for slots,
or an exchange of slots which results in only one party using its
slots, is an illegal transfer of slots rather than an exchange.58 8
The court rejected any such an interpretation, however, based
on the plain meaning of the regulation. Article 8(4) of Regulation 95/93, the court observed, provides for the free exchange
of slots, placing no limitations or restrictions on how slots may
580 Id. Air UK, British Airways, and IATA were also represented in the suit,
although they were not joined as defendants.
581 Id.
582 Id.

Id.
R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
583

584

586

Id.
Id.

587

Id.

588

Id.

585
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be exchanged. 5s9 The court also stated that the presence of an
accompanying payment of money does not convert an exchange
of slots into a sale.59 Therefore, the initial exchange of slots was
legal, despite Air UK's failure to use the slots it received and
British Airways' payment of money. This decision on the first
issue also obviated the need for a decision on the second issue,
which concerned the question of whether Air UK and British
Airways effected a "transfer" rather than an exchange. 9 ' The
court noted that this was an odd linguistic issue, but it was
founded on the opening sentence of Article 8(4), which states
that slots may be "exchanged" or "transferred," without distinguishing between the two. 59 2 An explanation of the distinction
between the two terms would be left for a court that had reason
to define them.593
The third issue the Board presented was whether ACL, as airport coordinator, had a duty to investigate the circumstances
surrounding exchanges of slots. 59 4 The Board based its argu-

ment on the second sentence of Article 8(4), which makes exchanges of slots "subject to confirmation" by the airport
coordinator that they comply with the terms of the regulation.59 5
The Board argued that it was "obvious" that Air UK had no intention to use the slots it obtained from British Airways and that
ACL should have disallowed the transfer.59 6 However, the court
found that Regulation 95/93 did not grant airport coordinators
investigative powers to examine slot exchanges in depth.597 Indeed, as the court pointed out, such investigations would frustrate the quick, efficient slot allocation method that the
regulation was intended to create.5 98 Judicial review is available
to correct abuses or serious oversights by coordinators.5 99
5s9 R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
590Id.
591 Id.
592 Id.
593Id.
594R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
595 Id.
596 Id.
597

Id.

598 Id.

599 R. v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
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Therefore, the court concluded that airport coordinators did
not have a duty to investigate the terms of slot exchanges.60 0
The final issue was whether the decision of ACL to allocate
the same slots to Air UK during the next scheduling period was
legal. The Board argued that Regulation 95/93 was intended to
assure that slots were allocated in a manner which would make
the best possible use of them, and particularly that they would
be allocated to air carriers which would use them. 60

1

The court

rejected this argument, pointing out that Article 10 of the regulation specifically gave rights to the previous holders of slots,
subject only to the condition that the holders had met the operating requirement for the previous scheduling period. 60 2 The

regulation places no duty on the airport coordinator to determine what carriers will do with the slots they are given and, indeed, to impose such a duty "would be highly damaging to the
scheduling process.

' 60 3

Thus, the court determined that there

was no duty for coordinators to investigate the plans of recipients of "grandfathered" slots, and consequently ACL had not violated the regulation when it reallocated the slots despite Air
UK and British Airways' agreement.16 4
The court's final determination was that ACL had not violated
the plain meaning of the terms of Regulation 95/93.605

Al-

though the court did not specifically address the terms of the
agreement between Air UK and British Airways in its final decision, its analysis clearly implied that the agreement was in compliance with the regulation. While the court's decision is
obviously not binding on the whole EU, the fact that the Board
could not present any Commission rulings to support its position strongly suggests that the court's decision was not too far
removed from the official Union view on the subject. It would
thus appear that the exchange of slots, provided it is done on a
one-for-one basis, is permitted regardless of what the exchanging parties plan to do with the slots or if the exchange is "sweetened" with money or other benefits.

600 Id.
601 Id.
602

Id.

603

Id.

604 R.

v. Airport Co-ordination Ltd., ex parte States of Guernsey Transp. Board,
CO/0722/98 (Q.B. 1999).
605

Id.
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5. BilateralAgreements
As noted above, transglobal aviation has historically been governed by bilateral agreements (bilaterals) between nations laying out the terms of market access for the respective states' air
carriers. 6 6 The states of the European Union were no different
and, by 1993, they had amassed over 800 separate bilaterals.'O°7
However, heady in the wake of the formation of the common
aviation market by the Third Package, the Commission began a
campaign to take over the negotiation and implementation of
such agreements on behalf of the Member States.""1 Thus began a battle between the Commission and the Member States
that has continued into the 21st Century without resolution.
Commission Efforts to Deal With Bilaterals

a.

In March 1993, the Member States' transport ministers rejected a proposal to pool their bilaterals and vest negotiating
powers for future agreements in the Commission.60 9 One transport minister6 even went so far as to characterize bilaterals as
"sacrosanct. " Although frustrated by the recalcitrance of the
Member States, the Commission denied allegations that they
would bring legal action against them. 61 1 However, the Commission's attitude would not always be so forgiving.
Eleven months later, the subject of bilaterals was once more
brought to the fore of the Union's attention by the Comit6 des
Sages (Comit6)6 12 in a report on many facets of the European
aviation industry. The Comit6 stated that bilaterals "ignore the
new realities" of the unified European aviation market and
should be replaced by a multilateral regime directed by the EU
rather than the member states.61 3 The report recommended
that the Commission be given such powers by mid-1995.61 4
606 David Mazzarella, The Integration of Aviation Law in the EC: TeleologicalJurisprudence and the European Court of Justice, 20 TRANSP. L. J. 353, 354 (1992).
607 Bruce Barnard, EC Ministers Reject Pooling of Air Traffic Agreements, J. COM.,
Mar. 16, 1993, at 3B.
608

Id.

609 Id.
610

Id.

Id.
Popularly called the "Committee of Wise Men" in English-language sources.
613 Wise Men: BilateralsIgnore "New Realities" of Single Market,AVIATION EUR., Feb.
17, 1994.
611

612

614 Id.
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The Commission apparently took the recommendation to
heart, as in March 1995 it issued a "strong . . .warning" that
individual Member States would be haled before the European
Court of Justice if they continued to negotiate bilaterals with
other nations (particularly the United States).615 The thenTransport Commissioner, Neil Kinnock, denounced bilaterals as
"the most serious obstacle to competition,""'6 while a senior aide
to the Commission stated that the Commission is "duty bound
under European law to carry out infringement proceedings"
against Member States engaging in such behavior.'1 7 However,
most of the Member States did not share the Commission's concerns, or at least not to the same degree, and the assembled
transport ministers rejected the Commission's proposals." 8
Following that defeat in 1995, Kinnock and the Commission
decided to apply some pressure to the Member States, filing a
complaint against six Member States that had completed bilaterals with the United States after the implementation of the Third
Package."' It was in this less-than-friendly atmosphere that the
transport ministers met the following year, although Kinnock
chose to present the situation more positively by claiming that
there had been "considerable progress" on the subject of conferring negotiating powers to the Commission.6 20 The transport
ministers agreed to give negotiating powers to the Commission,
but the powers were wrenched from them at high cost. The
Member States required the Commission to conduct any such
negotiations in two phases-the first phase was to give the Commission the power to negotiate "soft issues," such as computer
reservation systems, slot allocation, ground handling, and air
carrier ownership, while the second phase would give the rights
to "hard issues," such as traffic rights and pricing.6 21 The Commission would not receive the rights to negotiate agreements on
615

26.

EC Goal: All-Or-Nothing Bilaterals with U.S.,

AVIATION DAILY,

616

Julian Moxon, EC Sets Open-Skies Schedule, FLIGHT

617

Id.

INT'L,

Mar. 6, 1995, at

June 14, 1995.

618 Bruce Barnard & Lisa Burgess, Germany FacesEU Suit if it Signs US Air Pact,J.
COM., Feb. 16, 1996, at 1A.
619 Bruce Barnard, Kinnock Perseveres in Fight for EU-Wide Air Talks With US, J.
COM., June 20, 1995, at 2B. The targeted Member States were Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden.
620 France Rejects Traffic Rights as Issue in MultilateralTalks, AVIATION DAILY, Mar.
14, 1996, at 1, 2.
621 Commission's Multilateralism Mandate Comes in Phases, May be Too Late, AVIATION DAILY, June 20, 1996, at 1.
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the "hard issues," unless it could show that it had achieved "substantial results in the first phase. ' 622 Furthermore, the Member
States retained the right to negotiate their own bilateral agreements with other nations.62 3
While the Commission declared that the transport ministers'
concessions constituted a "true victory," the U.S. government
said that it would refuse to participate in any sort of limited negotiations.6 24 However, even with that rejection, Kinnock felt
confident enough of his new powers to be generous with the
Member States, stating there would be "no roll-back on any bilateral agreement in existence or under negotiation" and that
the complaint against the Member States who had signed bi6 25
laterals would be dropped.

By 1997 though, the Commission's patience with the Member
States was wearing thin once more, as Member States continued
their independent negotiations. 2 6 At the October meeting of
transport ministers, Kinnock pledged that there would be a role
for the Member States in any negotiations, but also floated the
possibility of reinitiating legal action against Members who had
already signed bilaterals. 627 Yet the transport ministers were
moved by neither the velvet glove nor the iron fist of the Commission and once more rejected granting it full powers to negotiate agreements.1 28 This prompted Kinnock to acknowledge
that the Member States were "resistant" to turning over negotiations to the Commission, and to promise that he would2 "return
to this issue" at the next transport ministers' meeting. 1 1
Kinnock was not to have to carry on alone in the struggle to
win negotiating authority for the Commission, however. Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert, long viewed as one of
the most charismatic and influential members of the Commission,6: increasingly brought the weight of his powerful office to

bear against carriers whose parent governments had negotiated
622 ld.

6i43
Id.
624

Id.

625 Id.
626 ChrisJohnstone,

Brussels Cajoles and Threatens in Bidfor United EU Air Front,J.
COM., Oct. 8, 1997, at 20A.
627

Id.

628 European

Union Denies Kinnock Authority to Negotiate 'Hard Issues' With U.S.,
Oct. 10, 1997, at 63.

AVIATION DAILY,

Id.
630Karel van Miert, When the Going Gets Tough .. ,AIRLINE Bus., May 1, 1998, at
629

26, 26-27.
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(or were in the process of negotiating) bilateral agreements."'
Van Miert stated in February 1998, "I consider that bilateral
6 32
open skies agreements do not constitute the right answer.
He continued by explaining" [I]f we want to establish fair competition conditions between European and North American
[a]irlines, the best solution is to conclude a global agreement
between the Community and the United States. We must develop a common policy giving Community carriers the possibility to compete on fair and equitable terms .... 633

But even testimony from such a powerful member of the
Commission was insufficient to convince the Member States to
desist from their activities, so in March the Commission announced that it had reopened legal proceedings against Member States that had signed bilateral agreements with the United
States.634 In its announcement, the Commission said that it was
"not motivated simply by the legal breach of EU rules," but because the bilaterals "do not safeguard the long-term interests of
the European air transport industry."6 5 By giving access to national markets on different terms, the Commission concluded
that bilaterals "not only distort the competition between airlines
but also between airports. "636 In spite of the Commission's careful couching of its language, its frustration with the Member
States still showed through: "Member States are not only failing
to comply with EU law, but are also not co-operating to adopt,
within a reasonable time, an EU approach making it possible to
remedy the legal infringements and ensure equivalent regulatory conditions .. -63' A spokesperson for Kinnock's office was
more blunt: "The cozy negotiations are over and the gloves have
63,G. Porter Elliott, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 185, 208-09 (1997).
632 Commissioner Karel van Miert, The Transatlantic and Global Implications
of European Competition Policy, Address to North Atlantic Assembly Meeting
(Feb. 16, 1998).
633 Id.
634 Commission Takes FurtherLegal Action against Member States' "Open Skies" Agreements with the United States, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/
dg07/press/ip98231en.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2001). The Members named
were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the UK,
which had signed a preliminary agreement with the US in 1995.
635 Id.
636

Id.

637 Id.
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now been
taken off.... If this does rattle some governments-so
8
' 63
be it.

The Member States reacted poorly to the Commission's
threats, with Britain and France declaring the following day that
they would continue their negotiations regardless.6' 9 The German transport minister called the threat "unacceptable" and
warned that it would "endanger European jobs," while others
referred to it as "counterproductive.""'"
Portugal and Italy announced their plans to proceed with their talks with the United
States, 64' seemingly undeterred by Kinnock's statement that
such' 6 4 2behavior was "a shortsighted policy based on nationality."
But even following the Member States' virtual dismissal
of Kinnock's increasingly heavy-handed tactics, the Transport
Commissioner still offered that they had a "final chance" at the
October 1998 transport ministers' meeting to give the Commission full negotiating powers. 64
The transport ministers, however, were not impressed by Kinnock's pleas or threats, and again rejected the Commission's
bid.6 4 4 This led the Commission to take its legal action to the
next level by filing a full complaint with the Court of Justice.645
In a speech announcing the move, Kinnock admitted that the
Member States had given the Commission negotiating powers,
"but its scope is not broad enough to make meaningful negotiation possible and until that changes the Commission... has no
option but to pursue legal action."64' 6 He continued to explain
that the Commission "sees no other option but to pursue the
procedure under [the Treaty of Rome] to the finish." '4 7 Yet
even as Kinnock delivered this blow to the Member States, he
continued to hold out the hand of partnership, stating that the
6-98 Chris Johnstone, Kinnock Challenges Open-Skies Pact; EU Transport Chief Files
Court Actions Against Member States that have ForgedDeals with U.S., J. COm., Mar. 12,
1998, at 12A.
639 Id.
640 Kevin O'Toole, The EC Wants Individual US Open Skies Deals to be Torn Up,
FLIGHT INT'L, Mar. 25, 1998, at 28, 29.
641

Id.

Pierre Sparaco, European Deregulation Still Lacks Substance, Av. WK. & SPACE
Nov. 9, 1998, at 53.
643 Bruce Barnard, Virgin Set to Challenge US Carriers in US Skies, J. COM., Sept.

642

TECH.,

24, 1998, at 11A.
644

Chris Kjelgaard, Commission Takes Eight EU Nations to Court Over US Bilaterals,
Oct. 30, 1998.
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Commission was "willing and available to constructively build a
common approach as regards air transport relations . . . and
hopes that substantial progress ... will be made in the coming
648
months."

While the Commission may have been willing to construct a
"common approach" towards external European aviation policy,
the Member States still were not. The UK continued its negotiations with the United States, albeit at a significantly reduced
rate, 649 while just weeks after the Commission announced its
complaint against eight Member States, Italy declared that it
had completed a bilateral with the United States that would
phase in Italian "open skies."""5 The Commission retaliated by
commencing legal proceedings against the Netherlands over its
bilateral with the United States."5 ' This came as a particular
shock to the Union's membership, as the Commission had previously indicated that the Netherlands/U.S. bilateral would be
allowed to stand since it predated the Third Package.652
Ironically, throughout the recriminations and complaints,
most Member States voiced support for giving the Commission
negotiating powers for external aviation agreements. As early as
1993, the Danish ambassador to the EU stated, "We can get better results by negotiating in common ....

In 1996, the trans-

port minister of Germany expressed hope for "a U.S.-European
'
agreement in the long term."654
That same year, at the transport ministers' meeting, the Italian minister said that no one in
the EU needed to be convinced of the value of multilateral negotiations, while the representative from the Netherlands was
characterized as being "enthusiastic" about the prospects for the
Commission being given full negotiating powers.655 Portugal
has also stated that it "firmly supports" the Commission's posiId.
John D. Morrocco, Open Skies Impasse Shifts Alliance Plans,Av. WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 9, 1998, at 45.
650 U.S., Italy Agree to Open Skies, Pending Alitalia-Northwest Immunity, AVIATION
DAILY, Nov. 13, 1998 at 275.
651 Netherlands/US Bilateral Agreement Focus of EC Proceedings, AIRLINE INDUSTRY
INFO., Feb. 8, 1999.
652 Id.
648
649

supra note 619, at 3B.
Germany - U.S. Open Skies 'Megadeal' May Boost MultilateralNegotiations, AVIATION DAILY, Feb. 8, 1996, at 1.
655 France Rejects Traffic Rights as Issues in MultilateralTalks, AVIATION DAILY, Mar.
14, 1996, at 1.
653 BARNARD,
654
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tion on the subject. 56 Indeed, the only Member States that
have been particularly intransigent about the possibility of giving the Commission full negotiating powers have been the unlikely duo of France and the UK,657 which have managed to
repeatedly sway enough of the Member States at any given time
to prevent a full transfer of powers. However, in 1999 the Commission introduced a new approach to the matter-the Common Transatlantic Aviation Area-which appears calculated to
finally end the nearly decade-long struggle between itself and
the Member States.
b.

Proposed common Transatlantic Aviation Area

On May 12, 1999, Neil Kinnock gave a speech to the European Aviation Club entitled European Air TransportPolicy: All Our
Tomorrows or "All Our Yesterdays" Replayed ?58 Kinnock admitted
air transportation in Europe "is shaping up to the future," but
he warned "that restructuring in [the] industry will only be truly
successful if it is accompanied and strengthened by an effective
and proactive external strategy. ' '61 9 He then proceeded to lambaste the Member States that had insisted on continuing to pursue bilaterals, referring to the "magical attraction" of bilaterals
66 " However,
and stating, "nostalgia . . . still has a big future.""
what initially seemed to have been little more than an occasion
for Kinnock to criticize his opponents quickly became something more substantial. Kinnock raised the concept of a Common Transatlantic Aviation Area (CTAA, alternatively referred
to as the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area, TCAA, or simply
the Common Aviation Area, CAA), a plan that he had initially
floated shortly after becoming Transport Commissioner but that
had been put aside during the lengthy struggles with the Member States.6 6 1 The CTAA would not merely be an EU-wide bilat656 Frances Fiorino, More Open Skies, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., June 12, 2000, at

19.
57 Commission' Multilateralism Mandate Comes in Phases, May be 7oo Late, AVIA-

June 20, 1996, at 1. Spain, Ireland, and Germany have also been
among the Member States to resist the Commission, but their positions have
been more flexible.
658 Commissioner Neil Kinnock, European Air Transport Policy: All Our
Tomorrows or "All Our Yesterdays" Replayed, Address at the European Aviation
Club (May 12, 1999). The title is a reference to a line in Shakespeare's Macbeth,
which Kinnock quoted from at some points.
659 Id.
6(4 Id.
TION DAILY,

fi"iI Id.
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eral, but would be qualitatively different, encompassing many
subjects normally outside the scope of bilaterals, such as consumer rights and environmental protection, as well as traditional subjects like traffic rights and code-sharing.66 2 Whether
the CTAA is truly something other than a "mega-bilateral" is
open to debate, but the Commission apparently felt strongly
enough about its potential to circumvent the deadlock on the
grant of negotiating powers that the legal proceedings against
Member States were put on indefinite hold."63
Paradoxically, once Kinnock and the Commission had finally
devised a seemingly feasible method of achieving their goals in
the arena of external aviation policy, the entire Commission was
reorganized and Kinnock was removed from the office of Transport Commissioner.664 The new Transport Commissioner,
Loyola de Palacio, has since shown much less interest in the subject of bilaterals and the CTAA,6 65 with leadership on the subject
of the CTAA passing largely into the hands of the AEA and its
member companies.666 Thus, at a U.S.-sponsored 1999 meeting
of 90 transport ministers, while de Palacio presented the concept of the CTAA, it was the heads of several European air carriers who spoke most forcefully on its behalf.66 The chairman of
British Midland Airways expressed dismay that the U.S. and the
UK, both of which had been long-time champions of deregulation, were now so opposed to even the idea of the CTAA.6 6 8 Luf-

thansa's CEO stated that the CTAA was "the only way to make
some progress" on the subject of international aviation.669 The
president of KLM declared that bilateralism was dead and that
the air transport industry was doomed to follow in the path of
the silent movies if the CTAA, or at least some form of multilateralism, were not adopted.670 While the latter address may
Id.
Simon Warburton, Kinnock Calls Again for Common Transatlantic Pact, AIR
TRANSP. INTELLIGENCE, May 13, 1999.
664 De Palacio is Proposed to Take Over As European Transport Commissioner, ATC
MKT. REP., July 22, 1999 at 8.
665 De Palacio's focus is centered on internal European air transportation issues, particularly air traffic control. New EU Transport CommissionerPledges to Fight
for 'Single Sky', AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 31, 1999, at 1.
666 James Ott, Aviation Summit Yields EU Plan for Open Market: European CEOs
Endorse a TransatlanticCommon Aviation Area as a TrailblazingAlternative to Bilateral
Agreements, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 13, 1999, at 43, 44.
662
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have been hyperbolic, it did serve to illustrate the increasing desire of the air carriers themselves to move beyond the bilateral
system.
Despite these strong testimonials, the CTAA did not gain
many supporters from among the world transport ministers and
no reference to it was included in the final statement released
by the conference.17 1 Furthermore, while de Palacio suggested

at the conference that the EU and the U.S. could meet every six
months thereafter to lay the groundwork for an initial conference on the CTAA,67 2 the first period for such discussions
passed without action on either side of the Atlantic. By mid2000 there were still no plans to even schedule discussions on
the subject, making it unlikely that de Palacio's stated goal of a
CTAA conference by 2002 would be met.6 73 Indeed, on approximately the date the first discussion session would have met, it
was announced that Portugal had signed a new bilateral with the
U.S., giving the U.S. enhanced "open skies" access to the Portuguese market.6 74 Thus, it appears that the final word on the
Commission's long struggle has yet to be said.
E.
1.

COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS

Regulation 2672/88

The Commission's first foray into Computer Reservations System (CRS) regulation was made in July 1988. They required
that the CRS neutrally display the flights of all airlines seeking
access, make available their services to all participating airlines,
and not discriminate in the fees charged or services provided
(including display bias).6 75 Unlike U.S. computer reservations
systems, European CRSs may not penalize travel agents who terminate their contracts. Travel agents may freely end their contracts on short notice, and may subscribe to more than a single
CRS.6 7 6 Commissions paid to them may not be linked to the
volume of bookings made in the system in which the airline has
671 Chris Thornton & Chris Lyle, Freedom's Paths,AIRLINE BUS., Mar. 2000, at 74,
75.
672 Graeme Osborn & Karen Walker-Was, Sans Frontiers?,AIRLINE Bus., Feb. 1,
2000, at 34, 35.
673

Id.

674 Frances Fiorino,

More Open Skies, Av. WK. &

SPACE TECH.,June

12, 2000, at

19.
675
676

Commission Regulation 2672/88, arts. 3, 4, 1988 OJ. (L 239) 13.
Id. at 13.
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an economic interest.6 77 No CRS may engage in practices de78
signed to partition the market.
2.

CRS Code of Conduct

The following year, the Council promulgated regulations providing for a Code of Conduct for Computerized Reservations
Systems (CRS Code of Conduct) .17 The CRS Code of Conduct
requires that a CRS vendor offering facilities for scheduled air
passenger services allow all carriers "the opportunity to participate, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis" in the computer
reservations system, subject to capacity and technical limitations.6 8 0 A CRS vendor cannot require a carrier to accept "supplementary conditions which . . . have no connection with
participation in its CRS."" 1 This would suggest that a vendor
could not, for example, require a carrier to purchase its own
line of office productivity software as part of an agreement for
access to the vendor's CRS. Data displayed therein shall be provided "in a clear and comprehensive manner and without discrimination or bias . . . ." particularly with regard to carrier
identity.6 8 2 A CRS vendor may not require travel agents to accept an exclusive contract,"8 3 and agents may terminate their
contract on three months notice.6 8 4 Fees charged shall be "nondiscriminatory and reasonable related to the cost of the service
provided... "685 Carriers may belong to more than one system,
and shall be free to leave a system upon six months prior
notice. 6861
The CRS Code of Conduct also places specific limitations on
the manner in which a vendor can provide information, statistical or otherwise, to parties using its system.68 7 Information concerning individual bookings must be made available on an equal
basis to each carrier involved in the booking.6 8 Aggregate statis677 Id. at 14.
678 ARGYRIS,

supra note 62, at 29-31; Commission Regulation 2672/88, art. 10,
1998 0J. (L 239) 13.
679 Council Regulation 2299/89, 1989 0J. (L 220) 1.
0soId. at 2.
681 Id. at 2.
682 Id. at 3.
-3 Id. at 4.
684
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tics requested by one carrier must be offered to all participating
carriers,69 while statistics regarding a particular carrier can only

be released to a requesting party with the permission of the carrier concerned."9 " Personal information regarding a particular
consumer generated by a travel agent may only be made available to parties not involved in the transaction with the consent of
the consumer.691 Interestingly, given that the CRS Code of Conduct explicitly placed restrictions only on the dissemination of
personal information about consumers as input by travel agents,
the CRS was free to distribute a consumer's personal information if it had been input by another party.
Aggrieved persons, natural or legal, or Member States may file
a complaint with the Commission seeking relief,692 or the Commission may act on its own motion.69" The Commission may
conduct investigations and hearings, make findings, and impose
fines on vendors, parent carriers, participating carriers, and/or
subscribers.6 94 Fines may be reviewed on appeal to the European Court ofJustice.619 5 In 1990, the Commission promulgated

implementing regulations.696
The rights and obligations under the Commission's block exemptions and the Council's Code of Conduct are essentially the
same. It is only the sanction that differs. If parties infringe the
Commission's Regulation, the Commission may withdraw the
benefit of the block exemption, thereby making transactions
otherwise shielded from the competition rules of the Treaty of
Rome effectively illegal.69 v Computer reservations systems could
not exist since they are co-owned by air carriers and/or other
service providers and need the block exemption to shield them
from the application from Articles 85(1) and (2). In contrast,
the punishment contemplated for violation of the Code of Conduct is the less draconian alternative to a fine.6 98
Council Regulation 2299/89, art. 6(b), 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1, 3.
Id. at 3.
("n' Id.
''

690

692

Id. at 4.
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696 Commission Regulation 83/91, 1991 OJ. (L 10) 9. By their own terms,
these regulations expired on December 31, 1992.
697 Commission Regulation 2672/88, 1988 O.J. (L 239) 13.
6'
Commission Regulation 2299/89, art. 16 (1),(2), 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1.
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In 1993, the Council amended its existing regulations significantly, described above,6 99 involving a code of conduct for computer reservations systems.7"' The new regulations recognize
that "competitive neutrality of computer reservation systems for
air carriers must be ensured in respect to equal functionality
and data security, in particular through equal access to functions, information/data and interfaces and a clear separation
between private airline facilities and distribution facilities. "701
The revisions to the CRS Code of Conduct were also made with
an eye toward developments in the U.S. CRS regulatory environment.7 0 2 The Council made this effort at harmonization of the
Code of Conduct as part of an attempt to lay the foundation for
uniform worldwide regulation of CRSs.7 °3
3.

Goals of the Regulations

The regulations have five principal goals-nondiscrimination,
accuracy, contractual freedom, system separation, and privacy.
a.

Nondiscrimination

Nondiscrimination is a dominant theme of the regulations.
For example, booking and sales data shall be made available to
participating carriers on a non-discriminatory basis with equal

timeliness.7 " 4 A system vendor7° must allow air carriers to par-

ticipate "on an equal and non-discriminatory basis" in its CRS.70 6
No discrimination is allowed in CRS displays on the basis of
flight schedules, fare types,70 7 seat availability of participating
7 09
carriers, 7 8 or on the basis of airports serving the same city.

Id. at 1.
Commission Regulation 3089/93, 1993 Oj. (L 278) 1. These regulations
had to be revised by December 31, 1997, by a Commission proposal submitted by
March 31, 1997. Id. at 18.
701 Id. at 2.
702 Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert, EU Competition Policy, The
USA and the Air Transport Sector, Address at the SABRE World Conference '95
(July 9, 1995).
703 Id.
704 Commission Regulation 3089/93, pmbl., art. 6(1)(a)(b), 1993 O.J. (L 278)
1.
705 System vendors are defined as those firms responsible for operating or marketing a CRS. Id. at 3.
706 Id. ("... within the available capacity of the system concerned and subject
to any technical constraints outside the control of the system vendor.").
707 Id. at 5.
708 Id. Information on bundled products shall not be included in the principal
display. ld.
,99
700
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Fees charged must be "nondiscriminatory, reasonably structured
and reasonably related to the cost of the service provided and
used and shall, in particular, be the same for the same level of
service."7 " " However, these nondiscrimination provisions apply
unconditionally only to Member State air carriers. If a nonMember State carrier operates a CRS outside of the EU, it must
provide treatment to Member State carriers in the nondiscriminatory manner prescribed by the Code of Conduct in order to
reciprocally receive nondiscriminatory treatment by CRSs within
the EU.7 1 1 If a CRS outside of the EU provides information biased against Member State carriers, then the parent carrier of
the alien CRS will be considered to have forfeited its12 privilege to
v
receive equitable treatment in Union-based CRSs.
Parent carriers of CRSs must provide information to other
CRSs "with equal timeliness, with the same information on
schedules, fares and availability relating to its own air carriers as
that which it provides to its own CRS... ",71 The parent carriers
also cannot refuse the distribution of their "air transport products" through a rival CRS, nor can they refuse to confirm or
accept a reservation for their "air transport products" made
through a rival CRS, provided that it complies with the parent
carrier's stipulated fares and conditions.71 4
b.

Accuracy

Accuracy is also an important goal of the regulations. All carriers must ensure that the data they provide to CRSs are accurate and not misleading.7" 5 Presumably this might prohibit
"bait-and-switch" advertising of a promotional fare for which
there were insufficient seats to meet market demand. System
vendors are also obliged not to manipulate the information received, nor to negligently or intentionally disseminate "inaccurate, misleading or discriminatory information."716 They must

also load data received from carriers into their CRSs with "equal
care and timeliness.

' 71 7

System vendors must include data pro-

709 Commission Regulation 3089/93, art. 5(2)(c), 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1.
710

Id. at 7.

711 Id. at 6.
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Id. at 4.
Commission Regulation 3089/93, art. 3a(1)(a), 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1.
Id. at 4.
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717 Id. at 4.
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vided involving "flight schedules, fare types and seat availability
in a clear and comprehensive manner and without discrimination or bias, in particular as regards the order in which information is presented.171 8 The specific order in which they are to
display flights are (1) nonstop flights between the city-pairs involved, 9(2) direct single-plane flights, and (3) connecting

fligh ts.71
c.

Contractual Freedom

Certain restrictions imposed upon the contractual freedom of
system vendors are designed to enhance the contractual freedom of participating airlines and subscribers. Vendors may not
attach "unreasonable conditions" to their contracts with air carriers, require them to accept conditions which are irrelevant to
CRS services, 720 or require carriers to abstain from participating
in other CRSs.7 21 After the end of the first year, carriers are free
to terminate their contracts with system vendors on not more
than six months notice, with the vendor limited to damages directly related to the costs of termination. 22 In regard to subscribers, no system vendor may attach unreasonable conditions
to its subscribers' contracts and, after the first year, such subscribers may terminate their contracts with three months notice.7 23 A parent carrier also may not "link the use of any

specific CRS by a subscriber with the receipt of any commission
or other incentive or disincentive for the sale of air transport
products ..

d.

724

System Separation

One interesting provision requires that CRSs be separated
from a carrier's "private inventory and management and marketing facilities.

'725

This separation may be accomplished either

by means of distinct software systems or by physically partitionId. at 5.
Commission Regulation 3089/93, Annex 1, 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1. Unless
otherwise requested by a consumer, nonstop flights shall be listed on the basis of
departure time, while the second two categories shall be listed on the basis of
elapsed journey time. Id. at 2.
720 Id. at 3, 4.
721 Id. at 4.
722 Id.
723 Id. at 6.
724 Commission Regulation 3089/93, art. 8(1), 1993 O.J. (L 278) 1.
725 Id. at 5.
718
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ing the respective components of the business. 26 This provision
apparently affects only one CRS-American Airlines' SABREwhich complained vigorously of the enormous cost of technical
and legal dehosting required to separate its internal database
from its CRS. 72 7
e.

Right of Privacy

Several provisions of the new regulations ensure the right of
privacy of passengers. The regulations set as a goal that "identification or personal information on a passenger or a corporate
user must remain private ....,,72' Data provided shall not identify passengers without their consent. 72 9 This closed the "travel
agents only" loophole that the Code of Conduct originally
created.
4.

Broadening the Codes Applicability

Aside from the five principal goals, the 1993 amendments to
the Code of Conduct also greatly broadened the application of
the Code of Conduct. As initially written, the Code of Conduct
applied only to matters involving scheduled air carriers. 730 Yet,
charter carriers transport 50 to 55% of all passengers in Europe 7 and make up approximately 80% of all licensed air carriers. 732 The Council rectified this considerable omission, noting
that "non-scheduled air services are of major importance in the
territory of the Community, ' 733 by removing the term "scheduled" from the Code of Conduct's definition of air transport
73

products.
726

1

Id.

AMR persuaded U.S. Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena to intervene with the EEC Commission on its behalf, to no avail.
728 Id. at 2.
729 Commission Regulation 3089/93, arts. 6(1) (b) (ii), 6(2), 1993 OJ. (L 278)
1.
730 Council Regulation 2299/89, pmbl., 1989 OJ. (L 220) 1.
731 EC Finds Progress under LiberalisationBut Weighs Probe of 'Excessive'Fares, 6 AviATION EUROPE 41, Oct. 24, 1996, at 1.
732 Michael Niejahr & Giuseppe Abbamonte, LiberalizationPolicy and StateAid in
the Air Transport Sector, 2 EC COMPETITION POLICy NEWSLETrER 2, Summer 1996, at
4.
733 Council Regulation 3089/93, pmbl., 1993 O.L. (L 278) 1.
7'4 Id. at 2.
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1999 Amendments
In 1999, the Council again amended the CRS Code of Con-

duct. 73 51 Its purpose in doing so was twofold: first, to broaden

the Code of Conduct to include rail carriers and second, to improve consumer protections. In regard to the first purpose, the
Council stated, that "the integration of rail services into the CRS
principal display can improve the quality of information available to consumers and provide consumers with the best options
for their travel arrangements. ' v36 The inclusion of rail carriers
in the Code of Conduct resulted in few significant structural
changes, primarily the changes were linguistic.737 However, one
of the few structural changes points to a deeper motive on the
Council's part. The system vendors must adjust the ranking
principles for the main display screen "in order to take due account of the needs of consumers to be adequately informed of
rail services that represent a competitive alternative to the air
services. '' 7 3" The Council goes on to provide the example that
rail services with a few brief stops can be ranked with nonstop air
services. 739 This would seem to suggest that the Council is hoping to offset the consolidation occurring among air carriers by
promoting rail services as a substitute means of transportation,
with CRSs as the means by which to do so unobtrusively.
The Council's second purpose, improving consumer protections, required more changes to the regulation's structure. The
first major change was made in Article 6 of the Code of Conduct.74 0 The change required that information concerning individual bookings be archived offline within seventy-two hours of
the completion of the last element in the book and ultimately
be destroyed within three years. 74 ' Furthermore, access to the

information after it is taken offline will be permitted only for the
resolution of billing disputes.742 The amendment also adds a
new article, Article 9a, which provides, among other things, that
the subscriber must inform the consumer of en route changes of
equipment, the actual identity of the air carrier operating the
flight (presumably to guard against misleading code-sharing),
735 Council Regulation 323/1999, 1999 OJ. (L 040) 1.
736

Id. at 2.

at 2, 5.
Id. at 5.

737 Id.
738

Id.
Council Regulation 323/1999, art. 1(6), 1999 O.J. (L 040) 1.
741 Id. at 3.
742 Id.
739
740
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and which airports the flight will pass through. 743 The subscriber must also tell the consumer the name and address of the
system vendor, the duration his/her individual information will
be retained, and the means of exercising his/her access
rights.74 4 The consumer also is given the right to receive a
printout of the CRS display or to be provided with access to a
parallel CRS display that shows the same information as displayed on the subscriber's terminal.745 Finally, the consumer
must be given access to his/her own information free of
charge7 46 and is also entitled to receive, at no cost, details of the
CRS's current procedures, fees, system facilities, and information on interfaces and display criteria.747
The SABRE-Lufthansa Dispute

b.

Since the implementation of the 1993 amendments to the
CRS Code of Conduct, there appears to have been only one major Commission decision regarding it. In January 1997, the system vendor SABRE Travel Information Network (SABRE) filed
a complaint against Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Lufthansa) for an
alleged infringement of the Code of Conduct. 74

SABRE

claimed that Lufthansa had offered incentives to corporate clients using electronic ticketing for its flights, but that electronic
ticketing for Lufthansa was only available through the START
Amadeus CRS, which was partly owned by Lufthansa.749 SABRE
also alleged that Lufthansa had refused to provide it with the
means to issue electronic tickets, thereby subverting SABRE's
market position in Germany.750
Lufthansa replied to SABRE's allegations with three different
theories as to why it was not in violation of the Code of Conduct.
The first theory Lufthansa offered was that the purpose of the
incentive was to encourage consumers and subscribers to make
use of the new electronic tickets, rather than to encourage them
to use a particular CRS. 75 1 Lufthansa's second theory was premised on the grounds that there is a certain amount of lag time
743
744

Id. at 3-4.
Id.

745 Council Regulation 323/1999, art. 1(9), 1999 OJ. (L 040) 1.
746

747

Id.
Id. at 4.

749

Commission Decision 99/618/EC, comp. (1), 1999 O.J. (L 244) 56.
Id.

750

Id. at 56.
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Id.

748

2001]

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

1087

in the introduction of any new technology, and that it had a
plan for eventually making electronic ticketing available to all
CRSs. v52 Finally, Lufthansa attempted to play on the semantics
of the Code of Conduct by arguing that a ticket was not an "air
transport product" under Article 8(1).753
The Commission first replied to Lufthansa's semantic argument. While the Commission agreed that the Code of Conduct
did not specifically use the term "ticket," it pointed out that Article 8(1) made reference to the sale of an air transport product,
i.e., a contract is formed between the carrier and the customer. 71 4 The Commission observed that the conclusion of such
a contract is usually manifested by the issuance of a ticket, regardless of its format.7 55 This led the Commission to determine
that the issuance of a ticket is "an integral part of the act of
selling [air] transport service" and thus Article 8(1) was applicable.756 The Commission also found that if the term "air transport product" were not understood to include tickets, it would
contravene the spirit, if not the letter, of the Code of
757
Conduct.
Next, the Commission rejected Lufthansa's first theory. The
Commission stated that "Lufthansa was fully aware that its announcement to offer incentives to subscribers to issue electronic
tickets could only have been taken up by subscribers to the system of which it was a parent carrier. 7 5 1 It then proceeded to
note that not all CRSs could have benefited from the incentive
program and, therefore, the program was improper.75 9
The Commission did not directly address Lufthansa's claim
that it had a plan to phase in electronic ticketing among other
CRSs. However, the Commission determined that the period of
the infringement of the Code of Conduct extended from January 1, 1997, (when the incentives were first offered) toJune 30,
1998, (when Lufthansa first made electronic tickets available to
a CRS besides START Amadeus) .760 This would seem to indicate that phased development of CRS technology is not permit751

Id. at 57.
Commission Decision 99/618/EC, comp. (3), 1999 OJ. (L 244) 56.

754

Id.

755

Id.

752

756 Id.
757 Id.

758Commission Decision 99/618/EC, legal assessment (49), 1999 OJ. (L 244)

56.
759 Id.
760

Id.
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ted if it would have the effect of favoring one CRS above others.
Therefore, a carrier planning on starting new procedures or services would probably do well to make such a procedure or service universally available at the time it is introduced. Ultimately,
Lufthansa was obliged to pay a fine of 10,000 euros.76 1
5. Industry Responses
In addition to EU actions, the private industry organization
ECAC plays a direct role in the regulation of computer reservation systems. In 1994, ECAC passed the Revised ECAC Code of
Conduct for Computer Reservation Systems. 76 2 As ECAC noted, the
Code "[d]eveloped in close co-operation with the European
Commission... and EU legislation (Council Regulations 2299/
89 and 3089/93) . . .to provide a common European code of

conduct [for the use of CRSs]."763 Substantively, the Code mandated clear and nondiscriminatory displays, fees, and carrier
links/agreements in the operation of CRSs. 64 In its regulation
of code sharing, ECAC in essence broadened the application of
the Code. In 1996, ECAC passed a recommendation to its Member States on the regulation of code sharing. The Recommendation on Consumer Information/ProtectionNeeds in Connection with
Code-SharedAir Services76 set out to insure full disclosure of codeshare information at every stage of the air travel process, particularly with respect to CRSs. The recommendation noted ECAC's
concern that "[t] he display of code-shared flights in CRSs does
not in all cases comply with the criteria set down in the ECAC
and EU codes of conduct.
"766 In 1997 the ECAC Task Force
on Code-Sharing issued a report detailing the code-sharing environment a year after the implementation of the recommendation. In particular, the report noted that consumer complaints
with respect to adequacy of code-share information had decreased since the passage of the recommendation. The Task
Force concluded that while significant improvements had been
761

Id.

at art. 2.

ECAC

CODE OF CONDUCT

ECAC/16 (1994)

[hereinafter EURO-

762 EUROPEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, REVISED

FOR COMPUTERIZED RESERVATION SYSTEMS,
PEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE].
763

ECAC, activities-economic, available at http://www.eac-ceac.org/uk/activi-

ties/activities-economic.htm (last visted Feb. 27, 1999).
764 EUROPEAN CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, supra note 762.
765Report of the 21st ECAC Plenary Meeting (ECAC/21), Attachment to Appendix 10, Report from the task force on Code-Sharing, Implementation of Recommendation ECAC/19-1.
766 Id.
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made in the disclosure of code-share information, continued
monitoring would be integral to the further success of the
recommendation.767
F.
1.

GROUND HANDLING

Regulation 2673/88

The Commission's initial ground handling regulation, Regulation 2673/88, ensured that a purchaser of such services may
switch to another supplier on short notice and is free to deal
with more than a single supplier.76" The regulation also ensured the absence of discrimination between airlines.769 Prices
charged were to be reasonable and bear a reasonable relationship to the cost of services provided.77 °
2.

Regulation 82/91

In 1990, the Commission adopted a second regulation on
ground handling (Commission Regulation 82/91), providing an
exemption so long (i) as the ground handler imposes no exclusivity requirements, (ii) the agreement is not tied to the requirement for the purchase of other goods and services, (iii) prices
reflect costs, (iv) conditions are nondiscriminatory, and (v) the
carrier is free to withdraw from the agreement upon three
months notice.771
3. Post-82/91 Discussion of Ground Handling Regulation
After the expiration of Commission Regulation 82/91 on December 31, 1992, the EC's governing bodies entered into a period of reflection on the subject of ground handling. The
Commission did not take any further action on the matter until
December 14, 1993, when it adopted a Consultation Paper prepared by the Competition and Transportation Directorates General.772 It subsequently submitted the Consultation Paper to the
Economic and Social Committee (ESC) under Article 198 of the
767

Id.
ARGYRiS,

supra note 62, at 31-32; Commission Regulation 2673/88 of July
26, 1988, at arts. 3(3), 16.
769 Smeathers, European Liberalization-TurbulenceEn Route, IATA REv. (Jan.Mar. 1989) at 3, 4.
770 Commission Regulation 2673/88 of July 26, 1988, at art. 3(4).
771 Commission Regulation 82/91 of December 5, 1990, art. 3.
772 Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee on the Commission Consultation Paper on Ground Handling Services, 94/C 393/21, 1994 OJ. (C 393) 110.
768
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Treaty of Rome.77 The ESC discussed the Consultation Paper
and ultimately issued an Opinion Paper on September 14, 1994.
Although the Commission had declared its intention to "take an
initiative before the end of 1994 in order to achieve market access for ground handling [sic] services at Community airports,"
it did not issue a proposal on new ground handling regulations
until April 10, 1995. TM Shortly after issuing the new proposal,
the Commission decided to submit it to the ESC, which released
its opinion on the proposal on September 13, 1995.775 Ultimately, the Council enacted new regulations governing ground
handling in October 1996.776

4. Directive 96/67/EC
Council Directive 96/67/EC is one of the less liberal air transport regulations introduced in the wake of the Third Package.
Its divided nature is reflected in its own Preamble, which states
that "it is essential that access to the ground handling [sic] market should take place within a Community framework, while allowing Member States the possibility of taking into
consideration the specific nature of the sector. ' 777 Although its
purpose was to create conforming Union-wide ground handling
regulations, its net effect was simply to "normalize" ground handling procedures within a certain range.
The greatest degree of liberalization took place in the area of
self-handling. Article 1 of the directive permits air carriers, as of
January 1, 1998, to self-handle passengers, aircraft maintenance,
surface transportation if necessary, and catering services. 778 Carriers are also allowed, as of January 1, 1998, to self-handle baggage, ramp services (i.e., docking the aircraft, loading and
unloading the aircraft), refueling, and freight and mail transport provided that the airport meets certain minimum traffic
volume requirements. 779 The volume requirements are not less
than one million passenger movements or 25,000 tonnes (met773Id.
774Opinion of the Economic & Social Committee on the Proposal for a Coun-

cil Directive on Access to the Groundhandling Market at Community Airports,
95/C 142/09, 1995 O.J. (C 142) 7.
775 Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Access to the Ground
Handling Market at Community Airports, 95/C 301/10, 1995 O.J. (C 301) 28.
776 Council Directive 96/67/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36.
777Id.
778Id.
779

Id.

at 36.
at 37.
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ric) of freight annually, although if an airport reaches the
freight threshold without meeting the passenger threshold then
only freight services will be subject to self-handling.78 The directive only stipulates what will happen if the freight threshold is
met while the passenger threshold is not, and not the reverse.
Presumably, if the passenger threshold is met then both passenger and freight traffic will be subject to self-handling.
Article 1 also permits third-party ground handling (i.e.,
ground handlers who are employed by a company other than
the airport itself or the carriers) from January 1, 1999, at airports with at least three million passenger movements or 75,000
tonnes (metric) of freight traffic annually. 7 1' Alternatively, it is
also permitted at airports that have had not less than two million
passenger movements or 50,000 tonnes of freight traffic during
the six-month period prior to April 1 or October 1 of the preceding year.782 This second provision would appear to be designed to address the issue of certain airports that are subject to
high seasonal fluctuations in traffic, such as Mediterranean resort areas.783
Article 4 of the directive requires that any party that provides
ground handling services and also provides some other variety
of service must keep separate accounts of their ground handling
and other services. 8 The separation of accounts is to be
checked by an independent auditor that has been appointed by
the Member State where the airport is located. 78 5 This separa-

tion and auditing process are, at least in the case of Airport
Managing Bodies (AMBs), intended to prevent cross-subsidization of ground handling operations by other services.786 Interestingly, Article 4 explicitly mentions the prohibition of crosssubsidization only in regard to AMBs, although it specifically
states that the separation of accounts applies to AMBs, carriers,
and third-party providers.787 This seems to suggest that cross780

Id.

781

Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 1(1)(c), 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 37.

782

Id. at 37.

It should be noted that Article 1 (2) states that the provisions of the directive apply to all commercial EU airports with at least two million passenger movements or 50,000 tonnes (metric) of freight traffic annually if the Article 1(1)
requirements do not otherwise apply to them.
783

784

Id. at 39.
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subsidization would be permissible for carriers and third-party
providers if they openly report it.
The directive in Article 5 also requires the creation of "Airport Users' Committees" (Users' Committee) within 12 months
of the time the directive enters into force.788 The Users' Committee is formed from all carriers who fly to a particular airport.
Carriers may, if they so desire, appoint an organization to represent some, or all, of their interests jointly. 7

9

The Users'

Committees do not hold great power under the directive, but
they are given a consultative role in determining which thirdparty providers are allowed to render ground handling services
if the airport is subject to limitations on the number of providers who may have access to it.790 Logically, the Users' Committees could serve as the basis for further liberalization in the
future.
The remainder of the directive is largely a ratification of state
power over ground handling. Article 6 gives Member States the
right to bar non-EU-based ground handling providers from
competing for access. 79 ' Member States may also limit the number of providers authorized to supply baggage handling, ramp
services, refueling, and freight and mail transport, although they
must permit at least two providers to offer these services.79 2 As
of January 1, 2001, at least one of the providers cannot be controlled either directly or indirectly by (i) the AMB, (ii) a carrier
that has transported more than 25% of the airport's passenger
or freight traffic in the preceding year, or (iii) a holding company that controls the AMB or such a carrier.7 9 3 However, on
July 1, 2000, a Member State may request from the Commission
a delay until December 31, 2002, in meeting the two provider
minimum.79 4 Article 7 permits Member States to restrict the
number of carriers who may self-handle items in the constrained
categories (baggage handling, ramp services, refueling, freight
and mail transport) to as few as two, provided that the Member
States do so on the basis of relevant, objective, transparent, and
nondiscriminatory criteria.7 9 5 Article 8 allows Member States to
788

Id.

789 See
790
791
792

794

Id.
Id.

795

Id.
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id.

See id. at 41.
Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 6(1), 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36, 39.
Id.

2001]

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

1093

reserve for the AMB, or "another body," the "centralized infrastructures used for the supply of ground handling [sic] services
whose complexity, cost or environmental impact does not allow
of division or duplication."' ' Member States may also make it
compulsory that self-handling carriers and third-party providers
use central infrastructures.797 The only limitation on Member
States' powers in this area is that management of the central
infrastructures must be "transparent, objective and non-discriminatory" and must not "hinder the access" of self-handling carriers or third-party providers "within the limits provided for in this
Directive. "798
Article 9 provides Member States further means by which to
restrict liberalization of the ground handling services at their
airports. If it is "impossible to open up the market" due to "specific constraints of available space or capacity," the Member
State may (i) limit the number of third-party providers to as few
as one or ban self-handling altogether or restrict it to as few as
one carrier, either in general or in particular categories of
ground handling. 799 If a Member State chooses to impose these
restrictions, it must specify the categories of services that are
subject to these restrictions along with an explanation of the
limitations that justify it and a plan for measures to overcome
the limitations. s00 The restrictions also should not "unduly
prejudice the aims of this Directive," create inequities between
self-handlers and/or third-party providers, or "extend further
than necessary."801 A Member State must submit a proposal for
such restrictions to the Commission, which will make a determination about whether or not to permit the restrictions, or if it
should be amended s°2 The Commission may permit a duration
of up to three years for most restrictions, the exception being a
decision to only allow one third-party provider to render services
in the constrained service categories, which can only be granted
for two years.8 03 A Member State may also request a single extension of two years." 4
796 Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 8(1), 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 40.
797 Id.
798

Id.

799 Id.

800 Id.
801
802
803
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Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 9(2) (b) (i)-(iii), 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 40.
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Id.
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Member States are also permitted, under Article 11, to establish a selection procedure for third-party providers if their numbers are to be limited under the terms of Article 6(2) or Article
9.805 Where a Member State has decided to establish such a se-

lection procedure, it must consult with the Users' Committee at
the relevant airport to establish "objective, transparent and nondiscriminatory" criteria.""6 The AMB and the Users' Committee
will select the third-party provider from the pool established
under the selection criteria, provided that the AMB has no connection to the providing of ground handling services."' v If the
AMB does have a connection to the providing of ground handling service, then the "competent authorities" of the Member
State, in consultation with the Users' Committee, will select the
third-party provider. 8 " A third-party provider will be selected
for a period of no more than seven years.8 °' 9 An AMB that also
provides ground handling services may automatically provide
those services, even if the airport in question is subject to restrictions under Article 6(2) or Article 9.s""
The directive goes on to state that Member States may "extend the obligation of public service" to an airport if it is located
on an island, has 100,000 or more passenger movements annually, and the Commission approves the extension.8 1' The Member States must also organize a mandatory annual meeting
between each airport's AMB, carriers, and any third-party providers of ground handling services.8 1' 2 A Member State can also
make the ground handling activity of third-party providers or
self-handlers contingent upon receiving the approval of a public
authority independent of the AMB. s l3 This approval may be
contingent on the financial condition or insurance coverage of
the party seeking to render such services.814 The Member State
may also apply such conditions as relate to the safety of installations, aircraft, equipment, or personnel, along with environmental protection and "compliance with relevant social
s15Id. at 41.
806 Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 11 (1)(a), 1996 OJ. (L 272) 36, 41.
807 Id,
8"8 Id.
809

Id.

810 Id.

Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 12, 1996 OJ. (L 272) 36, 41.
Id.
813 Id. at 42.
s14 See id.
81,
812

1095

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

2001]

legislation,"'815 provided that the criteria are applied in a "non-

discriminatory manner, ' 6 "relate to the intended objective, '
and do not have the effect of reducing market access below the
level provided for in the directive.8" 8 The directive also reserves
to the Members States the power to prohibit a third-party provider or carrier from operating ground handling services based
on the recommendation of the AMB if they have failed to comply with the operational rules imposed by the AMB. 19
Article 16 requires that Member States take necessary measures to ensure that self-handling carriers and third-party providers have access to airport installations as necessary to carry out
their activities.

2°

However, this and other provisions of the di-

rective "in no way affect the rights and obligations of Member
States in respect of law and order, safety and security in airports. '8 2 ' Furthermore, Member States can use "necessary measures" to assure "protection of the rights of workers and respect
for the environment, "822 as well as requiring suppliers of ground
handling service to conform
with national laws which are "com2
patible" with EU law.

1

Finally, the principle of reciprocity is codified by the directive. 8 24 A Member State may suspend its obligations under the

directive in respect to suppliers of ground handling services
from non-EU states if it "appears" that non-EU state does not
grant Member State suppliers of ground handling services the
same rights that suppliers from that country are granted at the
Member State's airports,82 5 or does not grant Member State suppliers the same rights as its national suppliers are granted, 2 6 or
grants suppliers from other nations more favorable treatment
than Member

State suppliers. 2 7

However,

this

article

is

"[w]ithout prejudice to the international commitments of the
815

Id.

816
817

Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 14(1)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36, 42.
Id.
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Id.

819 Id.
820
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825
826
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Id.
Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 17, 1996 0.J. (L 272) 36, 42.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Council Directive 96/67/EC, art. 20(1)(b), 1996 O.J. (L 272) 36, 43.
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Community,"8 28 which suggests that it does not supersede existing bilateral agreements between Member States and non-EU
states that may allow for a different level of access for ground
handling suppliers.
5.

The Charles de Gualle Airport Decision

There have been a number of Commission decisions pertaining to ground handling since the implementation of Directive
96/67/EC, but a particularly representative decision was
reached in April 1999.'29 The decision was issued in response to

a request by French authorities in January of that year for the
Commission to grant three exemptions for ground handling at
the Roissy-Charles De Gaulle airport. The first exemption
sought was for the Charles De Gaulle 2 (CDG 2) terminal to ban
self-handling and permit the AMB to control the use of thirdparty providers concerning ramp services, particularly the transportation of passengers and baggage between aircraft and the
terminal."" The proposed exemption was to be in effect until
December 31, 2000.3' The second exemption was for the AMB
to control the use of third-party providers at the T9 terminal
and concerned all ramp services other than catering and baggage handling inside the terminal itself.8 32 The AMB would also
have been granted the right to permit only two parties (either
self-handlers or third-party providers) to engage in passenger
handling 3 (i.e., any kind of assistance to passengers, including
check-in for tickets and baggage) .134 This exemption was to be
in effect until April 1, 2000.83 The last exemption was to restrict, indefinitely, self-handling at all terminals (CDG 1, CDG 2,
and T9) to three self-handlers in the categories of baggage 3han8 6
dling, freight and mail handling, and most ramp services.
The request for the exemption cited five factors that necessitated the restrictions for CDG 2: (i) the organization of the fleet
of buses used to transport passengers between satellite terminals

832

Id.
Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.

833

Id.

834

Council Directive 96/67/EC, Annex (2), 1996 OJ. (L 272) 36, 44.
Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, I(1)(1), 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14.
Id. at 15.

828
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830

831
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816
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and the main terminal building, 37 (ii) lack of adequate parking
for the bus fleet, 3 ' (iii) the current structure of the terminal
and its "halls" (i.e., concourses),839 (iv) saturation of the
aprons, 4 ° and (v) congestion on the service roads around the
terminal.8

41

For T9, the request only offered one justification,

namely the lack of sufficient space in the terminal and on the
"air-side" to "meet all the needs of the operators.8 42
In response to the request for the exemption, the Commission performed a study of the conditions at CDG, with particular
emphasis on the CDG 2 and T9 terminals. Traffic at CDG 2 rose
from 28.4 million passengers in 1995 to 38.5 million in 1998.43
CDG 2 has five halls (A, B, C, D, and Fl) and was originally
designed to handle 24.5 million passengers annually. 44 Because
CDG 2 is obliged to handle considerably more passenger traffic
than it was built to, satellite terminals have been built some distance from the main terminal. It was the transport of passengers between these satellite terminals and the main terminal
that was the primary focus of the proposed exemption for CDG
2.845 Two different types of buses are used for this type of operation, conventional buses and specially designed "aerobuses. "846
The aerobuses must be operated by personnel particularly
trained in their use.847 Because of the number and variety of
buses in use, there was too little space (a 1665 square meters
shortfall) for the buses to be parked at the terminal and they
were instead forced to park some distance away. 48 The Commission took particular note that because of the design of hall
C, only aerobuses could serve that part of the terminal. 49
The conditions at T9 were somewhat different, for T9 was especially designed to handle charter flights. 8 5° This results in the

terminal having an uneven traffic distribution, with one-third of
837 Id. at 16.
938

Id.

839

Id.
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Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, 11(14), 1999 O.J. (L 124) 14, 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
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its annual traffic passing through in July and August, and half
the weekly traffic volume coming on weekends."' The terminal
has also seen a surge in traffic, with annual flow increasing from
1.2 million passengers in 1995 to 1.9 million in 1998.52 Because
of its unusual traffic distribution, the terminal was partially constructed of prefabricated building units.

53

Ground handling at

T9 was provided by several third-party providers and one air carrier was self-handling for purposes of ramp services and refueling at the time the exemption was proposed.854 Due to these
factors, the terminal would reach "saturation" during peak periods, resulting in flights having to be diverted to other terminals
with available space.55 The AMB requested the exemption for

T9 so it could expand the terminal to accommodate the additional traffic and continue to allow competition for ground handling.

56

The exemption was intended to permit the AMB to

85 7
close part of the terminal for the expansion project.
The Commission first addressed the third exemption requested, the limitation to three self-handlers. It was found by
the Commission that it did not even need to grant an exemption for this action, as Article 7(2) of the ground handling directive permitted such an action without Commission approval
provided that it was done nondiscriminatorily 5 8 In regard to
the other exemptions, the Commission stated that "where specific space or capacity constraints ... make it impossible to admit a new supplier and/or authorise selfhandling . . . . the
Member State in question may ... restrict or even reserve the
provision of services . . . and/or ban or limit self-handling
. . . 99859 However, the Commission also noted that "the main
purpose of the Directive is to liberalise ground handling [sic]
services .... measures which are liable to exclude or prohibit
the activities of [parties wishing to ground handle] must 'be
such as to guarantee the achievement of the intended aim and
must not go beyond that which is necessary in order to achieve
Id.
Id. at 16.
853 Id. at 19.
854 Id.
855 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, II(B.1)(41),(42), 1999 O.J. (L 124)
14, 19.
856 Id. at 20.
857 Id.
858 Id. at 15.
859 Id. at 20.
851
852
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that objective."' 86 0 The Commission therefore determined that
its standard ofjudgment would be whether the exemptions contained "restrictions on freedom to provide services and, if so,
whether those restrictions are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest.""' The Commission proceeded to
state a three-part test for evaluating ground handling
exemptions:
* The existence and extent of the space and capacity constraints
used to justify the exemption and the impossibility of opening
up the market to the degree provided for in the Directive; only
the space an/or capacity constraints can be taken into account,
* The plan of appropriate measures to overcome the constraints;
this plan must be credible and unconditional and have a timetable for the implementation of those measures,
* Conformity with the principles referred to [in] Article 9(2) [of
Directive 96/67/EC] concerning compliance with the objective of the Directive, no distortion of competition and the extent of the measure. 62
Furthermore, exemptions must be strictly interpreted and the
scope of an exemption must be determined in relation to the
aims of the proposed measures. 6
Addressing the planned exemption for CDG 2, the Commission noted that while ground handling equipment "ideally"
should be located near the terminals, that was "only as a matter
of priority." '64 The Commission explained that the Directive required a petitioning party to "demonstrate that it is impossibl'
(emphasis added) to liberalize its ground handling operations
to the extent required.865 Thus, in this instance French authorities would have had to show there was no manner in which they
could accommodate additional buses. It was stated by the Commission that Member States could not use self-defined quality
criteria to demonstrate such "impossibilities."866 Specifically focusing on CDG 2 itself, the Commission stated that, other than
at hall C, it was physically possible to permit more buses to operate from the halls because the AMB was planning on phasing
860 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(1.1(56), 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14, 21
(quoting Commission Decisions 98/387/EC and 98/388/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 173)
32 & 45).
861 Id. at 21.
862 Id.
863 Id.

864

Id. at 22.

865

Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(2) (63), 1999 OJ. (L 124) 14, 22.

866 Id.
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out the aerobuses, which required significantly more space than
conventional buses.8 " 7 The Commission conceded that there
was inadequate parking at the terminals, but argued that the
buses could be parked farther away from the terminals, such as
on the open space reserved for future terminal construction. 6
However, the Commission admitted that it would not be possible to allow parties other than the AMB to serve hall C, because
hall C's design could only accommodate aerobuses which, for a
variety of reasons, are solely operated by the AMB's staff.8" 9 The
Commission therefore refused the requested exemption for all
the CDG 2 halls other than hall C, pending a demonstration
that there were other constraints on ground handling operations."" The Commission granted the exemption for hall C, because of the circumstances at the hall and because the AMB
complied with Article 9(2) of the Directive by providing a plan
to remedy the factors restricting operations.87 ' The plan was to
redesign hall C to eliminate the need for aerobuses by adding
stairways and/or escalators at the gates to permit conventional
buses to load/unload passengers and baggage at them. 7 2
Turning to the T9 terminal, the Commission observed that
while there were significant constraints on ground handling operations, the proposed exemption was too broad in scope.873
The space limitations previously identified concerned baggage
handling and passenger services within the terminal, but the exemption would have encompassed many aspects of ramp services where there was no demonstrable shortage of space.8 7 4
The Commission may have been particularly skeptical about the
requested exemption for ramp services because the AMB submitted a compliance plan that would have addressed only the
space problems within the terminal.8

75

Therefore, the Commis-

sion permitted only that part of the exemption that concerned
the ground handling services within the terminal, while denying
the part concerning ramp services. 87
8617

Id.

868

Id. at 23.

8; Id. at 22.
870 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(3) (81), 1999 Oj. (L 124) 14, 25.
871 M.

Id.
873 Id. at 26.
874 Id.
875 Commission Decision 1999/326/EC, IV(3) (82), 1999 O.J. (L 124) 14, 2526.
876 Id. at 27.
872
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Reflecting upon Directive 96/67/EC, the Commission remarked that while its primary purpose was to improve market
access, such access "should be real.

' a77

The Commission ex-

plained that this means access provisions that will improve the
quality of service and reduce costs to the consumer.878 Thus,
the Commission appears to be attempting to balance the generous powers the Council granted to the Member States and their
AMBs to restrict competition in the ground handling market.
This is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the Commission's statement about "real" market access and its earlier declaration above that it must be physically impossible for additional
parties to be admitted to the ground handling market for an
exemption to be granted. Given the apparent antagonism between the Council's writing and the Commission's interpretation, Directive 96/67/EC may not be the final piece of EU
legislation on the subject of ground handling.
G.

CARGO SERVICES

Council Regulations 294/91 applied to combined scheduled
and charter services, but cargo services were unaffected.1 79 The
Council met in December 1990 to consider regulations on the
intra-Community operation of air cargo carriers. Two months
later, the Council passed Regulation (EEC) 294/91, which came
into force on February 4, 1991.880 The Council announced its
intention to adopt rules for licensing and routes for such carriers by July 1, 1992.881

Third, Fourth, and Fifth Freedom rights

were conferred. 8 2 Capacity limitation provisions were similar to
those adopted in the Second Phase of Liberalization, discussed
above, providing that, except for safety reasons, "there shall be
no restrictions on frequency of service, aircraft type and/or the
amount of cargo and mail which may be carried."88

Cargo rates

were deregulated. 8 4
Ultimately, Regulation 294/91 was not long lived, being in effect less than two years. Article 15 of Regulation 2408/92 repealed all the provisions of Regulation 294/91 except for Article
877 Id. at 26.
878

Id.

879 GIEUMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, at § 57.
880 Council Regulation 294/91, 1991 0J. (L 36) 1.
881
882
883
884

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

arts. 3(2) 2.
arts. 4, 5, 2-3.
arts. 6, 3.
art. 9(1); see GIEMULLA & SCHMID, supra note 326, at

§ 58.
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2(b) and the regulation's annex. 8 5 Article 2(b) of 294/91
merely defines the term "Community air cargo carrier," which is
an air cargo carrier whose principal place of business is located
in a Member State and where Member States or their nationals
own a majority of its shares.88 6 The annex identified carriers
that, while not in compliance with the definition of Article 2(b),
Community air cargo carriers on a
were to be considered
"grandfather" basis. 887 Since January 1993, for the purposes of
tariffs and licensing, cargo services have been treated the same
as passenger services.
H.

THE COMPETITION RULES AND MERGER REGULATION

1. Introduction
Competitiveness in the EU's air transportation sector is governed by two principal mechanisms, the competition rules (Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87), which arise from Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, and the merger regulation (Regulation 4064/89), which is derived from Articles 87 and 235 of
the Treaty of Rome.8 8 The competition rules are also supplemented by Articles 88 and 89 of the Treaty of Rome when a
competition infraction lies beyond their scope."" ) The competition rules were promulgated in the wake of the Nouvelles
Frontieres case to forestall the Member States from seizing authority over air transportation regulation, while the merger regulation was created in the late 1980s as part of a surge in
Community regulatory powers in anticipation of the coming formation of the EU. Unlike the antitrust regulations of the
United States, these various regulations and treaty provisions are
intended not so much to prevent the formation, or force the
dissolution, of monopolies, but rather to prevent an undertaking, or group of undertakings, from achieving a market position
Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 15, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8.
886 Council Regulation 294/91, art. 2(b)(i), 1991 O.J. (L 36) 1.
887 Id. at Annex 4. (The "grandfathered" carriers are SAS, Britannia Airways,
and Monarch Airlines.).
881 Air Transport:Procedurefor Application of Competition Rules, available at http://
www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124079.htm (last visited 7/13/2000);
Air Transport: Application of Competition Rules, available at http://www.europa.eu.
int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124077.htm (last visited 6/13/2001).
889 Director of DG TV (Competition) Humbert Drabbe, Address to European
Air Law Association 10th Annual Conference (Nov. 6, 1998).
885
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that makes competition impossible or injures the consumer. 89
As detailed below, both categories of competitive measures have
played key roles in the shaping of the EU air transport industry.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the competition rules
and the merger regulation, however, there is a broader issue,
which includes both of them and is especially noteworthy in the
realm of international air transportation.
In 1991, the EU and the U.S. reached an understanding in
regard to the implementation of their respective competition
laws. 89' Called an Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Commission of the European Communities
Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws (the Agreement), the unimaginative title cloaked a radical step forward in
international cooperation. The Agreement was intended to promote coordination between the EU and U.S. (referred to as the
"parties" in the document) to reduce the danger of differences
in their respective competition rulings concerning transatlantic
mergers and acquisitions. 9 2 The "competition laws" included in
the Agreement were Articles 85, 86, 89, and 90 of the Treaty of
Rome, Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87 as "implementing regulations," and the merger regulation (Regulation 4064/89),
along with the U.S. Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Wilson Tariff Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.893
The basic premise of the Agreement was that each party
should notify the other whenever its competition authorities
(the Commission for the EU, the Department ofJustice and the
Federal Trade Commission for the U.S.) realize their enforcement activities may affect "important interests" of the other
party.8 4 This notice must be given in a timely manner so that
the other party has an opportunity to voice its opinions on the
matter.

95

Beyond this principle, the parties must also provide

each other with "any significant information" their respective
890 See generally G. Porter Elliott, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport
Sector, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 185 (1998).
891 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, 1995 OJ. (L 95) 47 (publication was delayed for four
years as the Court of Justice initially blocked its implementation) [hereinafter

AGREEMENT].
892

Id. at art. 1 (1).

898 Id. at art.
894
895

Id.
Id.

I(2)(A)(i) - (ii).
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competition authorities uncover which may be relevant to the
enforcement activities of the other party.' 6 Under the Agreement, the parties also affirm their intentions to cooperate with
each other in investigating anticompetitive activities that take
place in the territory of one party, but whose effects are felt in
the other." 7 However, the Agreement does not limit the discretion of the party in whose territory the anticompetitive activities
are transpiring to decide not to intervene 81
The parties undertake "at all stages in [their] enforcement
activities, to take into account the important interests of the
other Party.

.

. "899 If it appears that a party's enforcement activ-

ities would have a negative impact on the other party's "important interests," the enforcing party must consider several factors
before proceeding with enforcement.' ° Among these factors
are the relative significance of the anticompetitive activities, the
purpose behind the anticompetitive activities, and the extent to
which enforcement activities by the other party with respect to
the undertaking may be affected.9 1' Neither party is obligated
to provide information to the other if such disclosure is forbidden by the law of the party holding the information, nor is a
party required to provide information if doing so would be incompatible with its "important interests. "902 Furthermore, the
parties must maintain, "to the fullest extent possible," the confidentiality of any information provided by the other in confidence. °3' Finally, no terms of the Agreement may be
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws of
the parties." 4
In 1998, the EU and U.S. entered into a supplemental arrangement on the subject of their competition laws. 905 Entitled
an Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government
89'

AGREEMENT,

897
8,8

Id. at 48-49.
Id, at 49.

899

Id.

supra 891, at 48.

900 Id.
901AGREEMENT, supra note
9

Id. at 50.

903

Id.

891, at 49.

Id. There is a brief reference to the Agreement in the context of the Boeing - MDC decision, see Commission Decision 97/816/EC, 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16,
at art. VI(ll)-(12), 17-18.
905 Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government of
the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in
the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, 1998 OJ. (L 173) 28.
904
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of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity
Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws (the Comity
Agreement), it was intended to further clarify the principles
under which the parties cooperate to eliminate anticompetitive
activities in each other's respective territories. °6 As such, the
Comity Agreement covers little new ground, and it is explicitly
designed to refine the Agreement, rather than supersede it." 7
There is one significant change, however, in that the Comity
Agreement specifically removes proceedings under the merger
regulation, Regulation 4064/89, from the scope of the Agreement.908 The rationale for removing such an important piece of
EU regulatory work from the Agreement is uncertain. It may
have been a further response by the EU to its difficulties dealing
with the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger discussed below.
2.

Competition Rules

The EU competition rules are a complex mdlange of Articles
of the Treaty of Rome and their enforcing regulations. The relevant treaty provisions are discussed in Sections IV.C and VL.E
and F above, along with Regulation 3976/87 discussed in Section IV.C; therefore, this analysis will be principally focused on
the substantive portions of Regulation 3975/87. 909

a.

Regulation 3975/87

Regulation 3975/87 was intended to provide detailed rules
for the application of Articles 85 and 86 to the air transport industry, encompassing all air transport between Union airports."' ° The prohibitions prescribed by Article 85(1) of the
Treaty of Rome are held not to apply to certain agreements and
concerted practices provided that their sole object or effect was
to achieve technical improvements or cooperation." ' The investigative procedures established by the regulation may be
started by the Commission on its own initiative, or in response
Id. at 28
Id. at 30.
908 Id. at 29.
909 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 0J. (L 374) 1. Regulation 3975/87 has
been twice amended, first by Council Regulation 1284/91, 1991 0J. (L 122) 2,
and again by Council Regulation 2410/92, 1992 0J. (L 240) 18. As both amendments predate the Third Package and did not radically alter the character of the
regulation, the regulation as discussed here is its final amended form.
910 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 1(1) - (2), 1987 0J. (L 374) 1, 2.
91, Id. at 2.
906

q07
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to a complaint from either a Member State or a person, natural
or legal, who claims a legitimate interest in the matter." 2
Once the Commission has completed its investigation, and
has determined that there is an infringement of Articles 85(1)
or 86 of the Treaty of Rome, it may issue a decision requiring
the undertaking(s) to cease such activities. 913 However, at its
discretion the Commission may issue recommendations for actions that would bring the undertaking(s) into compliance with
the terms of the treaty provisions.9 14 If the activities of the undertaking(s) are in compliance with the terms of Article 85(1)
and 86, or if an exemption under Article 85(3) is applicable, the
Commission shall issue a decision declaring the activity to be
within the bounds of the Treaty of Rome. 915 Where the Commission has reason to believe that certain activities are imminently threatening the existence of air service or an air carrier, it
may issue an order halting the activities until such time as it is
able to render a final decision, although the order may not be
for an initial period greater than six months.9 16
Undertakings that desire to have the Article 85(3) exemptions
applied to their activities may submit an application to the Commission for such approval rather than wait for a complaint to be
brought against them.9 17 Once such an application has been
made and the Commission has taken comments from interested
parties, it may issue a decision granting or denying the exemption, alternatively, it may simply let the matter pass, in which
case after 90 days the exemption becomes effective for a period
of six years.9"' Any decision granting an Article 85(3) exemption must state the length of time for which it is valid, although
normally it would not be for a period less than six years. 9 9 The
exemption may be extended if the undertaking(s) involved still
comply with the necessary terms of the decision and the Treaty
of Rome. 920 Equally, the exemption may be terminated earlier if
there has been a change in the basic facts of the matter, or if the
undertaking(s) violated the conditions of the decision or en912

Id.

913 Id.
914

Id.

915 Council
916 Id. at 2.
917

Regulation 3975/87, art. 4(2) - (3), 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2.

Id. at 3.

918 Id.
919 Id.
920

Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 6(2), 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 3.
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gaged in other malfeasance. 921 The Member States have the
power to apply Articles 85 (1) and 86, provided that the Commission has not initiated an investigation, but only the Commission
may grant the Article 85 (3) exemptions, subject to review by the
Court of Justice.9 2
Regulation 3975/87 grants the Commission the power to conduct "all necessary investigations" into undertakings that are being examined. 923 Alternatively, the Commission may request the
Member State in whose territory the investigation is being conducted to use its resources to carry out the investigation.9 24 An
obligation of professional secrecy exists for examinations under
the regulation. 2 5 Where an undertaking fails to provide requested information to the Commission, or otherwise does not
cooperate with an investigation, the Commission may impose
fines up to 5,000 Euros. t2 6 If an undertaking is found to have
breached the terms of Articles 85(1) or 86 and/or failed to comply with a condition the Commission imposed in an earlier decision, the Commission may impose a fine from 1,000 to 1,000,000
Euros, or a fine in excess of 1,000,000 Euros but not exceeding
10% of the preceding year's turnover. 1 2 7 The implications of

Regulation 3975/87 are particularly relevant to alliances between air carriers, as most such agreements include provisions
that would violate Article 85(1)'s ban on anticompetitive activities. Thus, the air transport industry watched the first application of the regulation to an alliance with particular interest.
The Lufthansa - SAS Decision

b.

On May 11, 1995, Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Lufthansa) and
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) notified the Commission of
a newly concluded cooperation agreement that would lead to
the formation of "an integrated air transport system," (i.e., an
alliance) .928 The carriers contacted the Commission about their
proposed alliance in an effort to obtain an exemption under
Article 85(3).929 However, the Commission did not respond
921
922
923

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.

924

Id. at 5.

925 Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 17(1)-(2), 1987 OJ. (L 374) 1, 6.
926

Id. at 5.

927

Id.

928 Commission
929

Id.

Decision 96/180/EC, I(A)(1), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 28.

1108

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

positively to the initial application, stating that there were "serious doubts" about the compatibility of the agreement with the
Treaty of Rome, thus necessitating a full investigation. 0
In 1994, Lufthansa had the second largest amount of passenger-kilometers in Europe and the second largest amount of passenger-kilometers in worldwide traffic of any European air
carrier."' Lufthansa also had the second largest fleet among
European air carriers and it was the leading European cargo carrier. 9 1 2 SAS, on the other hand, was third in passenger-kilometers within Europe, but was the seventh-ranked European
carrier in worldwide traffic.9 3 SAS was the eighth largest European carrier in cargo traffic, both within Europe and worldwide,
and had the third largest fleet of European carriers."34 The
agreement would establish a regional joint venture to handle all
of their traffic between Germany and the Scandinavian nations35 The joint venture would be equally owned by the two
carriers and its management would have the authority to determine such items as capacity, frequencies, and fares, but it would
not constitute an independent company. 9 6 On a global level,
the parties would pool their sales and marketing efforts, establish joint network and price planning, offer reciprocal access to
their frequent-flyer programs, and integrate their cargo transport activities as much as possible. 937 Lufthansa and SAS would
also establish a joint hub system, although each party would still
handle its own domestic traffic independently.93
i.

The Relevant Market

The Commission began its analysis by determining the relevant market, which in this instance would be the market for
scheduled air transport of passengers and cargo on each of the
routes joining Germany and Scandinavia."3" The Commission
concluded that chartered air transport could not be a viable alternative, as the principal part of traffic on the routes was com9301
93 1

Id.
[d. at 29.

902 1(1.
113
934

935
9,3

Commission Decision 96/180/EC, I(B)(19), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 30.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id.

Id. at 30-31.
938 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, I(C) (26) - (27), 1996 OJ. (L 54) 28, 30 31.
.39 Id. at 31.
937
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posed of business travelers, who generally prefer to travel on
scheduled flights.

940

High-speed trains may serve as an alterna-

tive to passenger air travel but, due to geography, that was not
an option. Cargo transport by rail would not be a feasible alternative either.14' Furthermore, the geography of the region
would make it difficult for travelers to take alternatives to the
direct Germany-to-Scandinavia routes because of the considerable extra time such routing would add to the trip.942
ii. PotentialAnticompetitive Effects
Having established the nature of the relevant market, the
Commission next turned to considering the potential anticompetitive effects of the agreement. Lufthansa and SAS claimed
that there was significant competition between their proposed
hubs (Copenhagen, Stockholm, Oslo, Frankfurt, and Munich)
and other major European airports. 943 The Commission con-

ceded that this was true, but it also pointed out that the "hub
competition" was more important to intercontinental travelers
than intra-European travelers.944 Therefore, the anticompetitive
effects needed to be determined on a route-by-route basis. 45
There were 25 routes between Germany and Scandinavia, eight
of which were operated exclusively by the two parties (with the
exception of one daily frequency by Singapore Airlines). 46
These eight routes alone accounted for 66% of all traffic between Scandinavia and Germany, and at least one of the parties
operated on 12 of the other routes.'947 Thus, the proposed joint

venture would "appreciably restrict actual and potential competition" in regards to those routes.148 The carriers' economic

power would also be substantially increased as a result of their
operational consolidation on the German-Scandinavian routes,
while their pooled frequent-flyer programs would serve to attract even more traffic. 949 The combined integrated cargo ser-

vice the parties planned to create also had "the object and effect

941

Id.
Id.

942

Id. at 32.

943

Commission Decision 96/180/EC, II(C.1)(44), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 32.
Id. at 33.

940

944

945 Id.
946 Id.
947 Id.
948

Commission Decision 96/180/EC, II(C.1)(50), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 33.

,949 Id. at 34.
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of restricting competition" in the European air cargo market.95
Turning its attention to the global implications of the alliance,
the Commission was less concerned than it had been about the
effects of the joint venture. It was admitted that the agreement
would lead to competitive restrictions, but the effect of these
restrictions would be significantly weaker given the level of competition both Lufthansa and SAS face on the world market.95 1
iii. Groundsfor an Exemption
For the reasons above, the Commission concluded that the
agreement did in fact violate the terms of Article 85(1) of the
Treaty of Rome.952 This conclusion was reached with little fanfare, however, for Lufthansa and SAS had clearly anticipated
such a finding; hence their filing for an Article 85(3) exemption. The Commission therefore moved briskly to discuss possible grounds for an exemption. As part of its analysis, the
Commission identified four major considerations for granting
an exemption: (i) the agreement must contribute to the economic progress of the Union, (ii) the agreement must benefit
consumers, (iii) the restrictions must be indispensable in nature, and (iv) there must not be an elimination of
competition. 953
With respect to the agreement's contribution to the economic
progress of the EU, the Commission considered two factors: the
effects of the agreement on the European air transportation network, and its effects on the costs of the two parties. The Commission observed that SAS's network was predominantly
regional, while Lufthansa's was more balanced between regional
and pan-European routes.9 54 The alliance would therefore have
a beneficial effect on the overall European air transportation
network, particularly by improving service to Scandinavia, whose
geographically peripheral location has left its populations feeling marginalized in the EU. 95 The Commission also stated that
the reduction of European air carriers' costs is "an important
factor" to consider in granting such an exemption given the
considerably higher costs associated with European aviation.9 6
Id.

950

Id.

9.51

954

[i. at 35.
Commision Decision 96/180/EC, II(E)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 35 - 37.
Id. at 35.

955

Id. at 36.

956

Id.

92
953
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The precise savings that the agreement was estimated to produce were excised from the decision; however, the Commission
did appear to be impressed with the carriers' cost reduction
plan.9" 7 The Commission therefore concluded that the alliance
9 58
would "likely ... contribute to economic progress.
The Commission briefly addressed the other three considerations for exemption. First, it determined that consumers would
benefit from improved access to the European air network and
the lower fares the cost reductions were likely to generate. 59
The restrictions imposed by the agreement on the parties were
indispensable, as neither Lufthansa nor SAS could achieve the
same level of service operating independently.9 60 Finally, although competition would initially be reduced on the GermanScandinavian routes, there were other carriers operating in the
market which could expand their service, particularly once all
" ' Despite this
the Third Package measures came into effect.96
streamlined analysis, the Commission repeatedly expressed its
opinion that restrictions on the parties would be necessary to
bring the agreement into full compliance with Article 85(3).962
The Commission approved a ten-year exemption to the Article 85(1) prohibitions for the Lufthansa-SAS alliance, but approval came with a heavy price.96" Eight routes exclusively
operated by Lufthansa and SAS were singled out for the Commission's conditions under the decision (hereinafter the "Article 2(2) routes"). 964 To describe the conditions, the
Commission coined the phrase "Lufthansa/SAS entity." The
Lufthansa/SAS entity would be composed of Lufthansa, SAS,
any carrier in which either of the parties held more than 10 percent of the shares, any carrier with which either of the parties
had completed a structural agreement, and any carrier with
which the parties had concluded a code-sharing agreement on
routes between Germany and Scandinavia.965 Through October
31, 2002, on the Article 2(2) routes, if a carrier established in
Id.
958 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, 11(E) (a.2) (73), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 36.
957

959 Id.
960

Id. at (76)-(78).

961 Id.

Id. at 36-7.
Commission Decision 96/180/EC, art. 1, 1996 OJ. (L 54) 28, 40.
9 Id. The eight routes were Dusseldorf-Copenhagen, Dusseldorf-Stockholm,
Frankfurt-Copenhagen, Frankfurt-Gothenburg, Frankfurt-Oslo, Frankfurt-Stockholm, Hamburg-Stockholm, and Munich-Copenhagen.
965 Id.
962
963
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the EEA9 66 provides three months notice to the Lufthansa/SAS
entity of its intention to start service, the Lufthansa/SAS entity
must freeze its daily frequencies on the affected routes until the
new entrant starts its service.9 67 The Lufthansa/SAS entity may
subsequently increase its number of daily frequencies by one or
by as many as is necessary to equal the new entrant's frequencies
if it chooses to operate more than the Lufthansa/SAS entity already does.9 68 If an EEA-based carrier wishes to enter into an
interlining agreement with the Lufthansa/SAS entity, the entity
must permit it to do so on terms comparable to the industry's
norms for a period of seven years or until December 31, 2005,
whichever comes first.9 69 Furthermore, the Lufthansa/SAS entity must admit any EEA-based carrier into its frequent-flyer program if the new entrant is not already part of a frequent-flyer
program and it plans on operating a service on an Article 2(2)
route.9 70
The Commission also expressed concern about the fact that
Lufthansa and SAS already participated in frequent-flyer programs with other carriers. To resolve that issue, the Commission
obligated both parties to terminate those arrangements byJanuary 1, 1997. 9 71 As noted above, the shortage of slots at most European airports is a chronic problem, so the Commission
imposed elaborate slot allocation conditions on the Lufthansa/
SAS entity. 9 72 Basically, the entity was obligated to give up a limited number of slots on demand to a new entrant on the Article
2(2) routes, provided that the new entrant had not otherwise
been able to obtain the slots. Through October 31, 2002, the
Lufthansa/SAS entity must provide annual reports to the Commission, detailing its number of frequencies on the Article 2(2)
routes, any agreements on interlining or frequent-flyer programs, and a list of slots rendered to other carriers.9 7 3 Finally,
through December 31, 2005, the entity must provide the Com!)(;(The EEA is the European Economic Area. It is composed of the Member
States of the EU and the members of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), which are Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. There is a
close relationship between the EU and the EFTA. See EuropeanFree Trade Association, IP7A, available at http://secretariat.efta.int/euroeco.
90 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, art. 3(1)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 40.
968 Id.

!";11
Id.
970 Id.

971 Id. at 41.

972 Commission Decision 96/180/EC, art. 3(8)(a), 1996 O.J. (L 54) 28, 41.
973 Id. at 42.
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mission with annual reports on ticket prices, total monthly capacity supplied, and data regarding the extent of cost-reduction
achieved.974
c.

Weakness of Regulation 3975/87

While the Commission's decision in the Lufthansa/SAS case
has been hailed as a model for examining air-carrier alliances,975
it also served to illustrate an inherent weakness of Regulation
3975/87. As written, Regulation 3975/87 (along with Regulation 3976/87) is limited in its applicability, pertaining only to air
traffic within the EU.9 76 Therefore, agreements between EUbased carriers and carriers from other countries must be assessed by the individual Member States under Articles 88 and 89
of the Treaty of Rome, thus creating a danger of different national competition authorities reaching divergent opinions
about the compatibility of such an agreement with the Treaty of
Rome.977 This situation is particularly anomalous because it exists for no other industry and because the merger regulation
does not differentiate between intra-EU and extra-EU agreements. 9 78 To resolve this potential minefield of jurisdictional

controls, in 1997 the Commission proposed an amendment to
Regulation 3975/87 and 3976/87 that would extend the EU's
authority to extra-EU agreements. 9

79

Despite Parliament ap-

proval of the proposal, by mid-2000 no further progress on the
implementation of the amendments had been made.98 So for
now, the competition rules remain bound to the borders of the
EU.
3. Merger Regulation
a.

Regulation 4064/89

Shortly after the implementation of the regulations for the
competition rules, it became apparent to the EC's governing
974

Id.

Deputy Head of Unit DG Competition Joos Straiger, Presentation to the
11th Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association (Nov. 5, 1999).
976 Director of DG IV (Competition) Humbert Drabbe, Presentation to the
10th Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association (Nov. 6, 1998).
1475

977

Id.

978

Id.

979 Application of the Competition Rules in Certain Sectors: 1997 Proposal, available at

http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124078b.htm
21, 2000).
9( Id.

(last visited Aug.
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bodies that the regulations were not sufficient to cover all possible exigencies." S' It was therefore determined that a new regulation permitting effective monitoring of all concentrations, with
an eye toward determining their impact on the structure of competition within the EC, was necessary.9 2 To that end, in December 1989, the Council passed Regulation 4064/89, commonly
referred to as the "merger regulation." Much of the merger regulation is purely procedural. For example, it explains the process for empanelling an advisory committee in regard to certain
Commission actions; 98 3 however, several portions are highly relevant to the substantive subject of air transportation.
The regulation applies to all concentrations, i.e., where two
undertakings merge or where an undertaking acquires partial or
whole ownership of another undertaking,9 8 4 thus creating a

"Community dimension".985 A concentration has a "Community
dimension" when the aggregate worldwide turnover98 6 of all the
undertakings concerned is more than 5 billion Euros and the
aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings is more than 250 million Euros, unless more than
two-thirds of each undertaking's Union-wide turnover takes
place in one Member State.9 7 Obviously, a merger between two
or more major air carriers would almost certainly meet the
worldwide turnover requirement, and if a European-based carrier were involved the Union-wide requirement would be fulfilled as well.
When the Commission examines such a concentration it must
take into account a number of disparate factors. It must consider the necessity of preserving or developing effective competition within the Union in light of the relevant markets involved
and the existence of actual or potential competitors.' 8 The
Commission should also consider the economic and financial
power of the undertakings, access to supplies or markets, barri98,

Council Regulation 4064/89, pmbl., 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1, 1 - 3.

982 Id.

Id. at 10 - 11.
984 Id. at 4.
1185 Id. at 3.
98 "Turnover" is a peculiar financial concept much beloved by the EU. It is
the amount derived by an undertaking in the preceding fiscal year from the sale
of products and the provision of services falling within the undertaking's ordinary activities after deduction of sales rebates, value-added tax, and other taxes
directly related to turnover.
987 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 1(2), 1989 OJ. (L 395) 1, 3.
983

988 Id.
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ers to entry and trends in supply and demand for the relevant
good or serviceY98 Furthermore, the interests of all concerned
consumers, and the effect that the concentration may have on
technical and economic advancement must also be assessed. 990
If, after making these determinations, the Commission finds
that the concentration does not create or strengthen a dominant position that would otherwise imperil competition, the
concentration should be approved.99 1 However, if the concentration would endanger competition, it should be declared incompatible with the nature of the common market, 992 even
though satisfactory concessions by the undertakings may subsequently bring the concentration into compliance.
Given the current wave of air-carrier alliances, the merger regulation is of particular significance to the air transport industry.
It explicitly permits actions-including joint ventures- that have
as their object or effect the coordination of competitive behavior among undertakings, provided the undertakings remain independent. 99 3 As noted above, however, such an operation or
joint venture might be in violation of the competition rules. But
if the joint venture functions on a lasting basis as an "autonomous economic entity," then it does constitute a concentration
within the terms of the regulation. 94
If the Commission determines that a concentration strengthens or gives rise to an undertaking's dominant position, the regulation requires the Commission to issue a decision declaring
the concentration incompatible with the common market. 9 5 As
part of such a decision, the Commission may order the undertakings separated, their joint control terminated, or any other
appropriate measures to "restore conditions of effective competition."' 96 Alternatively, the Commission may place conditions
on an incompatible concentration to bring it into conformity
with the terms of the regulation. 997 The undertakings would
then be free to choose whether to comply with the conditions
989

Id.

990

Id.

991 Id.
992

Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 2(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 4.

993

Id.

994Id.

:9 Id. at 6.
:96 Id. at 6-7.
993 Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 8(2), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 6.
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and proceed with theconcentration or to dissolve the concentration rather than accept the Commission's conditions.
The merger regulation also gives the Commission broad powers to impose fines, both as punishment for failure to cooperate
with it procedurally and substantively. The Commission may
fine an undertaking up to 50,000 Euros for failure to provide
prompt notice of a concentration, negligently or deliberately
providing inaccurate or incomplete information, or otherwise
refusing to submit to an investigation of its business practices.99
For the more severe action of defying the terms of a decision,
the Commission may impose a fine up to ten percent of the undertaking's aggregate turnover 9 9 Such a penalty would clearly
be disastrous for an air carrier, because the value of the fine
could run into the hundreds of millions, or even billions, of Euros. Given the high aggregate turnover and the slim profit margins that characterize the industry, the severe nature of the fines
that could be imposed thus makes the aviation industry extremely susceptible to intimidation by the Commission via
merger regulation.
The Court of Justice enjoys "unlimited jurisdiction" to review
the decisions of the Commission within the context of the
° ° It may cancel, reduce, or increase the
merger regulation.'1
level of any fine imposed by the Commission. 10 11 The regulation does not explicitly give the Court of Justice the power to
alter the conditions imposed by the Commission, but that would
appear to be a logical extension of its "unlimited jurisdiction."
The regulation also imposes an obligation of professional secrecy on the Commission and any other parties involved in the
investigation of a concentration.10 0 2 Therefore, since the Commission may not disclose any information that would fall under
the "professional secrecy" standard, decisions under the merger
regulation often take on a cryptic tone. For example,
"[a]ccording to Boeing only ... of its production capacity is in
."03
use which leaves spare capacity of. ...

Finally, of particular importance for international aviation,
the merger regulation introduces the concept of reciprocity for
I8 at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
I01(8Id.
1002Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 17(1)-(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 10.
M03 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (65), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 26. (ellipses
in the original).
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investigations of concentrations. When it appears that a nonMember State is not granting Union undertakings the same
standard of treatment as the Union grants undertakings from
that nation, the Commission may submit a request for negotiating powers to the Council. 0 °4 These negotiating powers would
be used to obtain comparable treatment for Union
undertakings. 1005

b.

The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger

Although the merger regulation has been applied numerous
times since its introduction, there are few decisions as monumental in nature as the Commission's decision concerning the
Boeing Company's (Boeing) takeover of McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC). While not directly involving air transportation, much of the Commission's analysis in the case would have
equal applicability for air carriers.
In December 1996, Boeing and MDC concluded a purchase
agreement under which MDC would become a subsidiary of
Boeing, thus meeting the basic definition of a concentration
within the terms of the merger regulation.'006 The two undertakings had worldwide turnover considerably in excess of 5 billion Euros, along with Union-wide turnover greater than 250
million Euros. Neither undertaking achieved more than twothirds of their Union-wide turnover within one Member State
and, as a result, the merger had a Union dimension.'0017 Having
established that the Boeing-MDC agreement fell within its purview under the merger regulation, the Commission began its
analysis of the likely effects of the agreement.
The Commission identified the relevant product market for
the two undertakings as being the market for new, large commercial aircraft (i.e., those that carried more than 100 passengers and had ranges in excess of 1,700 nautical miles), since
those were the sole products that Boeing and MDC manufac-8
1
tured that were relevant to the Commission's investigation. 0
The relevant geographic market was the entire world, given the
ease with which the products are distributed. 1 09 In the global
Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 24(3), 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, 12.
Id.
1006 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (5) - (6), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 17.
1007 Id.
1008 Id. at 18. Because of U.S. security concerns, the Commission did not directly investigate the military aircraft divisions of the undertakings.
1009 Id. at 19
1004
1005
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market for new, large commercial aircraft, there were only three
manufacturers: Boeing, which was first with approximately 64%
of the market, Airbus, which was second with approximately
27%, and10 MDC, which was third with approximately six
0
percent.
The customers for the product were predominantly air carriers and leasing companies. '' While there were 561 air carriers
operating the various manufacturers' aircraft, the 12 largest carriers accounted for half of all such aircraft in operation, while
leasing companies held another 20%.1112 This skew among customers is particularly important, as carriers prefer to purchase
all their aircraft from a single supplier to streamline maintenance.")"3 Boeing was uniquely poised to exploit this preference, as it was the only undertaking capable of supplying aircraft
in all size-ranges within the product type, given that Airbus'
models were all of intermediate size and MDC's were of small to
intermediate size.1" 14 Furthermore, there was already evidence
of Boeing moving to take advantage of the carriers' preference,
as it had recently concluded exclusive dealing contracts with5
American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and Continental Airlines. 10
In each instance, the carriers received aircraft or purchase options on aircraft at reduced prices in exchange for an agreement
to use Boeing as their exclusive supplier for the next twenty
years. 1"6 These agreements effectively gave Boeing a guaranteed 13% of the estimated sales of large commercial jet aircraft
for the next twenty years. 1 11 7 All of these factors, combined with

the extremely high costs of starting an aerospace company,
served to ensure that no new competitors would enter the market in the foreseeable future.""'3

The Commission concluded that Boeing already held a domi-9
nant position in the market for large commercial jet aircraft. 10"
Particularly significant, Boeing's market share had increased
continuously over the previous seven years (primarily at the ex1olo Id. at 19-21. The remaining three percent was composed of aircraft whose
manufacturers had discontinued production, such as Lockheed and Convair.
101 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (25), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 20.
1012 Id.
1013 Id. at 21-22.
1014 Id.
1-5 Id. at 23.
1016 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (43) - (44), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 23.
1017 Id. at 24.
1018
1019

Id.
Id.
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pense of MDC), while Airbus' market. share had remained
mostly unchanged over the same period.' ° The Commission
explained that this demonstrated that Boeing was able to act "to
an appreciable extent independently of its competitors," which
constitutes "an illustration of dominance."'' 0 2 ' Having found
that Boeing enjoyed a dominant position, the Commission was
then obliged to assess whether the acquisition of MDC would
further strengthen Boeing's dominance.
The immediate effects of the merger would be to increase
Boeing's market share to 70% and give it a monopoly on the
smallest size of large commercial jet aircraft (100-120 passengers), complementing its existing monopoly on the largest
size. 10 22 This could permit Boeing to sell its intermediate size
aircraft below cost, relying on higher prices on the other sizes to
compensate for the loss, thereby undermining Airbus' market
position.

°23

Even more perniciously, the elimination of MDC

would likely result in an increase in prices. The Commission
determined this by comparing purchase agreements where
MDC was a competitor for the sale with those purchase agreements where it did not participate. It was found that final prices
were seven percent lower in those cases where MDC was a competitor, regardless of which undertaking finally received the
purchase order.10 2 4 Boeing would also benefit in the long run

from access to MDC manufacturing facilities and staff. Once all
remaining new aircraft are delivered by the MDC plants, Boeing
would be able to begin turning these resources to production of
its own aircraft models. 10

25

Given that the aircraft manufactur-

10 26
ing industry is characterized by large production backlogs,
this added capacity would eventually be of great benefit to
Boeing.
Boeing's subsuming of MDC would also sharply increase its
ability to negotiate exclusive dealing contracts-not merely due
to the elimination of a competitor, but also because Boeing
would be able to manipulate any pre-existing orders for MDC

aircraft and parts. 10
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027

2

1

Morever, Boeing had already suggested to

Id. at 21.
Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (37), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 21.

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26-27.
Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (28), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 20.
Id. at 27.
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carriers that it could take back newly delivered MDC aircraft,
cancel existing orders for MDC aircraft, and substitute new Boeing aircraft in their place. 11 28 Boeing's newfound monopoly in
the small-size large commercial jet market would also enhance
the attractiveness of any exclusive dealing contract it might offer
a carrier.10

29

The Commission estimated that Boeing could se-

cure as much as 40% of the world's market through such
0 30
contracts.'

While the Commission withheld judgment on the direct effects of the combination of Boeing and MDC's military aviation
divisions, it expressed consternation at the possible indirect effects the combination might have on Boeing's civil aviation division. The concentration would triple the size of Boeing's
military and space activities, thereby giving the undertaking access to a considerable stream of revenue which would be largely
unaffected by economic fluctuations. 0 " Acquisition of MDC
would also give Boeing access to the sizeable amounts of U.S.
government-sponsored research and development (R&D) funds
of which MDC was a beneficiary. 103 - 2 Despite Boeing's protests

that its civil and military divisions were discrete entities, the
Commission pointed out that Boeing already had a history of
diverting military research to civilian applications. "3 Furthermore, even if it were to keep its military and civilian divisions
clearly separate, Boeing still would obtain a greatly increased
number of patents as a by-product of its government-sponsored
R&D, which could serve to obstruct other manufacturers from
developing the same technologies for civilian applications. 034
Finally, the Commission expressed reservations about the
amount of influence Boeing would be able to wield over its suppliers in the wake of the concentration. The actual breakdown
of sales was excised under the professional secrecy obligation of
Article 17 of Regulation 4064/89. However, it may be inferred
from the decision that a considerable percentage of suppliers of
aerospace materials rely on Boeing and MDC for the majority of
their sales. ' °33 Boeing would have a significant ability to pres10128
102)
1)30

Id.

Id. at 28.
Id.

1031 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (73), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 28.
-31!
1033

1034
1035

Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
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sure these suppliers for favorable prices or preferred access to
products.' 136 The Commission cited a case from earlier in 1997,
where Northrop Grumman dropped out of a development project with Airbus, seemingly in response to efforts by Boeing to
dissuade it from cooperating with Airbus.1 3 7 For this reason,

and the others cited above, the Commission determined that
the merger of Boeing and MDC would "lead to a strengthening
of a dominant position through which effective competition
would be significantly impeded . . " - I

Nevertheless, the Commission agreed to grant permission for
the merger under a series of stringent conditions. Boeing was
obliged to maintain the civilian aircraft division of MDC as a
separate legal entity for ten years, subject to review by an independent auditor."' : Boeing was also required to support the
existing MDC product lines, providing the same level of service
'
as it did to users of Boeing's product lines.1040
Additionally,
Boeing had to give guarantees that it would not coerce any MDC
users into purchasing Boeing's products, or deter them from
purchasing another manufacturer's products.'0 4' Until August
1, 2007, Boeing would be barred from entering into any exclusive dealing contracts unless another manufacturer had already
offered such a contract to the carrier in question. 1 14 2 Further-

more, the existing exclusive
dealing contracts that Boeing had
43
1
completed were voided.

The Commission also imposed an elaborate series of restrictions on Boeing's R&D and patents. Upon request by another
commercial aircraft manufacturer, Boeing must provide "a nonexclusive, reasonable royalty-bearing" license for any government-funded patent that could be applied to commercial jet aircraft. 0 4 4 Under the same conditions, Boeing must license any

"blocking patent" to any other aircraft manufacturer that agrees
to cross-license its blocking patents to Boeing. 10

45

To aid in ver-

ification of this, for a ten-year period Boeing must supply the
Commission Decision 97/816/EC,
Id.
1038 Id. at 36.
1039 Id. at 36-37.
1040 Id.
1041 Commission Decision 97/816/EC,
1042 Id. at 37.
1043 Id.
1044 Id. ("government-funded" means
process of performing its duties under a
1045 Id.
136

(106), 1997 0J. (L 336) 16, 35.

1037

(115), 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, 36-37.

any patent obtained by Boeing in the
contract with the US government).
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Commission with an annual report of its unexpired governmentfunded patents." 4 " Also for the next ten years, Boeing must give
an annual report to the Commission detailing all of its nonclassifled government-sponsored R&D, including a description of any
patents or technologies generated by the research that could
have commercial applications.' 4 7
To make certain that Boeing did not exploit its dominant position vis-a'-vis suppliers, it had to assure the Commission that it
would "not exert or attempt to exert undue or improper influence

. . .

by promising an increase in supplies or subcontracted

R&D activities, threatening to decrease supplies or subcontracted R&D activities, or leveraging in any other way its own
supply relationships... "1048 However, the Commission did per-

mit Boeing to retain its ability to choose its0 own
suppliers and to
49
enforce its contracts with those suppliers.1

In its final conclusion, the Commission effectively admitted
that it would have liked to have seen MDC remain a competitor
or, failing that, be purchased by somebody other than Boeing. 11 5 1 However, as that was not possible, the Commission felt

that the conditions it imposed were a satisfactory alternative in
that "they adequately address[ed] the competition problems
identified... 15 1 Thus, the Commission approved the concentration, subject to the above conditions and with the requirement that Boeing allow a Commission-appointed expert
investigator to examine the undertaking periodically
to verify
1 0 52
compliance with all the terms of the decision.

c.

Regulation 1310/97

As the Boeing-MDC decision was winding its way through the
Commission's decision process, the Council was preparing to
make several significant changes to the merger regulation. The
Council had determined that the minimum turnover required
to trigger the Commission's investigative authority under Regulation 4064/89 was too high; many concentrations which would
have best been handled by the Commission were instead being
left at the mercy of multiple Member States' competition au1046 Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (117), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 37.
1047

Id.

1048

Id. at 38.

1049

Id.

I-)o Id. at 39.
10511
Commission Decision 97/816/EC, (123), 1997 OJ. (L 336) 16, 39.
1052

Id.
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thorities."1 ' 3 To rectify this and several other problems, the
Council passed Regulation 1310/97 in July 1997, although the
changes did not go into effect until the following March. 54
The most significant change for the air transportation industry came in a supplement to the standards for assessing whether
a concentration was sufficiently large to come under the Commission's purview. Under Regulation 1310/97, concentrations
that have a minimum aggregate worldwide turnover of 2.5 billion Euros, and where there is at least 100 million Euros turnover in at least three Member States, now are considered to
possess a Union dimension provided that they meet certain additional criteria.11 55 Additional criteria require that in each of at

least three Member States, the turnover of each of at least two of
the undertakings concerned must be more than 25 million Euros and the aggregate Union-wide turnover of each of at least
two of the undertakings concerned must be greater than 100
million Euros. 10

56

These reduced levels clearly bring the major-

ity of possible air carrier concentrations within the Commission's jurisdiction, with only concentrations between value
carriers likely being small enough to remain outside of it.
With respect to joint ventures, Regulation 1310/97 made
clear what Regulation 4064/89 had merely implied-joint ventures where the parties remain independent are still subject to
review under the competition rules. 1115 7 The regulation also pro-

vided guidelines for such an analysis, stating that the Commission should particularly consider whether the parent
undertakings would remain in competition with the joint venture, either in the same market or related markets, and whether
the joint venture would have the possibility of "eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products or ser-

vices in question." 1058
The remainder of the Regulation 1310/97 amendments have
few direct consequences for air transportation, as they concern
other industries (such as the formula for calculating turnover
for financial institutions) 1151 or are clarifications that do not oth1053

Council Regulation 1310/97, pmbl. (1), 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, 1.

Id. at 6.
1055
Id. at 2-3.
1054

1056

Id.

1057

Id. at 3.

1058

Council Regulation 1310/97, art. 1(2) - (3), 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, 3.
Id.

1059
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erwise alter the substantive nature of the regulation.1 6 " However, there is one procedural change of note, which likely
resulted from the Boeing-MDC case. Under Article 7(1) of Regulation 4064/89, a concentration could not be put into effect
before notification was given to the Commission or for three
weeks thereafter. Regulation 1310/97 has changed this so that
now a concentration cannot be effected until the Commission
renders a decision on its compatibility with the common market.""6 The only exception to this is where the Commission specifically grants a "presumption" of compatibility, which will allow
the concentration to be put into effect until such time as the
Commission gives its final decision.1°62 This change would appear to be at least partially a byproduct of the EU's disgust with
Boeing's manipulation of MDC's customers during the time the
Commission was investigating the concentration.
I.

STATE AID

The subsidization of the European transportation sector long
predates the aviation industry,' 6 3 but few industries have received such vast quantities of state support relative to their share
of national GDP. "' 4 Thus, the governing bodies of the EC/EU
were reluctant to formally address the issue, despite already having the authority under the Treaty of Rome to do so.10 65 It was
not until after the passage of the Third Package that the Commission finally decided to take up the subject of state aid, on the
grounds that state aid was more of a danger to the market now
that it had been liberalized.'0 6 6
1.

Comit6 Recommendations

In the summer of 1993, the Commission directed the Comit6
des Sages to analyze the condition of the EU's air transportation
industry and to make recommendations on future Union pol()';() Id. at 5.
106

Id. at 4.

1062

Id.

189-92 (Arthur Goddard trans.,
The Foundation for Economic Education 1996) (1848).
101
' Carole A. Shifrin, Market Rigors Squeeze Eurovpean Flag Carriers, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Mar. 14, 1994, at 64.
1065 TREA'IY OF ROME, supra note 34, at arts. 92, 93.
-- 3 Commission Paper, 350/07, 1.1(1), 1994 O.J. (C 350) 5 [hereinafter COM106 FREDERIC BAsTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS

MISSION PAPER].

20011
icy. 10 67

1125

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

The Comit6 completed its report in February 1994, of-

fering three principal recommendations.

l 0 68

The first was that

state aid to air carriers or ground handling services should be
disapproved if it would be "incompatible with normal commercial practices."'' 1 69 Second, the Commission should "strictly enforce" those parts of the Treaty of Rome that govern state aid
and it should release guidelines for evaluating any exceptional
state aid.10 7' Finally, the Comit6 recommended that for "a brief
period," the Commission should consider approving state aid
where the aid "serves the Community's interest"
in restructuring
07
a carrier so it can be commercially viable.'1
The Comit6 also provided seven suggested conditions for
such reorganizational aid: (i) the aid must be made on a "one
time, last time" basis, 1 7 2 (ii) the carrier and Member State must
submit a restructuring plan designed to lead to commercial viability within a specified time frame and must ultimately lead to
privatization,

17

1

(iii) the feasibility of the restructuring plan

must be determined by independent examiners selected by the
Commission," 74 (iv) the Member State concerned must refrain
from interfering with the carrier's operations,"' 75 (v) the carrier
may not use state aid to increase its total capacity,10 7 1 (vi) there

must be "acceptable proof' that other carriers' commercial interests are not damaged by the aid,"17 7 and (vii) the restructur-

ing plan must be monitored, preferably by independent
experts,
1 78
to verify that it complies with the above terms.

1

The Commission agreed with most of the Comit6's recommendations, but it did reject two key provisions. It was the Commission's opinion that it could not, under the Treaty of Rome,
absolutely refuse a Member State the right to grant aid to a carrier multiple times."' 79 Furthermore, the Treaty of Rome would
also prohibit the Commission from compelling a Member State
1067

1o68

Id. at 6.
Id.

1069Id.
1070

Id,

11171COMMISSION PAPER,
1072

J&d

1073

1075

Id.
Id.
Id.

1076

COMMISSION PAPER,

1074

1077
1178

Id.
Id.

1079) Id

at

6-7

supra note 1066, at 6.

supra note 1066, at 6.
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to privatize a carrier.""" However, the Commission stated that it
would take such factors into consideration in deciding whether
to permit state aid to carriers.l"08
2.

Commission Paper on State Aid

Having reviewed the Comit6s recommendations, the Commission then turned to laying out its own guidelines on the subject of state aid. Aside from carriers themselves, the guidelines
apply to any operations that are "accessory to air transport,"
such as flight schools, duty free shops, and airport facilities, and
will apply to either direct or indirect subsidization. 01 8 2 Aircraft
manufacturing is beyond the scope of the guidelines, but aid
granted for the purchase of aircraft is included.0 83 The guidelines also only apply to Member States, but if a third country is
heavily subsidizing a carrier, it may be dealt with under the EU's
"anti-dumping" regulations. l81 4 The construction or enlargement of infrastructure like airports is beyond the scope of the
guidelines,' 8 5 but granting preferential access to infrastructures
for particular carriers could be considered aid.1 0 6 Aid defined
as "social aid" may or may not be covered by the guidelines, depending on the effect of the aid.1 87 If the social aid gives a
carrier a competitive advantage, for example by lowering its
l88
costs, then it would fall within the scope of the guidelines.
a.

Direct Operational Subsidies

The Commission strongly opposed direct operational subsidization of air routes, stating that such aid is "not compatible with
the common market."""'
Although subsidization may be necessary to encourage development of "disadvantaged areas," the
Commission was concerned that the subsidies given for operation of such -routes would be covertly used to subsidize other
competitive routes."') Accordingly, the Commission deter-

l

I,
Id.
COMMISSION PAPER,

supra note 1066, at 6-7.

1OM2 Id. at 8.
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mined that direct operational subsidies would only be acceptable in two circumstances.
The first is where a public service obligation has been imposed on a carrier. 09 1 In such a case, a Member State may reimburse the carrier for any loss sustained in the process of
operating the route. 119 2 However, the carrier must clearly ac-

count for its costs in the operation of the route and the Member
State may not overcompensate the carrier. 10 93 To be considered
a true public service obligation route, the right to operate the
route has to have been made open to public bids. 1094 The recipient of the route should ordinarily be the lowest bidder, and if
not, the Member State should
be prepared to explain its selec10 9 5
tion to the Commission.

The other case where direct operational subsidies would be
permitted is where they are used for "social aid," particularly for
the benefit of individual consumers rather than suppliers, as
provided for by Article 92(2) (a) of the Treaty of Rome.' 1 96 As
applied to air travel, "social aid" would most likely mean aid intended to assist certain categories of passengers in obtaining
flights. 0°97 The aid must be granted without discrimination as to
the origin of the service, so the aid would have to be granted to
all Community carriers and European Economic Area (EEA)
carriers transporting those varieties of passengers. 09
b.

Evaluating Other Forms of State Aid

The Commission next established the method by which it
would evaluate various types of state aid other than direct operational subsidies. A two-tier test is to be used for such evaluations. The first tier is generally known as the "Market Economy
Investor Principle" (MEIP), meaning that the aid will be examined to determine if a private investor would make the same
sort investment in the carrier. 1' 9 9 If the aid fails this first tier,
then it will be examined under the second tier, which will consider whether the aid is "compatible with the common market"
1091 COMMISSION PAPER, supra note
1092
1093

1066, at 9.

Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.

1094Id.
1095

Id. at 10-11.
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under the derogations of Article 92(3) of the Treaty of
Rome.1 00 With respect to the MEIP, the Commission observed
that it did not require the restructuring plan to assure profitability "beyond all reasonable doubt;" it need only be "reasonably
certain" that a private investor would find the plan
satisfactory.""0 o
There are three major types of possible state aid other than
direct operational subsidies identified by the Commission. The
first is capital injection. Capital injections are not considered
state aid when the public holding in a company is increased,
provided that the capital injection is proportional to the share
of capital owned by the Member State and that it is done in
conjunction with a capital injection from a private shareholder
of "real economic significance."' 1102The MEIP will be satisfied if
the future prospects for the company are such that the cost of
the injection would be recouped through dividends or capital
appreciation within a "reasonable period." 1103 The Commission
noted that a private investor would normally provide financing
if the present value of future returns exceeded the present outlay." 04 Therefore, to determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate, the Commission will examine, among other factors, a carrier's debt/equity ratio, cash flow, operating costs, labor productivity, fleet condition, and commercial strategy along
with the "general economic environment of the airline industry."' 05 Where a carrier is actively losing money, a coherent re0 6
structuring program to restore profitability must be offered."1
The second possible type of state aid other than direct subsidization is loan financing. The MEIP will be applied to assess
whether the loan is being made on regular commercial terms
and whether such a loan could have been procured from a private bank.'"" 7 The Commission will consider both the level of
the interest rate and what collateral is required, as well as the
financial position of the company at the time the loan is
made.'"" The difference between the terms of the State-proII()[d.
1l
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vided loan and a private loan will be deemed aid. 1 °9 If no collateral is required by the Member State in a situation where a
private investor would have demanded it, then the entire value
of the loan is considered equivalent to a grant." 10
Finally, there are loan guarantees. The Commission will permit such guarantees only where they are contractually bound to
specific conditions for the carrier's operation. 1 " The aid element of a guarantee is the difference between the rate the carrier would have had to pay to obtain such a loan independently
12 If
and the rate the carrier must pay for the guaranteed loan.
a carrier's legal status is such that it cannot go bankrupt, or
where the Member State that owns it has taken on the burden of
unlimited liability for its losses, then the carrier is considered to
be permanently under a loan guarantee for these purposes.""
c.

Exemptions
Where it has been determined that a carrier is receiving state
aid through one of the above methods, the Commission will examine whether an exemption may exist under Article 92(3) of
the Treaty of Rome.11 4 The first exemption is for regional aid,
under Article 92(3) (a) and (c), which permits state aid to undertakings investing in "disadvantaged areas," as defined by
Commission Communication O.J. No. C 212 of August 12,
1988.11 5 The second exemption under Article 92(3)(c) is for
aid which "facilitates the development of certain economic activities ... of particular interest."'' ""

In the context of the aviation

industry, this usually will mean aid for corporate reorganization
or for social purposes such as "facilitating the adaptation of the
work force to a higher level of productivity. "1117 However, such

aid must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring
plan to restore the carrier's commercial viability, 1" 8 and it must
be "self-contained" (i.e., a one-time delivery of aid without expectation of future assistance). 19 The Commission will only
Id.
iii0
Id.
111COMMISSION PAPER, supra note
1112 Id.
1113 Id.
1114 Id. at 15.
1115 Id.
III" COMMISSION PAPER, supra note
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"11
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permit additional aid "under exceptional circumstances, unforeseeable and external to the company."' 1 20 The progress of the
restructuring plan will be subject to verification by the Commission, particularly those parts of it that the Commission
de2l
approval."
its
for
conditions
as
included
be
manded
d. Privatization
The guidelines also address the role of state aid in the context
of privatization. Aid is not considered to exist if the undertaking is disposed by way of "an unconditional public invitation" to
bid on transparent and nondiscriminatory terms, the undertaking is sold to the highest bidder, and the bidders were given a
"sufficient period" in which to prepare their offer. 1122 However,
there is a presumption that a sale includes aid if the sale is made
in a restricted manner or directly to a buyer, if the undertaking's debts are cancelled or capitalized, and/or if the conditions
of the sale would not be acceptable under the MEIP. 11 23 If the
sale is made in a manner that presumes aid, the undertaking
must be valued by an independent expert, and the amount of
aid will be the difference between the undertaking's market
value and what it would be sold for, although the Article 92(3)
24
exemptions may apply."1

e.

Exclusive Rights

According to the guidelines, the granting of exclusive rights
for activities that are accessory to air transport can also be a
form of aid. If a Member State grants an exclusive concession to
a carrier at a price below what that concession would have cost
on the open market, then that difference is considered to be
state aid."125 Furthermore, if the concession is put up for open
bid and a carrier other than the lowest bidder is selected by the
Member State, that choice may be subject to review by the
Commission. 1126
1120
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f. Reporting State Aid
The Commission was also concerned that prior to the implementation of the guidelines, many forms of state aid were not
properly reported. Consequently, the guidelines provide a list7
12
of actions that should be reported to the Commission.'
Funds that are provided through publicly owned undertakings
manner
or financial institutions should be reported in the1 2same
8
State.'
Member
the
by
directly
as funds provided
g.

Accelerated Clearance

Finally, recognizing that a detailed examination of all transactions falling within the scope of the guidelines was not feasible,
the Commission provided for an accelerated clearance procedure in certain instances.' 12 1 Where the amount of aid given to
an undertaking is one million Euros or less over a three-year
period, and the aid is tied to "specific investment objectives,"
other than operating expenses, the Commission will render a
decision within 20 working days." 1"' As the Commission noted,
the sum is so small it does not represent a meaningful amount
of aid in so costly a field as aviation, but rather is intended to
help with regional development not otherwise covered by public
service obligations." 3 '
The Commission concluded the guidelines by noting that it
would periodically update them.' 112 But since the implementation of the guidelines in 1994, they have remained unchanged" 3 and their vitality continues, subject only to the
interpretations of the Commission in its application of them.
3.

The Olympic Airways Decision

Soon after the announcement of the guidelines, the Commis-4
sion was confronted with a particularly grisly state aid case.' '
The Greek national carrier Olympic Airways (Olympic) had
1127 Id. at 19-20. The types of actions that should be reported include: set-offs
for operational losses, the provision of capital, nonrefundable grants or loans,
forgoing profits or the recovery of sums due, forgoing the return of public funds,
and compensation for state-imposed financial burdens.
1128
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been in deteriorating financial condition for years.' 135 Despite
holding a government-granted monopoly on all domestic scheduled air travel, along with ground handling and aircraft maintenance at all Greek airports, by 1992 Olympic's total debt load
1 The carexceeded its assets by a ratio of almost three-to-one. 36
rier had no realistic possibility of recovery on its own, as its expenditures on debt maintenance alone consumed 67% of its
annual revenue by 1993, while its passenger loads had fallen
continuously since 1988.1137 Even factoring out the cost of
maintaining its debts, Olympic was suffering losses as high as
16.7% annually on its operations account. 138 The Commission
itself stated, "This financial structure is the worst of all comparable Community airlines."1139 The only way Olympic was still able
to operate was because 4the
Greek government would guarantee
0
unlimited borrowing. 1

a.

The Commission Inquiry

The full scope of this situation first came to the Commission's
attention in July 1992 when the Greek government, in response
to an inquiry by the Commission, notified it of the loan guarantees it had extended to Olympic for the previous six years." 4 '
For reasons that are at best unclear, no further action on the
subject occurred for an entire year, at which time the Greek government sent a letter to the Commission requesting recognition
of a restructuring plan for Olympic which would involve further
state aid." 142 The request claimed that the aid should be permitted under Article 92(3) (b) of the Treaty of Rome, which permits state aid to remedy a "serious disturbance" in a nation's
economy. 1 43 The Commission felt that the plan, as submitted,
was too vague and sent two letters to the Greek government in
1 44
August 1993 asking for further clarification.
As the Greek government failed to respond to the letters by
March of the following year, the Commission published a notice
1135

Id. at 23.

I d.

136

1137

Id.

1138 Id.

1 3- Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. 1,1994 OJ. (L 273) 22, 23.
1140id. at 31.
1141 Id. at 24.
1143

Id.
Id.

144

Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. II, 1994 O.J. (L 273) 22, 25.

1142

20011

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

1133

in the Official Journal of the European Communities of its intent to investigate Greek state aid practices and the restructuring plan and it invited other parties to submit their
comments.1 45 Four Member States (Finland, Norway, Sweden
and the UK) and numerous other private parties responded to
the Commission's notice before the Greek government did." 46
The private parties almost universally condemned the restructuring plan, 147 while the Member States demanded that stringent conditions be placed on any aid." 48 Ultimately, these
comments, combined with a further two-month delay by the
Greek government in responding to the Commission's notice,
probably did little to predispose the Commission to be sympathetic to the restructuring plan when it was finally presented.
b. The State Aid Analysis
The Commission began its analysis of the restructuring plan
by noting that, under Article 92(1) of the Treaty of Rome, any
assistance given by a Member State or assistance given at the
behest of a Member State "which distorts or threatens to distort
competition" is incompatible with the common market to the
extent it affects trade between Member States and/or contracting parties."" However, as the Treaty of Rome does not
prejudice the rights of publicly owned undertakings, the Commission noted that it was obligated to assess any possible case of
state aid on its own merits, rather than having a per se rule
against such aid. 150 Instead, the Commission must apply the
logic of the Treaty of Rome and the MEIP in each instance, although "the conduct of a private investor ...

need not be the

conduct of an investor laying out capital... [for] a profit in the
relatively short term,"'1 15' but rather the conduct of an investor
"guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term."' 152
The restructuring plan contained four provisions that could
be state aid: (i) loan guarantees, (ii) debt relief, (iii) conversion
1145

Id.

1146

Id. at 26.

1147 Id. Only one party supported the restructuring plan, the bank Credit Ly-

onnais, which admitted in its comments it was concerned that its loans to
Olympic would not be repaid if the Commission refused the restructuring plan.
1148 Id. at 26. Norway and the UK took particularly strident positions on the
subject.
1149 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VI, 1994 O.J. (L 273) 22, 30.
1150 Id.
1151 Id.
1152 Id. at 31.
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of the debt to equity, and (iv) capital injections. The Commission stated that it considered all loan guarantees extended by a
Member State to be within the terms of Article 92(1) of the
Treaty of Rome and that it had to be notified of all such guarantees under Article 92(3).""5 The Greek government had failed
to notify the Commission in a timely manner of any of the loan
guarantees it had made previously; therefore, those guarantees
were provided illegally." 54 Future loan guarantees, because the
Greek government would guarantee them "indiscriminately,"
would be considered aid equal to the amount of the loan itself,
as they would be "disguised subsidies."'" 5 The Greek government's plan to assume 427 billion Drachmas worth of Olympic's
debt (over 90% of the carrier's total debt load), without
Olympic providing anything in return, would also be considered
an equal amount of aid.'""6 While under the MEIP, it could be

possible for a conversion of debt to equity to not be considered
state aid, the complete "absence of any prospect of a return, at
any point in time, on the capital invested" meant that in the case
of Olympic this too would constitute state aid." 5 7 Finally, the
capital injections as well would be labeled state aid under the
MEIP as well, once more because there was no reasonable possibility of Olympic becoming profitable.'
c.

Exemptions

Having established that all of the proposed assistance to
Olympic would fall under the rubric of state aid, the Commission next turned to the possible exemptions that would permit
state aid. The Commission quickly disposed of the Article 92(2)
exemptions, noting that the aid was not of a "social character,"
was not for the repair of damage caused by a natural disaster or
"exceptional occurrences," nor were the other exemptions in
that paragraph relevant."9
Next, the Commission turned to the three Article 92(3) exemptions, which were the ones the Greek government actually
1153
154
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raised in its proposal. The Commission explained that aid
under those exemptions must be compatible with the common
market as a whole, rather than merely the domestic economy of
the Member State." 6 Furthermore, the exemptions may only
be applied where the Commission determines "market forces
would not have sufficed to persuade the future aid recipient" to
act in the desired manner.1 61 Article 92(3) (a), which permits
aid for development purposes, did not apply as the Greek government was solely offering aid to Olympic, rather than to all
carriers serving an underdeveloped area.1'1 62 The Commission
also rejected the Greek government's request for an Article
92(3) (b) exemption because that provision allows aid to rectify
"a serious disturbance" in the Member State's economy, rather
than merely assisting one undertaking."" 3 Finally the Commission turned to Article 92(3)(c), which permits aid for the restructuring of an undertaking. There are three criteria that
must be met to exempt aid under the Article 92(3) (c) exemption. First, the aid must be part of a Commission-approved restructuring plan that will help the undertaking become
profitable within a reasonable period of time. 1 64 Second, the
delivery of aid must be transparent and verifiable." 65 Lastly, the
aid may not "shift the Member State's problems onto the rest of
'
the Community." 166
As Article 92(3) (c) was obviously the only possible basis for
granting an exemption, the Commission focused its attention
on whether the Greek government's restructuring plan met the
necessary criteria. To ascertain whether a restructuring plan
could restore an undertaking's profitability, the Commission
stated it must be determined that the aid component is sufficient to meet the undertaking's needs under the plan, and that
the assumptions of the plan are reasonable.' 16 1 In the case of
Olympic, the debt relief and debt conversion, combined with
the capital injections, would, within three years, reduce the carl 6
rier's debt load to less than a third of what it was in 1994. " 8
1160
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Theoretically this would produce a sharp enough decline in
Olympic's finance costs to allow the carrier to break out of the
debt spiral in which it had found itself." 69 Furthermore, the
traffic projections used in the plan were more conservative than
the projections of AEA and IATA for the same period," 70
1 so the
Commission did not consider them to be unreasonably optimistic.I 17 ' Olympic also had already initiated measures that would
significantly lower its operating costs over the following years,' 172
and, combined with the debt restructuring, would "create an operation of lasting viability within three years without receiving
further aid." '17
The Commission quickly determined that the restructuring
plan and aid met the requirement of transparency and verifiability. Since that May, the Greek government had supplied
all requested information and offered to provide follow-up reports on the progress of the restructuring.' 17' Additionally, the
Greek government agreed to permit the Commission to appoint
an independent investigator to verify compliance with the terms
of the restructuring plan." 7 5 Finally, the Commission concluded that the restructuring plan would not shift the burdens
of the Greek government and Olympic to the rest of the Community. The plan would not lead to an "over-capitalization" of
the carrier that would "give it privileged access to the capital
market," nor would the plan increase Olympic's overall capacity,
and Olympic guaranteed
that it would not acquire any holdings
1 76
in other carriers.'

Conditions Imposed on the Restructuring Plan

d.

Having established to its satisfaction that the criteria for granting an Article 92(3) (c) exemption existed, the Commission approved the Greek government's restructuring plan and all of the
aid components within it. 1 17 7 However, approval was not without its costs, for the Commission attached twenty-one distinct
conditions for granting its acceptance to the restructuring
1169 Commission Decision 94/696/EC, Sect. VII, 1994 O.J. (L 273) 22, 33.
1170 Id. at 27.
1171
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plan. 1 78 Many of the conditions were relatively specific to the
terms of the plan (such as the need to submit progress reports), 179 but several major concessions were also among them.
The Commission demanded that the Greek government repeal
by December 31, 1994 the law that permitted it to guarantee
unlimited quantities of borrowing to Olympic. I"' Olympic's legal status had to be made equivalent to any other Greek undertaking, except for specific tax exemptions related to the
restructuring plan. 181 Most importantly, Greek aviation law was
to be brought into compliance with the terms of the Third Pack12
age by December 31, 1994, as well.'
This last condition, combined with many of the Commission's
own comments and displays of logic in its decision, betrays its
real interests in the application of the state aid sections of the
Treaty of Rome. For example, there is a peculiar discrepancy in
the Commission's analysis of the proposed aid for Olympic. The
Commission observed that there was "no doubt ...

about the

absence of any prospect of a return, at any point in time, on the
capital invested," and therefore under the MEIP no private investor would choose to provide Olympic with funding."8 3 However, the Commission later stated that under the restructuring
plan Olympic would achieve "lasting viability within three years
without receiving any further aid."'1 84 Given that the Commission explicitly stated that the MEIP is not predicated on purely
short-term profitability, but extends to the long-term as well,' , "
it seems peculiar that the restructuring program would not have
qualified under it. The most plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that the Commission wished to be able to sculpt
Greek transportation policy. But if the restructuring plan fulfilled the MEIP, then the Greek government would have been
able implement it without the Commission's oversight.
This theory of the Commission's motivation in treating the
restructuring plan as state aid, yet still approving it, is further
supported by many of the Commission's statements during its
1178
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discussion of the criteria for granting an Article 92(3) (c) exemption. The Commission observed that the Greek government's offer to implement the provisions of the Third Package
(particularly 2408/92) showed the government's "desire to
place [Olympic] in a truly competitive environment."' 18 While
this may have been commendable, none of the criteria the Commission had articulated required such an action. 187 The same
was true of the Greek government's proposal to repeal its loan
'
guarantee law and to liberalize ground handling." 88
Finally,
while the Commission's statement that all such aid must be evaluated on an individual basis'" 8" appears to be the height of fairness, it also effectively permits the Commission to invent new
terms and criteria for permitting aid.' I" This all seems to support the theory that the Commission considers the state aid provisions to be a tool for promoting liberalization, rather than as
an end in themselves, a theory born out by later state aid
cases." 9 ' Indeed, in 1998, nine air carriers brought a suit in the
European Court of Justice against the Commission for failing
properly to apply the state aid provisions in assessing a proposed
capital increase for Air France.' 192 The Court concluded that
the Commission used "insufficient reasoning" in permitting
some actions on Air France's behalf and therefore annulled the
Commission's decision. "'" Whether the Court's ruling will lead
the Commission to a more strict interpretation and application
of the state aid provisions is yet to be clear.'"'
1 -8 Id. at

34.
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11 It should be noted that in its decision the Commission made only one
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REGULATION OF NON-ECONOMIC ISSUES

As the Commission and Council have progressively eliminated
the major obstacles to air transport in the EU, they have increasingly turned their attention to other related areas, ranging from
the congested state of airports in the Union to the compensation of passengers who are refused seats on overbooked flights.
Most of these reforms are targeted at improving the condition
of air passengers.
1.

Air Traffic Congestion
Historically, air traffic control has been the strict province of
national governments.11 ' 5 However, given the congested nature
of European airspace, it became apparent by the late 1950s that
some sort of transnational air traffic system had to be arranged.
This consensus led to the formation of EUROCONTROL in
1961, which, while independent of the EU, includes all of the
Member States and membership in it is mandatory for admission to the EU.' 196 The purpose of EUROCONTROL was to organize cooperation between its members' respective air traffic
control systems.' 17
While EUROCONTROL was initially hailed as a triumph of
international cooperation, by the 1990s its performance was less
than satisfactory. One-third of all flights experienced delays,
with an average delay of 20 minutes, and delays of several hours
being not uncommon during peak traffic periods." 9 Half of
these delays were directly attributable to air traffic congestion,
causing an estimated loss of five billion euros annually. 1 9
This less than satisfactory situation prompted the Council, in
June 1999, to request that the Commission investigate the condition of air traffic congestion in the Union and present a communication on what steps were being taken to improve the
situation. 200 The Commission reported back six months later,
stating that although EUROCONTROL had formulated a 15year plan for reducing congestion, "it is doubtful whether this
initiative ... is the right response if major structural reforms are
1195
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, EUR. PARL. Doc. COM(99) (614 final 2), Introduction (4) [hereinaf-

ter
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1196 d.
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not made both at national and at European levels."''
The
Commission hastened to point out that the recommendations it
made were not intended to undermine EUROCONTROL, but
should be viewed as part of "the will of the Commission to highlight the complementarity of the Community's political2 goals
120
and the specific responsibilities of EUROCONTROL."'

The Commission brought forward several proposals for improving air traffic flow. It suggested that in the short-term
EUROCONTROL should devise contingency plans to deal with
"crises due to unforeseen events," such as strikes or severe
weather, and make provisions for rerouting traffic around the
affected area." 1 For the long term, the Commission advocated
the adoption of a "Single Sky policy," which would dissociate air
traffic control from national governments and vest more authority in a European-wide system. 120 4 Under the aegis of the Single

Sky policy, traffic corridors and sectors would be established
without regard to national boundaries, while civil and military
traffic zones would be reorganized as well. 120 5 New regulations

standardizing air traffic control systems and procedures in Member States would also be used to further promote uniformity
120 6
among the EUROCONTROL members.

Since the Commission's report there has been little advancement in the development of a true Single Sky.1207 However,

Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio appears determined
to make the subject the focus of her term in office, calling the
present air traffic situation "catastrophic."' 120

De Palacio has

gone so far as to personally meet with striking air traffic controllers to assure them that the Single Sky policy would not cost
them their jobs. ""

Yet Europe's air traffic control unions re-

main tropismatically suspicious that the Single Sky policy is a
covert attempt to privatize air traffic control, despite de Palacio's repeated assurances that it is not. 1 2 1°1 If de Palacio is able to
1201

Id.

02 Id. at

1I(1).

1204

Id. at 1(8).
Id. at 11(12) - (13).

1205

COMMUNICATION FROM COMMISSION, supra note 1195, at

1203

11(13).
11(16).
Ministers Welcome Single Sky Initiative,ATC MKT. REP. 1, at 1 (Feb. 3, 2000).
Simon Warburton, De Palacio Offers to Meet French Controllers, AIR TRANSP.

12061Id. at
1207
1208

INTELLIGENCE,

Id.

JUly 12, 2000.

120(1

1210 De Palacio Slams 'Disinformation,Manipulation' by French ATC Strikers, AVIATION DAILY, Jun.

27, 2000, at 1.

20011

1141

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

overcome this opposition, the future looks bright for the Single
Sky, as the Member States almost unanimously support such a
change. 1211
2.

Noise Limitations

Unlike North America, where airports are normally constructed on the periphery of urban areas, European airports are
usually surrounded by dense population concentrations.1 2 1 2 It

comes as no surprise then that the EC/EU has been among the
world's leaders in efforts to restrict noise emissions from aviation. 12 13 However this leadership has often drawn criticism from
nations outside the Union, which view the noise limitations as
being used to restrict market access for non-Union carriers and
to protect European aircraft manufacturers. Yet the EC/EU has
soldiered on with its attempts to reduce noise pollution. The
Council's most recent action on the subject has proven to be its
most controversial yet, prompting a series of threats from the
United States, whose carriers, aircraft manufacturers, and aircraft reconditioning
firms stand to lose considerable sums of
12 1 4
money.
The regulation in question is Regulation 925/1999, which establishes significantly more stringent standards for noise emissions than the current ICAO convention demands.1

21 5

A full

understanding of the regulation would require an elaborate explanation of the technical aspects of ICAO noise emission standards.12 16 Suffice it to say that aircraft are divided into four
categories termed Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, after the relevant
chapters of Volume I, Part II of Annex 16 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, third edition. 1217 Chapters 3 and 4
set considerably higher standards for reducing aircraft noise
than Chapters 1 and 2.1218 Most Member States independently
1211 Simon Warburton, EC Ministers to Discuss Worsening ATC Delays, AIR TRANSP.
INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 4, 2000.
1212 Benedicte A. Claes,

Aircraft Noise Regulation in the European Union: The
Hushkit Problem, 65 J. AIR L. & CoM. 329, 341 (2000).
1213 Id. at 342.
1214 Id. at 346-47. It has been estimated that within a year of the regulation's
enactment US firms lost $2.1 billion in cancelled orders for hushkits, spare parts,
accelerated air fleet depreciation, etc.
1215 Council Regulation 925/1999, 1999 0.J. (L 115) 1.
1216 See Claes, supra note 1212, at 329 for a detailed discussion of how aircraft
noise is measured and classified under the ICAO's standards.
1217 Council Regulation 925/1999, pmbl. 5, 1999 0.J. (L 115) 1, 1.
1218 Claes, supra note 1212, at 339-40.
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banned Chapter 1 aircraft in 1988, 12 11 while the Council banned
Chapter 2 aircraft in 1990.122o However, nothing in these earlier

efforts at limiting aircraft noise prevented a carrier from reconditioning its aircraft or changing their operating profile and
then having them "recertificated" as meeting the standards of
Chapters 3 or 4.1221 As a result, many carriers took these less
expensive options rather than scraping their noncompliant
aircraft.
The EU was displeased by these less-than-absolute measures,
for while the reconditioned aircraft did meet the Chapter 3 standards, they were still not as quiet as newer aircraft specifically
manufactured to meet those standards. 12 22 Therefore, Regula-

tion 925/1999 was drafted with a particular eye towards closing
this loophole. The regulation sets a baseline for evaluating aircraft by defining a "civil subsonic jet aeroplane" as one with a
maximum take-off weight of 34,000 Kilograms or with 19 or
more passenger seats, and with an engine "bypass ratio" of more
than three-to-one.

1223

The bypass ratio is the volume of air

drawn into the engine compared to the volume of air actually
used in the fuel burning process. 1224 (This technical detail has
become the focus of the EU-U.S. dispute.) The regulation defines "recertificated civil subsonic jet aeroplane" as those meeting the size requirements laid out above, but which were initially
designed to meet Chapters 1 or 2 noise restrictions and have
subsequently been reconditioned or placed under operational
restrictions in order to comply with Chapter 3 limits.1

22 5

How-

ever, if an aircraft has been "re-engined" and its new engines
1219 Id. at 339. Chapter 1 includes such aircraft as the Boeing 707, the Hawker
Siddeley Trident, and the Arospatiale Caravelle.
122
Council Directive 89/629/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 363) 27. Chapter 2 includes
the Boeing 727, early models of the Boeing 737, and early models of the McDonnell Douglas DC-9.
122
Reconditioning is done in one of two ways. The aircraft's existing engines
may be modified through the use of a "hushkit," or, in a process called "re-engining" the engines may be entirely stripped and replaced with engines having a
higher rating. Changing an aircraft's operating profile means altering the way
the aircraft is operated, such as not loading it to full capacity, flying only to airports at particular elevations, flying only during certain times of day, etc.
1222 Council Regulation 925/1999, pmbl. (5), 1999 0.J. (L 115) 1, 1.
1223 Id. at 2. Please note that there is an error in the text of the regulation as
published, which states that the aircraft must have a bypass ratio of less than
three, however a full reading of the regulation and other relevant sources makes
clear that it must be greater than three.
1224 Claes, supra note 1212, at 331.
225 Council Regulation 925/1999, art. 2(2), 1999 0.
(L 115) 1, 2.

2001]

COMPETITION IN THE AIR

1143

meet the three-to-one bypass ratio it will not be considered as
being recertificated, but will instead be treated like an aircraft
that was initially designed to meet Chapter 3 standards. 26
The regulation barred Member States from registering recertificated aircraft after April 1, 1999, although recertificated aircraft registered as of that date would not be stripped of their
registration provided that they have remained continuously registered in a Member State. 1 227 Recertificated aircraft that are

registered in a Member State may not be operated within the
Union as of April 1, 2002, unless it has operated in the Union
prior to April 1, 1999.1228 Furthermore, as of April 1, 2002,
recertificated aircraft registered outside the EU would not be
permitted to fly to airports in the Union unless they had been
on the register of their home country as of April 1, 1999, and
had operated in the Union between April 1, 1995, and April 1,
1999.1229 There are certain exemptions, however, which Member States may grant, including for emergencies and other conditions of "an exceptional nature," as well as for aircraft that
operate exclusively outside of the Union's territory. 1231 The regulation also does3 not apply to the overseas possessions of the
Member States. 12 1

The dispute between the EU and the U.S. arises principally
from Regulation 925/1999's use of an aircraft's engine bypass
ratio to evaluate its noise emission status rather than directly imposing a standard of how much noise an aircraft can emit. The
EU has argued that the engine bypass ratio is a good measure of
how noisy an aircraft is and that it is less subjective than setting a
specific decibel level, as decibel levels can vary according to environmental conditions.

1232

The U.S. has countered by pointing

out that there are aircraft models with bypass ratios less than
that prescribed by the regulation which have lower noise emissions than aircraft that are capable of meeting the regulation's
standards. 1233 The issue of protectionism for European manu-

1227

Id.
Id. at 3.

1228

Id.

1226

Id. The date requirements in Article 3(3) appear to be designed to prevent carriers whose home territories are far from the Union from transferring
older short-range aircraft, which would not have been able to reach the Union
ordinarily, to carriers based on the Union's periphery.
1230 Council Regulation 925/1999, art. 4(1)-(2), 1999 O.J. (L 115) 1, 3.
1231 Id.
1232 Tom Gill, Europe Breaks Rank on Noise, AIRLINE Bus., Apr. 1999, at 32.
1233 Claes, supra note 1212, at 369.
1229
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facturers has also been raised by the U.S., as U.S.-based corporations are the sole suppliers of hushkits and many of the engine
models produced by American manufacturer
Pratt & Whitney
123 4
do not meet the bypass ratio requirement.

The EU agreed to delay implementation of Regulation 925/
1999 by one year to permit U.S. carriers an opportunity to eliminate more of their noncompliant aircraft through attrition or
advanced re-engining rather than scrapping them. 123 5 Yet this

will likely not forestall the U.S. government from taking some
form of retaliatory action, either unilaterally or multilaterally
through the ICAO and/or the WTO. The United States has
chosen to resist the Union over such a seemingly minor issue
because it is widely believed in the aviation community that Regulation 925/1999 represents a first step towards banning all
Chapter 3 aircraft, 123 6 which would encompass a majority of the

fleets of U.S. carriers. The EU has done nothing to assuage the
fears of U.S. carriers or manufacturers, but rather has been
pressing for revising the Convention on International Civil Avia12 37
tion to increase the stringency of noise limitation standards.
Thus, it appears likely that the subject of noise limitations will
remain a bone of contention between the EU and The U.S. for a
number of years to come.
3. Air CarrierLiability
Another area where the EU has recently shown dissatisfaction
with the global aviation community's standards is in the realm of
air carriers' liability for accidents. The Warsaw Convention of
1929 governs the policies concerning liability for accidents in
international air travel absent any countervailing national
laws. 23" The Warsaw Convention was to bring uniformity to air
carrier liability; but as its last fully ratified amendment was made
in 1961 a preponderance of national laws and regulations has
sprung up to replace it. '2 39 The EU recognized that it was desir-

able, both for passengers and carriers, to have consistent liability
1234

Gill, supra note 1232, at 32.

1235 Colin Baker, The Next Chapter, AIRLINE Bus., Mar. 2000, at 54.
1236 Id. at 55-56.
1237 Id.
1238 Council Regulation 2027/97, pmbl., 1997 OJ. (L 285) 1.
123, Id. In May 1999 the Warsaw Convention was finally amended to increase

the liability ceilings on carriers to levels more in line with current price levels,
however this amendment has not been ratified by all nations, so in many countries the 1961 liability ceilings still apply.
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policies throughout the union, and to that end the Council
adopted Regulation 2027/97 in October 1997.1240
Regulation 2027/97, which applies whenever a passenger is
killed or injured on board an aircraft while it is in flight, embarking, or disembarking, 124 is a peculiar mix of pro-plaintiff
and pro-defendant policies. Article 3 of the regulation provides
that the liability of a carrier is not subject to any limit defined by
law, convention, or contract. 242 Furthermore, up to a level of
100,000 SDRs (Special Drawing Rights, the "currency" of the International Monetary Fund which is used in IATA calculations),
a strict-liability regime applies. 243 In other words, a carrier cannot defend itself by showing that it has taken all necessary safety
precautions, nor can it claim that it was impossible to have done
anything to avoid the loss. However, despite the strict liability
regime, contributory negligence still applies, so if the injured or
deceased passenger caused, or contributed to, the damage,
the
1244
carrier may be partly or wholly exempted from liability.
The regulation also describes the assistance the carrier must
render in the event of an accident. Within fifteen days of identifying the dead or injured passenger, the carrier has to provide
such money "as may be required to meet immediate economic
needs," proportional to the damage suffered. 2 45 Yet in the
event of death, the advance payment cannot be less than 15,000
SDRs per passenger. 1 246 Any advance payments cannot be con-

sidered admissions of liability and they may be deducted from
any future settlement or judgment against the carrier. 1247 Ordinarily, the carrier cannot demand the return of advance payments, unless it is proved that the passenger contributed to the
1 248
damage or was otherwise not entitled to compensation.
Finally, it is stipulated what carriers must do to notify passengers of the terms of the regulation. Carriers licensed by the
Member States are required to include the provisions of the regulation in their conditions of carriage, 2411 and they must make
"adequate information" in "plain and intelligible language" on
1240

i.

1245

at 2.
Id.
Council Regulation 2027/97, art. 3(2), 1997 O.J. (L 285) 1, 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.

1246

Id.

1241 Id.
1242

1243
1244

1247 Id.
1248

Council Regulation 2027/97, art. 5(3), 1997 OJ. (L 285) 1, 3.

1249 Id.
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the regulation available to passengers at travel agencies, check1 25 0
in counters, company offices, and at other points of sale.
Carriers from outside the Union may choose to not apply the
provisions of the regulation, but they must "expressly and
clearly" notify passengers of that at the time of sale of the
ticket. 1251
Regulation 2027/97 has appeared to be relatively uncontentious. However, the Council provided as part of the regulation
that the Commission should prepare a report on the effectiveness of it. 1252 The Commission's report should be available by

the end of 2000.
4.

Civil Aviation Accident/Incident Investigations

Within the EC/EU, the procedures and mechanisms for investigating civil aviation accidents had long been governed by the
Chicago Convention, which gave exclusive control of the process to the Member State in which such an accident occurred
and, where different, the home state of the carrier that suffered
the accident.'2 5 : But with the passage of the Third Package, it
would be increasingly difficult to neatly identify which Member
States had an interest in such an investigation. Therefore, the
Council determined that it was necessary to provide guidance
on harmonizing investigation processes in the Member States.
To this end, in 1994 the Council issued Directive 94/56 with
the goal of "facilitating the expeditious holding of investigations
"..
,,1254 The terms of the directive apply to all investigations of
accidents or incidents within the territory of the Union, along
with accidents or "serious incidents" outside of the territory of
the Union if the aircraft concerned are registered in a Member
State or owned by an undertaking established in a Member
State, and the state where the event took place does not conduct
such an investigation. 1255 For the purpose of the directive, an

"accident" is defined as an event that occurs while passengers
are on board the aircraft and where the event results in the
death of, or serious injury to, a person, where the aircraft is seriously damaged, or where the aircraft "is missing or is completely
12501(.
1251 Id.

1252 Id.
12-53

Council Directive 94/56/EC, pmbl., 1994 OJ. (L 319) 14.
15.

1254Id. at
1255

Id.
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inaccessible."' 1216 An "incident" is an event, other than an accident, which affects or would affect the safety of the aircraft,
while a "serious incident" is an event that1257
involves circumstances
suggesting an accident nearly occurred.

Every accident and serious incident must be the subject of an
investigation, while lesser incidents may be investigated at the
discretion of concerned Member States.12

5a

The scope and na-

ture of the investigation is to be determined by the appropriate
investigating bodies, but the investigation is not to assign blame
or liability for the event. 12 59 A Member State may use whatever

procedures are appropriate within its legislative system for establishing or defining an investigating body.'2 " ' However, the investigating body must have free access to all relevant materials
and evidence related to the event, such as manufacturers' design information and the site of the incident. 12 6 ' The investigat-

ing body must also be "functionally independent" from other
national aviation authorities, particularly those charged with certification of airworthiness, air traffic control, aircraft maintenance, or any other duty which might conflict with the duties of
the investigating body. 126 2 The investigating body must have suf-

ficient resources to be able to conduct its duties normally. However, it may request assistance from other national agencies for
the supply of installations and equipment for certain aspects of
the investigation process. 126 3 This would include everything

from hangars to store crash debris to specialized lab facilities for
examination of flight data recorders. This assistance should be
supplied at no cost where possible.

264

A Member State may

choose instead to delegate its investigatory duties to another
265
Member State. 1

Any investigation into an accident must be the subject of an
accident report summarizing the investigating body's findings
and its safety recommendations if any.' 26 6 The report must be
Id.
Id. at 16. See the Annex to the Directive for a list of possible events which
would constitute a "serious incident."
1258 Council Directive 94/56/EC, art. 4(1), 1994 O.J. (L 319) 14, 16.
1256
1257

1259 Id.

1260 ld.
1261
1262
1263

Id. at 16-17.
Council Directive 94/56/EC, art. 6(3) - (4)(a), 1994 OJ. (L 319) 14, 17.

126.1 Id.
1265 Id.

1266Id.
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made public, preferably within 12 months of the accident. 1267
The conditions attached to an incident report are significantly
more stringent, presumably because the less severe nature of the
event militates against the release of superfluous information.
While an incident report must be generated, including safety
recommendations where appropriate, it should guard the anonymity of any persons involved in the incident. 1268 Furthermore, unlike the accident report, which is to be publicly
distributed, an incident report need only be provided to "the
parties likely to benefit" from its determinations. 1269 Any safety
recommendations included in either type of report must be pro1270
vided to all of the concerned parties and to the Commission.
Such recommendations shall not give rise to a presumption
of
1 271
blame or liability for the event being investigated.
Since it was adopted in November 1994, Directive 94/56 has
proven to be uncontroversial. Almost six years after its enactment, no Commission decisions have even cited it, let alone
turned on it, nor has it been cited in a ruling by the Court of
Justice. 1272
5. Denied-Boarding Compensation
As part of an effort to stem the "constant stream of complaints" about customer service received by the EU's governing
bodies and the Member States' air authorities, 12 73 the Council

took action in 1991 to address the particularly trying subject of
denied boardings. 1274 (A denied boarding is when a carrier refuses to permit a passenger on a flight despite the passenger
holding a valid ticket, having a confirmed reservation, and having presented himself for check-in within the required time.) 1275
Regulation 295/91 encompasses all instances of denied
boarding due to overbooking for scheduled flights within the
Union's territory, regardless of the nationality of the passenger
1267

Id.

1268 Council
1269
1270

Directive 94/56/EC, art. (8)(1), 1994 OJ. (L 319) 14, 17.

Id.
I.

1271 Id.

1272

As of August 16, 2000.

1273- Air Passenger Rights in the European Union: A Consultation Document on Con-

sumer Protectionin Air Transport,availableat http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/
dg07/pass-protcons/passprotcons.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2000).
1274 Council Regulation 295/91, 1991 OJ. (L 36) 5.
1275 Id. at 5.
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or carrier. 1276 Carriers must devise their own rules for how passengers will be loaded in the event of overbooking, which
should include a procedure for requesting volunteers to remain
behind 127 7 and also address the needs of passengers who should
have boarding priority, such as handicapped persons or unaccompanied children. 12 78 Carriers are required to make the
terms of their boarding policies available to the public and to
1279
notify the Commission and interested Member States as well.
Regardless of the carrier's boarding rules, if a passenger is denied boarding due to overbooking he or she must be given a
choice between a full refund of the unused portion of the ticket,
re-routing to their final destination at the earliest opportunity,
8
or re-routing at a later date at the passenger's convenience.12 0
The regulation also provides for compensation that the passenger must receive in the event of such a denied boarding in
addition to the refund or re-routing laid out above. If the final
destination was 3,500 Kilometers or less from the point where
boarding was denied, the carrier must pay the passenger 150
Euros, or 300 Euros if the final destination was more than 3,500
Kilometers from where boarding was denied. 1 28- ' The payment
must be made in cash, unless the passenger agrees to accept it in
some other form, such as a discount voucher, 1 28 2 although the
payment may be reduced by 50% if the carrier is able to re-route
the passenger in a manner that allows him or her to reach the
destination within a brief length of time after they were originally scheduled to arrive. 128 3 Furthermore, the payment "need
not" exceed the original cost of the ticket. 1 28 4 If the passenger
agrees to accept a seat in a class lower than that paid for, the
carrier must reimburse the difference in price between the two
seats. 1285
Regardless of what form or amount of compensation a passenger receives under these provisions, the carrier must also provide, free of charge, a telephone call or fax to the passenger's
final destination, meals and refreshments "in a reasonable rela1276

Id.

1277

Id. at 6.

1278

Id.

1279

Council Regulation 295/91, art. 3(1), (2), 1991 OJ. (L 36) 5, 6.

1280
1281

Id.
Id.

1282

Id.

1283

Id.

1284

Council Regulation 295/91, art. 4(4), 1991 OJ. (L 36) 5, 6.

1285 [d.
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tion" to the wait time, and hotel accommodations if the passenger will be delayed overnight. 2 6 In the case of a metropolitan
area served by multiple airports, if a passenger agrees to travel to
a different airport than he was originally destined for, the carrier must pay for the cost of travel between the respective airports or to another nearby location.1

28 7

If the passenger

obtained his or her ticket through a package tour, the tour operator is to be the point of contact for matters relating to the
denied boarding. 12 8 Carriers must provide a passenger who has

been denied boarding a document enumerating all their rights
under Regulation 295/91.289 Interestingly, the regulation specifically states that it is without prejudice to any subsequent determination by courts that further compensation is
appropriate. 121),
The Union practices governing denied-boarding compensation have remained unchanged since the implementation of
Regulation 295/91. However, there was some movement, beginning in late 1999, to amend and expand the terms of the regulation. The proposals before the Commission were to increase
the level of compensation and possibly extend compensation to
those passengers whose flights are delayed longer than is
deemed acceptable.' 21' By mid-2000 though, they had still not
been enacted.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Since the genesis of international aviation, all nations have
jealously guarded their sovereignty over aviation, allowing airlines owned by foreign nationals to enter their own markets only
on a reciprocal basis, carefully negotiated in a series of bilateral
air transport agreements. But truly open markets require that
traditional notions of air sovereignty, and the complex matrix of
bilateral air transport agreements which codify the concept,
must be superseded by a regime that treats all of the EU as a
domestic cabotage market.
1286

Id.

1287
21

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6.

289

Council Regulation 295/91, art. 8, 1991 O.J. (L 36) 5, 7.

1290

Id.

129
1 Air Passenger Rights in the European Union: A ConsultationDocument on Con-

sumer Protection in Air Transport, availableat http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comrnm/
dg07/pass-prot-cons/passprotcons.pdf (last visited Aug. 10, 2000).
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Another traditional concept that already appears to be crumbling is the notion of "effective ownership and control" of a flagcarrier by citizens of its nation. For example, where the IrelandPortugal bilateral air transport agreement allowed a carrier flying the flag of each nation to serve the Dublin-Lisbon market, it
was required that each nation's carrier be effectively owned and
controlled by citizens of the nation whose flag the airline flew.
Thus, more than 50% of Aer Lingus is owned by Irish nationals,
and more than 50% of TAP, the national airline of Portugal, is
owned by Portuguese. "Effective ownership and control" is a
concept that has long dominated the air transport relations of
most nations, although a few multinational carriers existed here
and there, the most notable among them being the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), a consortium of Scandinavian nations. Under the regulations proposed by the Commission in
1991, an airline registered in any Member State would have virtually unhindered freedom to transport passengers in any intraCommunity cabotage or Fifth Freedom market. Hence, entry
would largely be deregulated. Carriers like British Airways or
Swissair have already expressed interests in acquiring carriers
like KLM and Sabena. Hence, multinational European airlines
are likely eventually to be the norm, rather than the exception.
With their eyes on the U.S. "megacarriers" that have emerged
from American deregulation (where fewer than a half-dozen airlines control more than 80% of the U.S. domestic market),
privatization and merger discussions between carriers have become increasingly popular in Europe. The five largest EC airlines (i.e., British Airways, Air France, Lufthansa, KLM, and
Iberia) account for nearly 70% of scheduled European traffic. 1292 Jan Carlzon, former president of SAS, predicted that ulti-

mately only five airlines will survive liberalization. 1293 The global
impact of deregulation is predicted to result in a consolidation
of the industry into 15 to 20 multinational airlines, competing in
1 29 4
markets around the world.
If the U.S. experience is any indication of what will occur in a
liberalized regulatory environment in Europe, bankruptcies,
consolidations, and mergers will result in a highly concentrated
European Deregulation Expected to Lead to Airline Mergers, Av.

WK. & SPACE
Mar. 9, 1987, at 203. British Airways alone accounts for 22% of all EEC
revenue passenger miles, even without its acquisition of British Caledonian. Id.
1293 Carey, European Airlines DiscussJoining Forces, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1987, at
16, col. 3.
1294 Kasper, Toward Open Skies World-Wide WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 17.
1292

TECH.,
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group of multinational European megacarriers, all utilizing huband-spoke operations and linked to only a few sophisticated
computer reservations systems. 1211 In the short run, passengers
will enjoy lower ticket prices, as carriers become hotly competitive, because their profit margins will be severely squeezed by
new entrants. 129 6 Many smaller carriers and most new entrants

will fall into bankruptcy, unless they can align themselves as
feeders for the megacarriers. 1297 The charter airline industry
will shrink radically or disappear. And once the remaining airlines have achieved consolidation into a handful of megacar129
riers, ticket prices will likely rise.

The increasing number of liberal bilateral agreements is evidence that the European nations are creating a more free-market-oriented air transport system. Individual airlines are also
taking direct action against restraints to air transport. Nations
and airlines opposed to deregulation are being increasingly subjected to market forces to which they must respond or risk losing ground to the more flexible, less-regulated States and
increasingly privatized carriers. Industry organizations have tre1295 The emergence of European computer reservations systems (CRS) has already begun, with British Airways, KLM, and Swissair linking themselves in ajoint
venture with United Airlines, and its Covia reservations system. Rose, Allegis Aims
for More Profit, Passengers with European Reservations Venture, WALL ST.J., July 13,
1987, at 2, col. 2. Recently, Allegis announced its intention to sell 35% of its
Covia system to British Airways, Swissair, KLM and Alitalia. Allegis Discloses More on
50% Sale of Its Covia Unit, WALL ST.J., Feb. 19, 1988, at 36, col. 2. Meanwhile, Air
France, Lufthansa, Iberia and SAS have teamed with Texas Air's System One CRS
to form the Amadeus computer reservations system.
129, Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Experience of Deregulation:Erosion of the Common
CarrierSystem, 13 TRANSP. L. INST. 121, 172-75 (1980).
1297 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in Transportation:Concentration is the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505 (1987); Paul Stephen Dempsey,
Birth of the Monster Airlines, TRAFFIC WORLD, Dec. 1, 1986, at 77; Rose, Major U.S.
Airlines Rapidly Gain Control Over Flying Low, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Aug. 9, 1987, at
73; Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Carnageof Airline Deregulation,HOUS. CHRON.,July
30, 1987, at 27; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Consolidation, a Destructive Trend, DENV.
POST, Dec. 6, 1986, at 4B, col. 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Deregulation's Toll Is
Rising,DENXV. POST, Sept. 4, 1986, at 5B, col. 4; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Deregulated
Skies Unfriendly to Small Airlines, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 25, 1986, at 77, col. 1;
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline Deregulation's Hostile Skies, DENyV. POST, Oct. 17,
1983, at 3B, col. 1; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Affordability, Safety of Airlines May Suffer,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1983, at 7, col. 1; Rowen, Airline Deregulation: A Bankrupt
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mendous influence in the European air transport industry.
ECAC has made significant strides toward liberalization with its
recent Memoranda of Understanding on tariffs and capacity.
Although the interests and objectives of each organization are
different, there is growing support for modest liberalization
from these bodies, as well.
The European Community was established to promote a free
market among Member States. Actions by the EC/EU were
delayed by political considerations and by the reluctance of a
few nations that own or subsidize their national airlines. 1299
While unable to accomplish immediate deregulation, the EC/
EU helped generate public support that pressured governments
towards more bilateral agreements to ease regulation. Through
its governing bodies, the EC/EU contributed to the creation of
a governmental climate favoring partial liberalization. Much
progress has been achieved toward that objective with the Council's promulgation of its long-awaited regulations, group exemptions, directive and decision.
Although it is far from clear what the final result of these
forces favoring liberalization of air transport regulations will be,
it is obvious that significant liberalization in the regulatory environment of European air transport is occurring and that this
trend will likely continue. Whether it will ultimately mirror U.S.style deregulation or some more modest form of regulatory liberalization, as many EC officials insist it should, is as yet unclear.
1299

LIBERALIZATION POLICIES,

supra note 183, at 28.
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